Bradley v. Cole
| Decision Date | 14 December 1885 |
| Citation | 25 N.W. 849,67 Iowa 650 |
| Parties | BRADLEY v. COLE. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cerro Gordo circuit court.
Action to recover on account of taxes paid by plaintiff upon certain lands claimed by him, the title to which, in an action between the parties, was adjudged to be in defendant. Plaintiff asks that a lien for the amount paid by him be established upon the lands. Both parties appeal.Richard Wilber, for plaintiff.
Miller & Cleggett, for defendant.
1. The action is triable in this court de novo. Plaintiff, in his petition and amended petition, seeks to recover for taxes paid upon the lands from 1861 to 1874, inclusive, except the year 1872. He asks that a lien be established upon the lands for the amount he may be entitled to recover. By the decree of the circuit court plaintiff recovered for the taxes paid by him for the years from 1868 to 1874, inclusive. It is shown by the record that plaintiff, during the time he was paying taxes upon the lands, claimed title thereto under a sheriff's sale and deed made upon a decree of foreclosure of a trust deed. In an action brought by plaintiff, and finally determined in this court in 1877, the title to the land was found not to be in plaintiff, but to be in defendant. See Bradley v. Jamison, 46 Iowa, 68.
2. The record establishes, without a doubt, that plaintiff paid the taxes for which he claims to recover, in good faith, believing that he held a valid title to the lands. He claimed the lands under a judicial sale and a sheriff's deed, and, while so claiming, paid the taxes. His title, though held defective, certainly amounted to color of title, and would have made any possession which he may have held under it lawful; that is, he would not have been regarded as a mere trespasser. Had he made improvements in good faith upon the lands while holding possession under his title, he could have recovered under our statute the value thereof before being ejected therefrom. Code, §§ 1976-1987. The payment of taxes being made in the lawful exercise of ownership over the lands which the law authorizes under color of title, and in the discharge of the duty of a citizen, the plaintiff ought to be protected, and ought to recover for the outlays made by him in payment of taxes in an action against the owner. The payments being made for the protection of the property, and redounding to the benefit of the real owner of the land, he, ex œquo et bono, ought to reimburse plaintiff. The facts of this case bring it within the doctrine of Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555, S. C. 2 N. W. Rep. 395, and Goodnow v. Stryker, 62 Iowa, 221, S. C. 14 N. W. Rep. 345, and 17 N. W. Rep. 506, and distinguish it from Garrigan v. Knight, 47 Iowa, 525, as held by the majority of the court. Indeed, it would seem that, as plaintiff in this case claimed title under a judicial sale, he was authorized to rely upon its validity with a degree of confidence which the tax-payer in the case of Goodnow v. Moulton could not have had, as he did not claim under such a sale. All men presume, as does the law, that judicial proceedings are correct. Resting upon this presumption, one acquiring a title by judicial sale is surely authorized to regard the land as his own; and for its protection, and in the discharge of his duty as a good citizen, he ought to be permitted to pay the taxes without peril of loss.
3. Defendant insists that the question of plaintiff's right to recover the taxes was adjudicated against him in the action wherein it was found and adjudged that the title is held by defendant. But we do not find that the question was presented for adjudication in that case. Plaintiff did not claim to recover therein any sum advanced by him in payment of taxes. He sought no relief other than that his title be quieted. Payment of taxes by plaintiff, and his right to recover therefor, were not matters in issue and adjudged in the case.
4. The defendant maintains that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Both plaintiff and defendant are non-residents of the state. Plaintiff's cause of action accrued upon the adjudication that defendant held the title, and it arose in this state. See Goodnow v. Stryker, 62 Iowa, 221; S. C. 14 N. W. Rep. 345, and 17 N. W. Rep. 506. Surely, his right of action to enforce the lien upon the lands arose in this state where the lands are situated, and nowhere else.
5. At the time of the payment of some of the annual taxes the lands were not owned by defendant, being conveyed to him afterwards. It is insisted that plaintiff cannot recover therefor. Jamison acquired the lands in 1860, and conveyed them to defendant in January, 1868, by quitclaim deed. Plaintiff's equitable right to a lien cannot be enforced against one holding the lands without notice thereof. But a grantee of the owner of the lands at the time of the payments of the taxes, who had notice of plaintiff's equity, and purchased subject thereto, stands in the shoes of his grantor, and the lands in his hands are subject to plaintiff's claim and lien. Defendant acquired the lands by quitclaim deed, and is charged with notice of plaintiff's equities, and the law regards his purchase as subject thereto. These positions are based upon familiar doctrines, which will be everywhere admitted without support of authorities. Fogg v. Holcomb, 21 N. W. Rep. 111, is not in conflict with our conclusion. It is not shown that the land-owner in that case was chargeable with notice of the equities of the tax-payer existing when the title of the lands was conveyed to him. In our opinion, plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the lands for all the taxes paid by him. He ought not, however, to recover a personal judgment against defendant for taxes paid before he became owner of the land; but such a judgment should be rendered for the taxes paid afterwards. The cause will be remanded for a decree in harmony with this opinion, or at plaintiff's option such a decree may be entered here.
