Bradley, Jr. v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 17 October 2000
• Docket Number: WD57621
• Parties: This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court. William W. Bradley, Jr., Respondent v. Betty Lee Bradley, Appellant Case Number: WD57621 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date:
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court

William W. Bradley, Jr., Respondent v Betty Lee Bradley, Appellant

Case Number: WD57621

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

Handdown Date: 10/17/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Boone County, Hon. Joseph D. Holt, Judge

Counsel for Appellant: Pamela Lambert

Counsel for Respondent: Edward Christian Clausen

Opinion Summary:

Betty Lee Bradley appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to modify maintenance.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Division Two holds:

Betty Lee Bradley is totally disabled from working, whereas she was able to work and did work at the time of the dissolution and for most of the period thereafter until the filing of her motion to modify. Such a disability is a change of circumstances, and the trial court erred in failing to consider whether on the facts before it the disability caused a change of circumstances that was so substantial and continuing as to render the prior decree unreasonable. This Court rejects William Bradley's contention that the trial court could and should have ignored the effects of the disability simply because it originally arose out of an alcohol problem which developed following the dissolution, for Betty Lee Bradley no longer abuses alcohol, and the trial court clearly found that, whatever the origin of her problems, she now has permanent liver damage and other permanent injuries which have rendered her totally physically disabled and unable to work.

In considering the effect of the disability and resulting inability to work of Betty Lee Bradley, the court erred in stating that it would not consider the effects of the 18 years of inflation which had occurred since the initial decree since inflation necessarily affects all parties. While inflation may be universal in occurrence, how it affects an individual will vary depending on that individual's situation. Where, as here, Betty Lee Bradley is now unable to work and is on a fixed income consisting primarily of Social Security and maintenance, and where, as here, the record appears to show that her expenses exceed her income by over $1,000, the court erred in failing to consider the effects of inflation on her ability to meet her reasonable needs.

The court also erred in refusing to consider any evidence of expenses presented by Betty Lee Bradley which the court believed the parties could, 18 years earlier, have foreseen would occur sometime in the future. While the parties should reasonably anticipate and take into consideration at the time of the dissolution such matters as what income will be earned on property distributed to a spouse, the parties should not be required to speculate on possible future expenses or changes in circumstances which are not reasonably likely to occur in the near future. Indeed, it would be erroneous to do so. Should such expenses occur in the future, they are more appropriately the subject of a motion to modify, such as the one filed here.

Opinion Author: Laura Denvir Stith, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Lowenstein, P.J. and Newton, J. concur.

Opinion:

Appellant Betty Lee Bradley appeals the trial court's judgment denying her motion to modify the amount of maintenance that Respondent William Bradley was ordered to pay her under the terms of a dissolution decree entered on November 25, 1981. The issues before us are whether the trial court erred: (1) in failing to find a substantial and continuing change in circumstances from the time of the original dissolution decree; in that Mrs. Bradley, who was working at the time of the dissolution, is now disabled, unable to work, and drawing social security, and her expenses exceed her income by $1,005 per month; and (2) in ruling that in determining whether a substantial change in circum-stances had occurred which rendered the terms of the original decree unreasonable, it would ignore the effects of 18 years of inflation and would ignore any changes which could have been foreseen at the time of the dissolution, without any evidence that they were in fact considered at the time of the original decree.

We find these rulings were erroneous. The court should have considered the effects of Mrs. Bradley's disability on her earning capacity, as well as the fact that her disability caused a reduction in her income by one-seventh in real terms, and by much more if the effects of 18 years of inflation are considered, as they should have been. The court similarly erred in refusing to consider expenses which were proved but which it believed the parties should have considered and taken into account 18 years earlier, and erred in failing to consider whether these changes were so substantial as to render the terms of the original decree unreasonable. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The twenty-five year marriage of Betty Lee Bradley and William Bradley was dissolved by order of the Circuit Court of Saint Louis County, Missouri, entered November 25, 1981. At the time of dissolution, Mr. Bradley, then 47 years old, was earning approximately $7,600 per month as a medical doctor. Although Mrs. Bradley, then 44 years old, was primarily a mother and home-maker, she was earning $825 per month. This amount included $300 she had earned monthly doing "some bookwork" in Mr. Bradley's medical office.

