Bradford v. Blossom

• Decision Date: 28 June 1905
• Citation: 88 S.W. 721,190 Mo. 110
• Parties: BRADFORD, Appellant, v. BLOSSOM et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

88 S.W. 721

190 Mo. 110

BRADFORD, Appellant, v. BLOSSOM et al

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 28, 1905

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Warwick Hough Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

M. F Hanley and R. P. & C. B. Williams for appellant.

(1) If the person who sustains the confidential relation to the testator at the time of the making of the will is to get any pecuniary benefit, either directly or indirectly, under the will, a presumption of undue influence will be indulged. Barkley v. Cemetery Assn., 153 Mo. 315; Lins v Lenhardt, 127 Mo. 271. (2) Undue influence may be shown by the relation of the parties, the mental condition of the person whose act is in question, and the character of the transaction. Dingman v. Romine, 141 Mo. 466. (3) That the testatrix had the power to dispose of her estate as she saw fit is undoubted, but when the will is unreasonable, the clearest evidence is required that it was the deliberate offspring of her own unbiased mind. Harvey v. Sullen, 46 Mo. 153. (4) Where the testamentary capacity of the testator, and undue influence exercised upon him are in issue, it becomes material to know what were his previous purposes, intentions and state of mind, and statements made by him at, before and after making the will in question are competent evidence for these purposes. Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160. (5) In determining whether or not a will was the result of undue influence, it is proper to consider the mental and physical condition of the testator, and the will itself may be read to the jury. The question should be determined in the light of all the circumstances. Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433; Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 586; Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691. (6) Undue influence need not be shown by direct proof, but may be inferred from facts and circumstances. Doherty v. Gilmore, 136 Mo. 414. (7) When the will is unreasonable in its provisions and inconsistent with the duties of the testator with reference to his property and family, this of itself will impose on those claiming under the instrument the necessity of giving some reasonable explanation of the unnatural character of the will. Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 264. (8) In passing upon the capacity of a person to make a will, the will itself and all its provisions may be considered by the jury, and, while the fact that it is apparently unjust to his children is not of itself sufficient to invalidate it, yet it is a circumstance to be considered. Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 586. (9) Blossom sustained a confidential relationship to the testatrix. The will gives him a substantial and valuable interest, which he may transfer and assign for value; a presumption, therefore, of undue influence arises, which shifts the burden upon proponents. Lins v. Lenhardt, 127 Mo. 271; Barkley v. Cemetery Assn., 153 Mo. 315.

Thos. B. Harvey for minor respondents.

(1) This case should have gone to the jury. Merely the proof of Blossom's confidential relation to the testatrix, in connection with the will itself, under which he receives a very large and certain remuneration as trustee, and under which his wife may become a beneficiary, made a prima facie case and shifted the burden of proof to the proponents. The rule that a presumption of undue influence in the making of a will obtains where confidential or fiduciary relations exist, has its basis in the idea that some pecuniary benefit is to be derived, directly or indirectly, under the will by the person who sustains the confidential relations to the testator. Barkley v. Cemetery Assn., 153 Mo. 300; Lins v. Lenhardt, 127 Mo. 271; Tibbie v. Kamp, 154 Mo. 580. (2) The will itself bears strong evidence that it is not the free act and deed of the testatrix. It is absolutely inconsistent with her devotion to and love for these minors, her grandchildren, expressed in every other act of her life. It was undoubtedly her purpose for these children to get the benefit of this property during their minority, and then to come into the absolute possession of it upon the death of their mother or upon attaining their majority. In the late case of Wood v. Carpenter, 166 Mo. 466, this court uses some very strong language in regard to the inherent proof of the capacity of a testator to make a will by the character of the instrument which was dictated, not by a lawyer, but by the testator, who was a carpenter, and written in the exact language which he used. To the same effect is: Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433; Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 586; Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691; Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 264. (3) The testatrix was unquestionably in a weak physical condition and very nervous, making her dependent upon others, which conditions had begun to rapidly increase for two or three years prior to the execution of this will, which, together with her infirmity of deafness, made her an easy victim of anyone in whom she reposed especial confidence. Under such circumstances, this court has said it is proper to consider the will itself, the mental and physical condition of the testator, the relation between him and the person who influences the making of the will, and the character of the transaction; and the question of whether or not it is indeed his will, should be determined in the light of all the circumstances. Myers v. Hauger, supra; Young v. Ridenbaugh, supra; Dingman v. Romine, 141 Mo. 466; McKissock v. Groom, 148 Mo. 459; Cash v. Lust, 142 Mo. 630.

