Bradberry v. State

• Citation: 154 S.E. 344,170 Ga. 859
• Decision Date: 21 July 1930
• Docket Number: 7775.
• Parties: BRADBERRY v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

154 S.E. 344

170 Ga. 859

BRADBERRY v. STATE.

No. 7775.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 21, 1930

Syllabus by the Court.

Conviction for murder held authorized by evidence.

The evidence authorized the verdict.

Generally evidence of crime differing from crime charged is inadmissible; crime differing from crime charged, if committed as part of same transaction and forming part of res gestæ, is admissible; evidence of murder of deceased's wife to keep her from talking held admissible in prosecution for murder of deceased.

Generally on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence of another and distinct crime wholly independent from that for which one is on trial is inadmissible; but there are exceptions to this rule. One is, if the separate crime was committed as a part of the same transaction as that for which the accused is being tried, and forms a part of the res gestæ.

Evidence concerning condition of body of deceased's wife murdered at same time as decedent, for whose death defendant was prosecuted, held not erroneously admitted as irrelevant and prejudicing jury.

In the circumstances stated in the previous headnote, it was not error to admit evidence as to the condition of the body of Frances Elder (the wife of the deceased), for the alleged reason that it threw no light on the killing of Doc Elder for whose murder the accused was being tried, and that such evidence caused a violent prejudice in the minds of the jury against the accused, which prevented them from recommending a life sentence for the accused.

Confessions by accused, made freely and voluntarily after arrest by sheriff, who carried accused handcuffed to deceased's home, held properly admitted; confessions shown on preliminary examination to have been freely and voluntarily made held prima facie admissible; where confession is shown voluntarily made, defendant has burden of showing contrary.

On the trial of one charged with murder, it was not error to admit the testimony of the sheriff of the county, as to certain confessions made by the accused after the sheriff arrested and put him in the sheriff's car wherein were two other persons, and carried the accused handcuffed to the home of the deceased, where it appeared that the confessions were freely and voluntarily made. Where a preliminary examination of witnesses offered by the state shows that a confession was freely and voluntarily made without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury, such evidence is prima facie admissible for the jury's consideration. Where, in such case, the confession is shown to have been freely and voluntarily made, the burden is then on the defendant to show that the same was not so made.

Statement by solicitor general that he expected to connect defendant with killing of wife of decedent for whose murder defendant was charged held proper under evidence.

The court did not err in admitting the evidence set out in grounds 6 and 7 of the motion for new trial, with reference to the killing of the wife of deceased.

Discretion of trial judge in passing on alleged bias of juror from conflicting evidence will not be interfered with unless abused; trial judge held not to have abused discretion in finding juror was not biased because of alleged prejudicial statement.

"The discretion of a trial judge, who passes upon the alleged prejudice and bias of a juror from conflicting evidence on a motion for new trial, will not be interfered with unless it is manifestly abused." The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in the present case.

Failure to charge distinction between confessions and inculpatory statements held not error under the evidence, where court fully instructed on confessions.

Under the evidence in this case, where the court had fully and correctly instructed the jury on the law of confessions, it was not error to fail to charge the distinction between confessions and inculpatory statements. The evidence did not require a charge on the latter subject.

Failure to charge that killing of wife of decedent, for whose murder defendant was charged, by some one other than defendant was not part of corpus delicti, held proper.

Where the court had correctly instructed the jury on the law of confessions and corpus delicti, it was not error to fail to charge further and explain to the jury that "the killing of Frances Elder by some one other than the defendant could not be more than a circumstance, and not a part of the corpus delicti." The evidence did not require such a charge.

Instruction that drunkenness of defendant may be considered in determining state of defendant's mind at time of killing held properly refused (Pen. Code 1910, § 39).

Under the facts of this case, it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury that "drunkenness of the defendant may be looked to by the jury to throw light upon the state of the defendant's mind at the time of the killing, upon the question of malice."

The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.

