Bradberry v. Astrue, Case No. 3:10-cv-05272-KLS
| Decision Date | 17 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-05272-KLS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | JESSIE BRADBERRY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff has brought this matter for judicial review of defendant's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the parties' briefs and the remaining record, the Court hereby finds that for the reasons set forth below, defendant's decision to deny benefits should be affirmed.
On August 15, 2005, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability as of March 20, 2002, due to hip and back problems. See Tr. 9. 78, 83, 109. His application was denied upon initial review and on reconsideration. See Tr. 9, 42, 47, 50. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on September 9, 2008, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. See Tr. 19-39.
On September 23, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision in which plaintiff was determined to be not disabled. See Tr. 9-18. Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision was denied by the Appeals Council on March 4, 2010, making the ALJ's decision defendant's final decision. See Tr. 1; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. On April 21, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision. See ECF #1. The administrative record was filed with the Court on June 14, 2010. See ECF #8. The parties have completed their briefing, and thus this matter is now ripe for the Court's review.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded to defendant for an award of benefits or, in the alternative, for further administrative proceedings before a different ALJ, because the above ALJ erred: (1) in finding plaintiff's obesity and mental health conditions were not "severe" impairments; (2) in finding none of his impairments met or medically equaled any of those contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 1.02 and § 1.04 ("Listing 1.02" and "Listing 1.04"); (3) in assessing his residual functional capacity; and (4) in finding him to be capable of returning to his past relevant work. For the reasons set forth below, though, the Court does not agree that the ALJ erred in determining plaintiff to be not disabled, and therefore hereby finds that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed.
This Court must uphold defendant's determination that plaintiff is not disabled if the proper legal standards were applied and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the determination. See Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975); Carr v. Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 522, 524-25 (E.D. Wash. 1991). If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold defendant's decision. See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).
To be entitled to disability insurance benefits, plaintiff "must establish that his disability existed on or before" the date his insured status expired. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995) (). Plaintiffs date last insured was September 30, 2004. Tr. 11, 40. As such, to be entitled to disability insurance benefits, plaintiff must establish he was disabled prior to or as of that date. See Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601. But, as explained below, plaintiff has not done so here.
At step two of the sequential disability evaluation process, 1 the ALJ must determine if an impairment is "severe." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. An impairment is "not severe" if it does not "significantly limit" a claimant's mental or physical abilities to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (c); see also Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181 *1. Basic work activities are those "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 *3.
An impairment is not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has "no more than a minimal effect on an individual[']s ability to work." See SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 *3; see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir.1988). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that his "impairments or their symptoms affect [his] ability to perform basic work activities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998). The step two inquiry described above, however, is a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290.
In this case, the ALJ found plaintiff had "severe" impairments consisting of moderate degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and coxa vara deformity of the left hip. See Tr. 11. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in not also finding his obesity and mental health conditions to be "severe" impairments as well. With respect to plaintiff's obesity, the ALJ found in relevant part as follows:
I also do not find that obesity is a severe condition during the relevant period. While the claimant was clearly obese at the time of the hearing, as he was five foot seven inches tall and weighed 280 pounds, there is no indication that the claimant was that heavy prior to September 2004. In fact, the claimant reported in February 2008 that he had gained more than 80 pounds over the previous six months, well outside of the relevant period. Ex. 9F. 4.
Tr. 14. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that while the ALJ found the record did not establish that he was obese prior to or as of his date last insured, he himself testified at the hearing that his obesity did exist during the relevant time period, and that it "directly related to his disabling limitations." ECF #11, p. 6. Defendant concedes the ALJ did not properly evaluate the evidence in the record regarding plaintiffs obesity prior to his date last insured (see ECF #15, p. 8), which does appear to indicate that condition existed during that period (see Tr. 277).
Defendant argues such error was harmless, however, because the credible evidence in therecord fails to indicate the existence of functional limitations greater than those the ALJ assessed discussed below. The Court agrees. None of the objective medical evidence in the record shows any work-related limitations stemmed from plaintiff's obesity. At most, the record reveals only a diagnosis of obesity. See id.; Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (). In addition, while the ALJ must take into account a claimant's pain and other symptoms at step two (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529), the severity determination is to be made solely on the basis of the objective medical evidence in the record:
A determination that an impairment(s) is not severe requires a careful evaluation of the medical findings which describe the impairment(s) and an informed judgment about its (their) limiting effects on the individual's physical and mental ability(ies) to perform basic work activities; thus, an assessment of function is inherent in the medical evaluation process itself. At the second step of sequential evaluation, then, medical evidence alone is evaluated in order to assess the effects of the impairment(s) on ability to do basic work activities. If this assessment shows the individual to have the physical and mental ability(ies) necessary to perform such activities, no evaluation of past work (or of age, education, work experience) is needed. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the minimal impact of the impairment(s), that the individual is capable of engaging in [substantial gainful activity].
SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 *4 (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiff's testimony notwithstanding, to support a finding of "severity" in regard to obesity, there must be objective medical evidence of actual work-related limitations stemming therefrom, which, as discussed above, is absent from the record. Accordingly, no error was committed by the ALJ here.
In regard to plaintiff's alleged mental conditions, the ALJ also found in relevant part that:
The claimant's substance abuse history does not enhance his credibility, and would tend to lend credence to the notion that reasons other than his physical capacity affected his maintaining work. However, there is insufficient predicate to establish substance abuse as a disabling impairment, and if [the] claimant was disabled on this basis he would not qualify for disabilitybenefits.2
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I find that the above listed impairments are both medically determinable and cause significant limitations to the performance of basic work activities. I also note substance abuse disorder, particularly cocaine and alcohol addiction; however, based upon the record, conclude that these conditions caused no more than mild limitations regarding the performance of activities of...
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