Bradley Lumber Co. v. Cheney

• Decision Date: 29 October 1956
• Docket Number: No. 1057,1057
• Citation: 226 Ark. 857,295 S.W.2d 765
• Parties: BRADLEY LUMBER COMPANY of Arkansas, Appellant, v. J. Orville CHENEY, Commissioner of Revenues, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 765

295 S.W.2d 765

226 Ark. 857

BRADLEY LUMBER COMPANY of Arkansas, Appellant, v. J. Orville CHENEY, Commissioner of Revenues, Appellee.

No. 1057.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 29, 1956.

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 10, 1956.

Davis & Allen, El Dorado, for appellant.

J. E. Gaughan, Camden, John H. Lookadoo, Arkadelphia, Hendrix Rowell, Pine Bluff, and Herrn Northcutt, Little Rock, for appellee.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice.

This is a bill in equity by which the appellant seeks to enjoin the Commissioner of Revenues from enforcing a regulation issued under § 1 of Act 100 of 1955, Ark.Stats.1947, § 84-2107. It is asserted that Act 100 was not constitutionally passed by the General Assembly and that in any event there is no statutory authority for the imposition of a severance tax upon rough lumber as distinguished from timber. The chancellor held Act 100 to be constitutional and dismissed the appellant's complaint.

Section 1 of Act 100 requires, in substance, that a purchaser of severed natural resources must ascertain whether the severance tax thereon has been paid and, if not, must withhold the amount of the tax from the purchase price. The appellant, in attacking the validity of the act, offers proof to show that, although the bill as introduced in the House of Representatives was amended by that body, the Governor signed the bill in its original form, without the amendment. It is accordingly argued that the bill which the Governor approved is not the same bill which was passed by the legislature.

The undisputed proof is to this effect: The bill, as introduced in the House on January 20, contained a clause authorizing the Commissioner of Revenues to prepare a formula for determining the severance tax upon saw timber that had been converted into lumber. On February 3 the House adopted an amendment which provided that this formula should be prepared by the State Forestry Commission. On February 8 the bill was read for the third time and passed by the House. The entry in the House journal with reference to the final passage of the bill refers to the measure merely as 'the bill,' without mentioning the amendment previously adopted; so the journal does not affirmatively reflect that the House approved the measure in its amended form. The bill was then sent to the Senate, which passed it on February 11. The Senate journal, like that of the House, refers merely to 'the bill.' As signed by the Governor the measure does not contain the amendment adopted by the House on February 3.

These facts are not sufficient to establish the invalidity of the act. When a bill is signed by the Governor and deposited with the Secretary of State, there arises a presumption that every requirement for its passage was complied with. Harrington v. White, 131 Ark. 291, 199 S.W. 92. This presumption cannot be overcome by the silence of the legislative journals unless the constitution requires the journals affirmatively to show the action taken. There is no requirement in the constitution that either house keep a record of its action upon amendments to a pending bill; all that is required is a record of the vote cast upon final passage of the measure. Const. art. 5, § 22. It is therefore entirely possible--and the presumption arising from the Governor's approval requires ...