Error from Superior Court, Oconee County; Blanton Fortson, Judge.

Weyman Bradberry was convicted for murder, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Carlisle Cobb and F. A. Gillen, both of Athens, and R. M. Nicholson of Watkinsville, for plaintiff in error.

Henry H. West, Sol. Gen., of Athens, Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., and T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HILL J.

The grand jury of Oconee county returned a bill of indictment against Raymond Cooper, Weyman Bradberry, and Harvey Bradberry, jointly charging them with the murder of Doc Elder. Weyman Bradberry was put on trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty, without recommendation, and the court sentenced the defendant to be put to death by electrocution. The defendant made a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

1. The verdict was authorized by the evidence. The evidence for the state tended to show that the three young white men, indicted here, including the plaintiff in error, met and conspired to put to death the deceased, Doc Elder, an old negro, for the purpose of obtaining the money that he carried. They went to the home of Elder about midnight on November 10, 1929, and called him on the pretense that their automobile was broken down and they wanted him to assist them in repairing it. He took his lantern and went with the three men down the road toward where the automobile was said to be. Elder and Raymond Cooper were in front, and Harvey and Weyman Bradberry were in the rear. When they had reached a point several hundred yards from the house, near a bridge, on a signal given by one of the defendants, who said, "Hardknot, aint you going to do it?" Harvey Bradberry hit Elder in the head with a chop-ax, and Weyman Bradberry jumped on him and cut his throat. Then they searched him, got two pocketbooks from his person, and went back to the house. Thinking that the wife of the deceased, Frances Elder, knew who they were, they decided to "shut her mouth." Cooper stood in the door, and Harvey went into the house and killed the woman, and then came out and got in the car, and they left. Weyman Bradberry was sitting in the car at that time. The sheriff and his deputies found, hidden in or near the yard of the defendant's father, the pocketbooks taken from the body of the deceased, containing $190, and more money was found behind the cotton house. The state introduced A. Y. Crowley the sheriff of Oconee county, who testified in part as follows: "I had occasion to talk to this defendant, Weyman Bradberry, about this crime. He made statements to me about it, freely and voluntarily, although no hope of reward was offered by me or any one else. I arrested Weyman Bradberry out at Mr. Cooper's, just beyond my house, and picked him up. He was sitting there in the car with his father. Mr. Carl Parson and Mr. Saye were with me when I arrested him, and we carried him down to Doc Elder's home, and drove up in front of the house, and I asked him if he would tell me where the hatchet was they killed Doc Elder with, and he said he didn't know anything about it. I left him sitting in the car with Mr. Parson, and I got out and looked for it, and Mr. Parson and Weyman talked a little while, and I came back to the car. It was raining. When I got back to the car Weyman says if you will take the handcuffs off of me I will find the hatchet for you. I told him I thought we had enough evidence, and I didn't take the handcuffs off of him, and that if he wouldn't show me it was all right with me. At that time he stepped out of the car. I was looking for it on one side of the house, and it was on the other. He pointed it out to us, and Mr. Saye picked up the hatchet out in an open place, and he says, 'Yonder it is out yonder,' and Mr. Saye picked it up and brought it back, and Weyman says 'Let me put my hand on that,' and he took it in his hand and says, 'I want to say this is the first time I ever had my hands on this hatchet.' He identified the hatchet. He said it was the hatchet they knocked him in the head with. He said Harvey knocked him in the head, and he, Weyman, cut his throat. Then Harvey searched him and got his pocket-book and he and Harvey rolled him off down the bank. Weyman didn't know that they got but one pocket-book, somewhere around $25 or $30 in it, and they got two; and I don't think he knew even when they locked up the other two boys, possibly a week or two afterwards. There was a little splotch of blood on the hatchet when I found it. It is on there now. I said blood. It looked like blood when I got it. It is right there [showing]. They were traveling in an automobile. The automobile belonged to Mr. Cooper. When I got down there I walked around and looked at those car...