Reversed on plaintiff's appeal. Affirmed on defendant's appeal.
1. WHEN STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN.
(1) Agents.
(2) Bankruptcy.
(3) Bills, etc.
( a) Claims Payable on Demand.
(4) Bonds.
( a) Administrator's Bond.
( b) Appeal-Bond.
( c) Guardian's Bond.
( d) Public Officer's Bond.
(5) Book-Accounts.
(6) Contribution.
(7) Conversion.
(8) Corporation--Municipal.
(9) Corporations--Stockholders.
(10) Co-Tenants.
(11) Covenants.
(12) Decedents, Estates of.
(13) Dower.
(14) Fraud.
(15) Implied Contract.
(16) Judgment.
(17) Leasehold--Assignment.
(18) Married Woman.
(19) Minor or Ward--Suit after Majority.
(20) Mortgage.
(21) Nuisance.
(22) On Coming into State.
(23) Order or Warrant on County Treasurer.
(24) Partnership--Accounting.
(25) Promise to Pay, etc.
(26) Rape.
(27) Real Estate--Adverse Possession.
(28) Salary.
(29) Tax--Illegal--Mandamus.
(30) Tax Title.
( a) Against Owner of Land.
( b) Against Holder of Tax Deed.
( c) On Failure of Tax Title.
(31) Trusts.
( a) Misappropriation, etc.
( b) Resultant, Constructive, Implied Trusts.
(32) Verbal Contract to Convey.
(33) Wrongful Act.
2. COMPUTATION OF TIME.
3. WHAT PREVENTS THE RUNNING.
(1) Acknowledgment or New Promise.
( a) Promise in Writing.
(2) Absence from the State.
( a) Temporary Absence.
( b) Removal from and Return to State.
(3) Commencement of Action.
( a) Defense or Counter-Claim.
(4) Estates of Decedents.
( a) Appointment of Administrator.
( b) Devolution.
(5) Extension of Time.
(6) Fraud.
(7) Mortgage.
(8) Negligence or Laches.
(9) Note, etc.
(10) Part Payment.
( a) Voluntary Payment.
( b) Enforced Payment.
( c) By Partner, Co-Surety, etc.
(11) War.
4. SUIT--WHEN COMMENCED.
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
6. COUNTER-CLAIM.
7. IN EQUITY.
(1) Laches, etc.
(2) Pleading and Practice.
(3) Federal Courts.
(4) Admiralty.
8. STATE.
9. CONSTRUCTION.
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose, Hurley v. Cox, 2 N. W. Rep. 705;Letson v. Kenyon, 1 Pac. Rep. 562;Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kan. 499;Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan. 604, and are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing it beyond a reasonable time if he has the power to sue. Such reasonable time is therefore defined and allowed. But the basis of the presumption is gone whenever the ability to resort to the court has been taken away; for in such a case the creditor has not the time within which to bring his suit that the statute contemplated he should have. Greenwald v. Appell, 17 Fed. Rep. 140. The object of the statute is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims, and prevent them from showing up at great distances of time, and surprising the parties or their representatives when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost, or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time, or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses. Hurley v. Cox, 2 N. W. Rep. 705;Spring v. Gray, 5 Mason, 523.
1. WHEN STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN. Where a statute of limitations provided that in cases where the cause of action had already accrued at the passage of the act a party should have the whole period prescribed by the act, after its passage, in which to commence action, and by another act of the same legislative session it was provided that said statute and others should take effect at a day subsequent to the date of their actual passage and approval by the governor, it was held that the period of limitation did not begin to run until the statute took effect, as provided in the second act. Schneider v. Hussey, 1 Pac. Rep. 343;Rogers v. Vass, 6 Iowa, 408.
(1) Agents. As a general rule the statute of limitations does not commence to run in favor of an agent and against his principal until the principal has knowledge of some wrong committed by the agent inconsistent with the principal's rights. Perry v. Smith, 2 Pac. Rep. 784;Green v. Williams, 21 Kan. 64;Auld v. Butcher, 22 Kan. 400;Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Ang. Lim. § 179 et seq.; 7 Wait, Act. & Def. 238....
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