Boyle, Priest & Lehmann for respondents.

(1) There was no evidence whatever showing, or tending to show, fraud or undue influence by Blossom. Tibbe v. Kamp, 154 Mo. 545; Wood v. Carpenter, 166 Mo. 465; Hamburger v. Rinkel, 164 Mo. 398. (2) The evidence shows affirmatively that the will was deliberately and considerately executed, and carried out the long-fixed purpose of the testatrix. (3) There was no error in the rulings of the circuit court upon the admission and exclusion of evidence.

BURGESS, J. Gantt, Valliant, Fox and Lamm, JJ., concur; Brace, C. J., and Marshall, J., dissent.

OPINION

In Banc.

BURGESS J.

This is a statutory contest of the will of Emma V. Bradford, who died July 28, 1898.

The will was admitted to probate August 8, 1898, and the contest proceedings were begun on October 10, 1899. The contestants are Frank E. Bradford and Caroline B. Ryan, son and daughter, and only children, of the testatrix. The will purports to have been executed on the 21st day of July, 1893. It reads as follows:

"I Emma Virginia Burns Bradford, widow of the late William E. Bradford, of the city of St. Louis, State of Missouri, being of sound mind and memory and mindful of the uncertainty of life, do by these presents make, publish and declare the following instrument to be my last will and testament, hereby expressly revoking all other wills made and published by me.

"I.

"I declare that I have now living two children, my son, Frank E. Bradford, and my daughter, Carrie Bradford Ryan, wife of Alfred Ryan; that I have no debts or obligations of any character to be allowed against my estate, except such as may accrue for my last sickness and funeral, and except such as may be secured on real estate purchased by me, for the deferred payments of the purchase price, for which I have hereinafter made special provision. And as to other debts and obligations, I direct my executor named to contest the validity of any claim against my estate which in his opinion is of long standing and supported by doubtful or uncertain evidence.

"II.

"It is my will that all of my estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever situate, and to which I am entitled either at law or in equity, vested in me in fee simple, or otherwise, by virtue of any gift, grant, devise, inheritance, or by virtue of any conveyance made to any trustee or trustees for my use and benefit, or under any power mentioned in such conveyance, which authorizes me to appoint, dispose or devise by last will and testament, or any other conveyance in the nature of a last will and testament, any of such property, real, personal or mixed, I do hereby will, devise and bequeath to my friend Howard A. Blossom.

"To have and to hold the same unto him, the said Howard A. Blossom, and to his heirs and assigns forever.

"In trust, however, for the following purposes, towit: To deliver to my daughter, Carrie Bradford Ryan, wife of Alfred Ryan, and to my son, Frank E. Bradford, out of my residence such statuary, pictures, laces, jewels, clothing and household goods, of equal value to each of said persons, as they may select; and if my said son and daughter cannot agree upon the articles to be selected by them then said trustee shall decide in all cases of disagreement and shall deliver such property as herein devised and bequeathed to him to said persons, as he may determine.

"And in further trust, as to all other property owned and possessed by me, or to which I am entitled either at law or in equity, to collect and receive all the rents, issues and profits thereof, and to pay all the taxes, assessments insurance and repairs, and all other expenses which in the discretion of the said trustee may be deemed proper and expedient to be incurred in holding, managing, controlling and disposing of said property; and to pay out of said income (or the principal, if necessary), so held by said trustee, any sum or sums of money that may be recovered by any action at law or suit in equity against said trustee, by any person or persons whomsoever, for any damages or injuries sustained by any person or persons by reason of any act done, or omission of any act, by the said trustee, by which any cause of action for any injury or damage shall result, and for which any person or persons may be entitled to recover against said trustee for such...