Bradfield v. Pueblo
Decision Date | 08 August 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 18769,18769 |
Citation | 354 P.2d 612 |
Parties | L. E. BRADFIELD, Plaintiff in Error, v. PUEBLO, a Municipal Corporation, and Duke W. Dunbar, as Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Defendants in Error. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Seavy & Seavy, Pueblo, for plaintiff in error.
Gordon D. Hinds, Lee R. Wills, Pueblo, for defendants in error.
This action involves the validity of certain ordinances and city charter provisions relating to the levying, collecting and payment of taxes for a special improvement district within the City of Pueblo.
The parties appear here in the same order as they appeared in the trial court, where, after hearing upon stipulated facts, the court entered its Findings of Facts, Conclusion of Law and Order and Judgment dismissing the complaint.
Pursuant to the authority granted by Sections 7-25 and 7-27 of its charter, the City of Pueblo on October 14, 1955, adopted Ordinance Number 2190, the title of which is:
THE CONSTRUCTION THEREIN OF STREET IMPROVEMENTS, PROVIDING FOR THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS OF THE DISTRICT TO PAY THE COSTS AND EXPENSES OF SAID IMPROVEMENTS, AND PROVIDING FOR THE PAYMENT OF SUCH BONDS AND INTEREST THEREON.'
Subsequently, on November 9, 1955, the City adopted Ordinance Number 2203, the same being a tax levy ordinance which included a two mill tax levy to be used to implement the provisions of Ordinance Number 2190.
It appears that the improvement district in question was for the construction of highways and that part of the cost was assessed against the private landowners residing therein and part of the cost was to be borne by the city itself. The city created a reserve fund by general taxation to not only pay its share but also to 'advance' sums necessary to meet any deficiencies which might occur.
Among the pertinent provisions of Ordinance 2190 are the following:
'SECTION 5. * * * local improvement bonds of the City shall be issued for the purpose of paying for the special improvements in this Ordinance described and provided to be constructed in said Improvement District No. 55-1, in an amount not to exceed the cost of said improvements, * * *.
'SECTION 6. Said bonds * * * shall be payable out of the moneys collected on account of the assessments made for said improvements and from the special funds hereinafter mentioned. * * *.
'* * *
'SECTION 10. Whenever there is a deficiency in said special improvement district fund to meet the payment of outstanding bonds of this issue and interest thereon, such deficiency shall be paid out of the surplus and deficiency fund of said City, designated in Section 7-26 of the City Charter, and 'Whenever a special or local improvement district has paid and cancelled three-fourths (3/4) of its bonds issued, and for any reason the remaining assessments are not paid in time to take up the remaining bonds of the district and interest due thereon, and there is not sufficient money in the special surplus and deficiency fund, then the City shall pay the bonds when due and interest due thereon and reimburse itself by collecting the unpaid assessments due the district'.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 5, 1955, alleging inter alia:
'That the provisions of the Charter of Pueblo reciting that the installation of special improvements confer general benefits upon the City at large in special or local improvement districts and in Section 11 of Ordinance 2190 and purporting thereby to authorize a tax, to pay special improvement assessments on improvements located in one district, on all the property within the corporate limits of Pueblo and not within the boundaries of the district where special improvements are made and for the purpose of advancing money to maintain current payments of interest and equal annual payments of interest and equal annual payments of the principal amount of bonds issued for any special or local improvement district hereafter created are void, illegal, unconstitutional and of no force and effect for the following reasons, to wit:
'(a) That plaintiff is thereby deprived of his property without due process of law;
'(b) That a tax is thereby levied upon plaintiff's property for which no benefit is or can be derived.'
It is not urged that Ordinance 2190 violates any other provision of the State or Federal Constitutions than those relating to due process of law. Among the facts stipulated by the parties and followed by the trial court are the following: (1) that plaintiff is the owner of real property within the City of Pueblo, (2) that none of the special improvements are within a radius of eight blocks of plaintiff's property, and (3) that by reason of the taxes levied on account of the special improvements made under Ordinance 2190 the taxes of plaintiff have been raised.
Section 7-25 of the Charter in pertinent part reads:
'The City of Pueblo shall have power to construct or install special or local improvements of every character within designated districts in said City, which improvements shall confer special benefits on the real property within said districts and general benefits to the City at large. * * *.'
And Section 7-27 of the Charter states:
Plaintiff urges as error here:
1. That before a general tax may be imposed upon all of the real property in Pueblo, there must be a factual determination that the improvements in 'Pueblo Special Improvement District No. 55-1' are of a general benefit to the City at Large.
2. That the tax provided for in Section 7-27 of the Charter and in Section 11 of Ordinance No. 2190, and imposed under Ordinance No. 2203, the same being the Tax Levy Ordinance, is unconstitutional for the reason that the City of Pueblo is thereby lending or pledging its credit or faith thereof in aid of private persons, contrary to Section 1, Article XI, of the Colorado Constitution.
It is under plaintiff's first ground of error that he would have us hold that he is being unconstitutionally deprived of his property for two reasons: (a) by having to pay taxes assessed against his lands because of no purported direct benefit to him; and (b) because of alleged impropriety in the city creating a fund to meet future deficiencies, if any, in bond and interest payments.
We direct our...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
The Harm in Hold Harmless Clauses
...in Bradfield v. Pueblo, infra, this note); Montgomery v. City and County of Denver, 80 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1938); Bradfield v. Pueblo, 354 P.2d 612 (Colo. 1960); Allardice v. Adams County, 476 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1970); McNichols, supra, note 4 (bond funds raised to buy land for donation to U.S. au......
-
Management and Mismanagement of Municipal Special Improvement Districts
...Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1989); Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 533 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1975); L. E. Bradfield v. Pueblo, 354 P.2d 612 (Colo. 1960). 11. City of Pueblo v. Grand Caniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, 358 P.2d 13, 21 (Colo. 1960); Zelinger v. City and County of ......