Brackett v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 03 March 1916
• Citation: 111 N.E. 1036,223 Mass. 119
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: BRACKETT v. COMMONWEALTH (two cases). BUTCHERS' SLAUGHTERING & MELTING CO. v. SAME (two cases).

223 Mass. 119

111 N.E. 1036

BRACKETT

v.COMMONWEALTH (two cases).

BUTCHERS' SLAUGHTERING & MELTING CO.

v.SAME (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 3, 1916.

Reports from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Reports from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge.

Petitions in the Supreme Judicial Court by Arthur L. Brackett and by the Butchers' Slaughtering & Melting Association against the Commonwealth, for assessment of damages sustained by the building of a bridge. Exceptions by both petitioners and the Commonwealth to report of commissioners and requests for rulings and motions for recommitment of report, etc., were overruled by the single justice, and the cases reported. Petitions in the superior court by the same petitioners against the same defendants, seeking collection of the amounts awarded. The Commonwealth's demurrers and answers in abatement were overruled, and the cases reported. Petitioners in the superior court dismissed, and rulings of single justice of Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Powers & Hall, of Boston, for petitioners.

Roger Sherman Hoar, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Judd Dewey, of Boston, for the Commonwealth.

RUGG, C. J.

The first two of these cases are petitions brought for the assessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the petitioners as lessee and owner respectively of property abutting on the Charles river above the Stadium or Anderson bridge, caused by the construction of that bridge, built in accordance with St. 1911, c. 439. Upon these petitions commissioners were appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk county, to hear the parties and to assess their damages, whose award was returned into that court. The commonwealth filed numerous exceptions to the report and moved to recommit the report for the same reasons in substance set forth in its exceptions. The petitioners asked for a ruling that the court had no jurisdiction to receive or to act respecting the report, and that it be stricken from the files and returned to the commissioners. The single justice denied these requests for rulings, overruled the exceptions, refused to recommit the report, ordered it confirmed, and then reported all questions of law involved for the determination of this court. The last two cases are petitions brought by the same petitioners in the superior court against the commonwealth under R. L. c. 201, seeking collection of the amounts awarded by the commissioners. The commonwealth demurred and answered in abatement. A judge of the superior court overruled the demurrers and answers in abatement and then reported the cases.

1. The first essential step open to a person damnified in his estate by the construction of the bridge was to file a petition in the Supreme Judicial Court. That of itself is implication that that court acquired and retained jurisdiction of the cause of action described in the petition. The next step in the procedure was the appointment by that court of three commissioners. The entire authority of the commissioners came from that appointment. They were thereby empowered and directed to perform the duties set out in the order of appointment, and to execute the functions described in the statute. In the absence of express provision to the contrary, they were officers of the court. By imperative inference, they were required to make report of their doings to the court by which they were appointed. They stand on the same footing in this regard as auditors, masters and referees. As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Gray, with affluent citation of authorities, in Wyman v. Eastern Railroad, 128 Mass. 346, 347:

‘It is settled, by repeated decisions, that commissioners appointed by this court and deriving all their powers from their judicial appointment must, by necessary implication, without any express statute direction, return their award to the court which appoints them, to be there examined, and, if no sufficient cause to the contrary is shown, confirmed and recorded.’ Kingman, Petitioner, 153 Mass. 566, 579, 27 N. E. 778,12 L. R. A. 417.

The consent of the United States was necessary for the construction of the bridge. That consent was given by act of Congress approved February 27, 1911 (36 Stat. 933, c. 165). It there was enacted that, before the construction of the bridge should begin, the state of Massachusetts should, by legislative enactment, provide for adequate compensation for persons suffering injury like in kind to that claimed by the petitioners, and

‘Provided further, that said legislative enactment shall provide for the appointment of three commissioners to hear the parties in interest and assess the damages to said property; their decision as to the amount of damages and questions of fact to be final; said commissioners to be appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.’

