Braden v. Randles

• Decision Date: 23 October 1905
• Citation: 128 Iowa 653,105 N.W. 195
• Parties: BRADEN v. RANDLES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

128 Iowa 653

105 N.W. 195

BRADEN

v.RANDLES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 23, 1905.

Appeal from District Court, Monroe County: C. W. Vermillion, Judge.

Action at law to recover commissions for services rendered in procuring a purchaser for defendant's real estate. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.Mitchell, Tomlinson & Price, for appellant.

D. W. Bates and John T. Clarkson, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

Defendant was the owner of a house and lot in the city of Albia. Plaintiff is a real estate broker in said city, and as such was employed by defendant to find a purchaser for and sell the said property. The original agreement was that plaintiff was to have as and for his commission all over the sum of $2,000 that he could obtain for the property. Thereafter it was agreed, and indorsed upon the original contract, which was in writing, that plaintiff should have “the further sum of $20 as compensation for his services.” On the day that this addition to the contract was made plaintiff entered into a contract with one Barger for the sale of the house and lot. Defendant claims that she repudiated this contract for various reasons; and that she thereafter sold the property to Barger on her own motion for the sum of $2,000. This action is to recover the commission called for in the contract as modified by the parties on the theory that plaintiff found a purchaser as agreed, or that in any event he found the purchaser to whom the defendant sold the land. The petition is in one count, and it asks judgment for the sum of $120, it being charged that plaintiff sold the land to Barger for the sum of $2,100. Defendant denied that plaintiff found a purchaser for the property according to the terms specified in his contract. She also alleged fraud in procuring her signature to that part of her contract with plaintiff providing for the extra compensation of $20, and fraud and concealment on the part of plaintiff in making the sale to Barger. She claims that on account of these matters she repudiated the contract made by plaintiff with Barger; and thereafter made a new and independent one with him, with which plaintiff had no connection.

The plea of fraud is based upon the following state of facts, which the evidence tended to establish. By the terms of the original contract with plaintiff he was to have as compensation for his services all that he could obtain in excess of $2,000. The property was to be sold on or before March 1, 1904, and the purchase price was to be paid in cash or the equivalent. Before the agreement to allow $20 as further compensation was entered into, plaintiff had found the purchaser (Barger) who was willing to pay $2,100 for the property; but this fact he (plaintiff) concealed from defendant, and, instead of disclosing the offer, he represented and stated to defendant that Barger would not pay more than $2,000 for the house and lot, and that if he closed the deal with him he should have some compensation, and that, if she (defendant) would pay him the sum of $20, he would go ahead and close the deal. Relying on these statements, defendant entered into the agreement for further compensation, and made the addition to the contract already noted. By the terms of the contract made between plaintiff and Barger, he (Barger) was to pay but $1,100 in cash, and the balance was to be represented by a note due in two years, secured by first mortgage upon the property; Barger having the option to make “any number of $100 payments at the end of the first year.” He was also to have the option of paying the $1,000 in cash if he so desired. This may be said to be no material departure from the terms of his (plaintiff's) authority. But by the terms of plaintiff's agreement with Barger defendant was to assign all unexpired fire insurance to Barger, and was to give possession on or before May 1, 1904. This was not authorized by defendant. The agreement was to be consummated by the execution of deeds, mortgages, etc., on or before March 1, 1904. When defendant learned of the terms of this agreement she repudiated it, and refused to be bound thereby, although the evidence shows that some time thereafter, and after the 1st day of March, 1904, defendant sold the property to Barger for the sum of $2,000 in cash. Plaintiff denied the alleged fraud, and pleaded ratification by defendant of his contract with Barger. The case was submitted to a jury on these issues, which returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $100. For a reversal of the judgment entered thereon, defendant argues several propositions of law and fact, and to such as are...