The decree was based on and incorporated a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. In accordance with that Agreement, the decree provided that Mrs. Bradley was to receive the parties' new, paid-for Lincoln automobile. She was given primary physical custody of the parties' three teenage sons and received $900 per month in child support for them. She was also awarded the family home, which had been remodeled in part and had a nearly new roof at the time of the dissolution. Mr. Bradley was directed to pay the mortgage on the house as a form of maintenance. The court also ordered him to pay Mrs. Bradley statutory maintenance of $1,000 per month, and, as additional maintenance, to pay the taxes and insurance on the home for five years. Presumably, the parties anticipated that by that point Mrs. Bradley would be earning enough to take upon herself the payment of insurance and taxes on the house. The dissolution decree provided that the amount of maintenance "shall be subject to modification by the Court upon a showing by either party of a changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of the original maintenance order] unreasonable as provided in Section 452.370 ..."

Mrs. Bradley did not work immediately after the dissolution, but within a few years she began work as a clerk in a flower shop, performing miscellaneous duties and earning approximately $500 per month. In 1988, Mrs. Bradley took a factory job in Centralia, Missouri, with A.B. Chance, Inc. She worked full time and generally accrued 6 hours per week in overtime as well, earning approximately $1,500 to $2,000 per month.

After the dissolution, Mrs. Bradley engaged in excessive drinking, arising in part out of depression. She was diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver in January, 1994. Mr. Bradley presented evidence that it was at least in part as a result of Mrs. Bradley's drinking and her resulting health problems that, in the Spring of 1995, she was terminated from her job with A.B. Chance due to excessive absences. Mrs. Bradley presented evidence that her health problems, whatever their origin, in fact prevented her from obtaining another job, and that as a result she had been forced to apply for Social Security Disability benefits. On September 25, 1996, the Social Security Administration awarded benefits to Mrs. Bradley. In so doing, the Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] found that Mrs. Bradley suffered from "impairments which are considered to be severe under the Social Security Act and Regulations: [including] liver cirrhosis; chronic hepatitis; ascites; anasarca; clotting abnormalities; gastritis; and pruritis." The ALJ further found that:

[t]hese impairments prevent the claimant from engaging in any type of even moderately strenuous activity, including stretching, bending, stooping, pushing and pulling things, lifting and carrying items weighing over ten pounds, ascending more than two flights of stairs, walking farther than three blocks, standing in excess of thirty minutes, and from engaging in activity requiring sustained concentration.

The ALJ additionally noted that "[g]iven the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education and past relevant work experience, there have been no jobs existing in significant numbers that the claimant has been capable of performing since May 1, 1995. . . . The claimant has been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, since May 1, 1995."

After nearly two years of alcohol abuse, Mrs. Bradley quit drinking, and began extensive and extended treatment with Dr. Elizabeth Armstrong, M.D., for cirrhosis of the liver, depression, anxiety, and edema, an allergic reaction from exposure to toxic chemicals. The doctor later testified that she was unable, during a period in 1995, to administer some necessary tests to monitor Mrs. Bradley's complications arising from her cirrhosis of the liver, or to perform routine physical examinations, because Mrs. Bradley's insurance, at that time, was "exhausted." Dr. Armstrong provided some care to Mrs. Bradley without billing for procedures for which her clinic otherwise charged.

On July 6, 1998, Mrs. Bradley filed a motion to modify the dissolution decree in the Circuit Court of Boone County, alleging that a substantial and continuing change in circum-stances had occurred which rendered the prior decree unreasonable. In support, she alleged that she was now disabled and unemployed, and had been unable to secure adequate employment, largely due to...