The material parts of the language from the act of Congress were embodied in St. 1911, c. 439, § 2.

This act of Congress does not constitute the commissioners federal officers. They do not derive their authority in any degree from the United States. The Congress having the power to withhold consent for the construction of the bridge, or to grant consent upon whatever terms seemed wise, imposed as conditions to the granting of its consent, that provision should be made for awarding damages to persons suffering damage like that claimed by the petitioners, and that such damages should be ascertained by commissioners appointed by the highest court of the commonwealth. These conditions could only be performed by the General Court of Massachusetts acting within the scope of its legislative powers, and providing for the exercise of judicial functions by a state tribunal. Doubtless the injuries sustained by the petitioners were of a kind for which at common law no action would lie and no constitutional right would have been infringed if no provision for compensation to them had been made. Blackwell v. Old Colony Railroad, 122 Mass. 1;Dwyer v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 209 Mass. 419, 95 N. E. 850. But the commonwealth was not thereby precluded from awarding them damages. Statutory compensation is not imperatively confined to the boundaries of strict rights secured by the paramount law. Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 583, 63 N. E. 10,57 L. R. A. 292, 91 Am. St. Rep. 326.

Manifestly, compliance with the conditions imposed by the act of Congress did not establish a federal but a state commission, deriving its authority from the state court by which it was appointed and to which it must report. The act of Congress does not purport to provide active affirmative action on the part of the United States. It simply allows the state to provide a comprehensive scheme of legislation for the construction of the bridge, including compensation for injury to property, which so far as it affects that part of the field over which Congress has power, must comply with certain conditions. But it is a state scheme throughout when made vital by act of the General Court of Massachusetts. The commissioners, when appointed under this special statute, were officers of the court by which they were appointed.

2. It would be most unusual, if not unprecedented in our legislative history, to clothe a court with the duty to appoint commissioners to determine damages, and deprive it of power to enforce its award. St. 1911, c. 439, § 3, makes ample provision for meeting the expenditures incurred under the act out of the resources of the commonwealth. There is a necessary implication that the Supreme Judicial Court has the power and is charged with the duty of taking whatsoever steps may be appropriate to see that the report of the commissioners is enforced, provided it is according to the law and ought to be enforced.

3. It follows from what has been said that the superior court has no jurisdiction over the petitions filed in that court. Since St. 1911, c. 439, is sufficient and complete in itself as to remedy for damages, that affords the means provided by the commonwealth for the enforcement of rights against itself. It cannot be impleaded in any other manner or in any other court. McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 83 N. E. 334, and cases there collected.

4. The court has power to examine the report of the commissioners and review it as to any errors of law apparent on its face. This power is ordinarily a part of judicial duty. In the absence of express statute or law to the contrary it inheres in a court appointing its officers to make investigations. It is provided in section 2 of the instant statute that:

‘The decision of said commissioners as to the amount of said damages and as to questions of fact involved shall be final.’

The fair implication from these words is that in other respects their decision is not final, but is subject to usual court procedure, and that questions of law raised in the report may be reviewed. The statute did not constitute the commission a board of referees or arbitrators, to whom all issues between the parties, both of law and fact, were to be submitted irrevocably. It is quite distinguishable from that before the court in Selectmen of Danvers v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 502, 506, 69 N. E. 320. Since neither the statute, the rule of court, nor agreement of parties made the commissioners referees or arbitrators, the well-settled principle that the award of arbitrators or referees will not be set aside for alleged errors of law, is not applicable. Fairchild v. Adams, 11 Cush. 549;Electric Supply & Maintenance Co. v. Conway Electric Light & Power Co., 186 Mass. 449, 71 N. E. 983;Darrow v. Braman, 201 Mass. 469, 88 N. E. 5.

Moreover, it is apparent from the report that the commissioners intended to proceed and to decide according to law. It has been said that, under such circumstances, even an award of arbitrators or referees may be reviewed to correct errors of law. Spoor v. Tyzzer, ...