Bradley v. Bradley, 88-336
Decision Date | 30 March 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 88-336,88-336 |
Citation | 575 A.2d 190,154 Vt. 304 |
Parties | Donna (Christopher) BRADLEY v. Joel D. BRADLEY. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Donna H. Christopher (Bradley), Burlington, pro se.
Blodgett, Watts & Volk, Burlington, for defendant-appellant.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and PECK, GIBSON, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ.
At issue in this appeal is the power of the court to modify the amount of child support when the parties agreed that child support would extend beyond the period set by 15 V.S.A. § 658(c) () (formerly § 651(d)). We affirm.
The court granted the parties an uncontested divorce in 1983. A written stipulation to all terms of the divorce was incorporated in the divorce judgment, including monthly payments of $600 to be divided equally for the support of their two children "until they reach the age of 21." The parties waived separate maintenance. In 1987, the court approved plaintiff's request to increase child support and denied defendant's request that child support cease when the children reached eighteen, holding that at eighteen, the 1983 provision on child support would govern.
The defendant agreed at the time of the divorce to be bound by a court order to pay child support after the period provided by statute. Defendant maintains, however, that plaintiff "rescinded" the agreement when she sought increased premajority child support and it was error for the court to extend support in any amount beyond eighteen. Premised on this assertion, he argues he has been deprived of the benefit of the bargain when the court raised the amount of child support until age eighteen because he had bargained for a reduced child support amount in exchange for extending child support payments beyond the statutory period until age twenty-one. In essence, defendant says plaintiff cannot have it both ways--increased support and extended support.
We agree with defendant up to a point. When parties stipulate that child support extends beyond the age of majority, a court may not ordinarily modify that agreement "upon a showing of a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances." 15 V.S.A. § 660(a). But that is not what happened here. The court left intact the parties' stipulation on past-age-of-majority child support.
Defendant's argument is unavailing...
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Grimes v. Grimes, 92-016
...499, 503, 450 A.2d 1108, 1110 (1982). The parties cannot withdraw this jurisdiction by agreement. Id.; see also Bradley v. Bradley, 154 Vt. 304, 305, 575 A.2d 190, 191 (1990) (law permits modification of child support regardless of motivation of parties in setting original amount). Finally,......
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