Braddock v. State

• Decision Date: 07 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 47570,No. 2,47570,2
• Citation: 194 S.E.2d 317,127 Ga.App. 513
• Parties: Cecil R. BRADDOCK v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 317

194 S.E.2d 317

127 Ga.App. 513

Cecil R. BRADDOCK v. The STATE.

No. 47570.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Nov. 7, 1972.

White, Webb & Jewett, C. Lawrence Jewett, Atlanta, Wilder & Crowder, Charles R. Crowder, Birmingham, for appellant.

Ben F. Smith, Dist. Atty., Marietta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

HALL, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained by an alleged illegal search.

Defendant is a truck driver employed by a man named Christion who owns a truck tractor. Both defendant and Christion were arrested and indicted for possession of amphetamines. Christion made the first motion to suppress and the transcript of his hearing was stipulated as the evidence in this case. The court denied defendant's motion on the same grounds as Christion's and certified the order for immediate review.

The facts developed at the hearing are sketchy. It appears that Christion has some form of contract with Home Transportation, a motor carrier engaged in interstate commerce. An officer of Home Transportation called it a lease of the tractor, but the document itself is not in the record. Two of its provisions were read into evidence and suggest, along with Christion's presence in the truck, that the agreement is one for hauling services by an independent contractor but with stringent control provisions sufficient to meet the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. One clause gives Home the right to inspect the equipment for operational safety. The other gives Home the right to terminate immediately if the owner or an employee are found in the possession of alcohol or drugs when hauling goods. Neither one specifically gives Home the right to search for drugs.

Defendant and Christion pulled into Home's terminal after a trip from Alabama. A safety investigator of the Federal Department of Transportation was on the premises conducting a week-long 'over-all safety compliance survey.' As soon as defendant and Christion left the truck, this inspector came over and told the 'driver' (apparently Christion, although this is not clear) that he wanted to inspect the vehicle and asked him to get inside. The inspector made a thorough search including the sleeper berth and a compartment between the seats similar to a glove compartment in an automobile. There he found a bottle of amphetamine capsules. He turned them over to Home's safety director and presumably some Home official called in the police. The only evidence concerning the actions or reactions of Christion and defendant was the inspector's testimony that Christion did not object, i.e., that while he did not actually give permission, he did not question the action either. The trial court denied the motion on two grounds, that no police action was involved and that Home had consented to the search.

The first ground is erroneous. In 1966, specifically overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877, the United States Supreme Court declared that administrative searches are governmental action and fall within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930; See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943. Camara and See involved city fire inspectors. The principle has since been applied to a variety of officials such as inspectors of the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration. We see no possible basis for distinguishing the Transportation Department. The State also contends that defendant has no standing to complain of the search. The contention is without merit. He is an aggrieved party under both state and federal tests. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697; Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 160 S.E.2d 368.

Therefore, the issue is whether the facts of this case fall within any of the limited exceptions to the constitutional requirement for a search warrant. Emergency can be eliminated immediately, leaving for consideration only consent in its various forms. One subgroup of consent is that which is given by implication in the operation of accepted licensing programs. See v. Seattle, supra. One who receives the benefits of a public license to conduct a certain form of business must also accept any reasonable regulations upon the conduct of the business and, of course, any reasonable method of verifying his compliance with the regulations. The Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327) establishes a licensing system for motor vehicle carriers and Home Transportation operates under a contract motor carrier's permit. The Act and regulations adopted pursuant to it provide for the most extensive and intensive inspection of carriers, including their vehicles. Since the regulations also prohibit the transportation of certain dangerous drugs in the possession of a driver, 'inspection' of vehicles would encompass what is actually a search for these drugs. There is no doubt that Home's own trucks could be searched by Transportation Department inspectors without a warrant and without any necessity for consent further than that which exists by virtue of its operation under the public permit.

This does not answer the question of whether Home can consent to the search of a non-owned vehicle, however. The sufficiency of third-party consent has undergone a distinct reassessment and limitation. In a series of cases the United States Supreme Court has effectively held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; that only the aggrieved person or an expressly...