Braden v. Sturges

• Decision Date: 31 December 2020
• Docket Number: 529824
• Citation: 189 A.D.3d 2015,139 N.Y.S.3d 400
• Parties: Daniel BRADEN Sr. et al., Appellants, v. Charles E. STURGES et al., Defendants, and Joseph Stanzione, as Greene County District Attorney, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

189 A.D.3d 2015

139 N.Y.S.3d 400

Daniel BRADEN Sr. et al., Appellants,

v. Charles E. STURGES et al., Defendants,andJoseph Stanzione, as Greene County District Attorney, et al., Respondents.

529824

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: November 17, 2020

Decided and Entered: December 31, 2020

Law Office of Ralph C. Lewis Jr., Catskill (Daniel A. Benoit of counsel), for appellants.

Murphy Burns LLP, Loudonville (Stephen M. Groudine of counsel), for respondents.

Before: Aarons, J.P., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pritzker, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Elliot III, J.), entered June 25, 2019 in Greene County, which granted a motion by defendants Joseph Stanzione and County of Greene to dismiss the amended complaint against them.

Plaintiffs commenced this action contending, as is relevant here, that they were entitled to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of federal constitutional rights violations by defendant County of Greene and its District Attorney, defendant Joseph Stanzione (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants). In particular, it was alleged that defendants had infringed upon plaintiffs' rights by serving grand jury subpoenas for their prescription and medical records in the course of an investigation into whether plaintiff Daniel Braden Jr. had misused opioids prescribed to him and other plaintiffs. In lieu of serving an answer, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint against them. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and served an amended complaint that reduced the number of their claims against defendants and clarified that a violation of their right to privacy in their medical records was at issue. Defendants replied and argued that the amended complaint also failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court agreed and granted the motion, prompting this appeal by plaintiffs.

We affirm. "To maintain a [ 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct complained of deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" ( Sinacore v. Dept. of Correctional Servs., 104 F.3d 354, 1996 WL 671144, *1, 1996 U.S. App LEXIS 30029, *4–5 [2d Cir.1996] [citation omitted]; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Town of Tupper Lake v. Sootbusters, LLC, 147 A.D.3d 1268, 1270, 47 N.Y.S.3d 778 [2017] ). "The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause ... protects individuals ... from arbitrary intrusions into their medical records" ( Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 65 [2d Cir.2018] ; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 [1977] ; Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 266–267 [2d Cir.1994] ). The right to privacy in one's medical records "is not absolute," and "[a] constitutional violation only occurs when the individual's interest in privacy outweighs the government's interest in breaching it" ( Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d at 65 ). As relevant here, to establish a substantive due process violation, the governmental action alleged must be "so arbitrary as to shock the conscience" ( id. at 66 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 [1998] ). "Whether executive action shocks the conscience depends on the state of mind of the government actor and the context in which the action was taken" ( Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d at 66 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). "Mere irrationality is not enough: only the most egregious official conduct, conduct that shocks the conscience, will subject the government to liability for a substantive due process violation based on executive action" ( O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 203 [2d Cir.2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d at 66 ).

Here, plaintiffs allege that Stanzione, pursuant to his office policy, issued grand jury subpoenas for plaintiffs' medical records during a criminal investigation but outside the auspices of a pending judicial proceeding and that these subpoenas did not comply with CPLR 3122. Even accepting these allegations as true and conferring on plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference, as we must in a motion to dismiss (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ; McFadden v. Amodio, 149 A.D.3d 1282, 1283, 52 N.Y.S.3d 538 [2017] ), plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action. Liberally construed, Stanzione acted carelessly and negligently in the issuance of the subpoenas but, as currently alleged, his conduct does not "shock the conscience" ( Edwards v. Orange County, 2020 WL 635528, *3, 2020 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23480, *9 [S.D. N.Y., Feb. 10, 2020, No. 17–CV–10116...