Bradley v. Commonwealth ex rel. Cameron
| Docket Number | 2022-SC-0076-TG, (2021-CA-0280) |
| Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
| Citation | 653 S.W.3d 870 |
| Parties | Brandis BRADLEY, Individually, and in Her Official Capacity as President of the Floyd County Bar Association, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky EX REL. Daniel CAMERON, Attorney General; and Michael Adams, Secretary of State, Appellees |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Janet Lynn Stumbo, Ned Barry Pillersdorf, Prestonsburg, Ryan Douglas Mosley, Pillersdorf Law Offices.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Courtney Elizabeth Albini, Office of the Solicitor General, Brett Robert Nolan, Matthew Franklin Kuhn, Office of the Attorney General.
Brandis Bradley brings this appeal challenging a ruling of the Franklin Circuit Court concerning the constitutionality of House Bill (HB) 348,1 which partially adopted this Court's 2016 Proposed Judicial Redistricting Plan, including this Court's recommendation that one of the divisions of general jurisdiction in the 31st Judicial Circuit (Floyd Circuit) be eliminated based on insufficient workload. We accepted transfer from the Court of Appeals because this case raises important questions regarding the constitutionality of HB 348 and constitutional standing. After careful review, we conclude that Bradley's claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.
In 2016, this Court issued a "Proposed Kentucky Judicial Redistricting Plan for 2022." The plan recommended an appropriate number of judges within each judicial circuit based on the results of the Judicial Workload Assessment Report.
Then, in February 2017, this Court issued a "Certification of Necessity: Realignment of Judicial Circuits and Districts and Reallocation of Existing Judgeships." The 2017 Certification "certifie[d] to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky the need to realign circuit and district judicial boundaries and reallocate existing judgeships" in the manner prescribed within the Certification. Paragraph VI of the 2017 Certification provided that:
The Supreme Court finds and declares that each section of the judicial redistricting plan set forth in this Certification of Necessity is essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon each other. Accordingly, the provisions are nonseverable and if any part of the Judicial redistricting plan is rejected, then the entire Certification of Necessity is rendered void and unenforceable.
During the 2018 Regular Session, the General Assembly passed HB 348, which partially adopted this Court's Judicial Redistricting Plan. HB 348 eliminated one of the divisions of general jurisdiction in the 31st Judicial Circuit (Floyd Circuit) effective January 2, 2023.
After passage of HB 348, this Court issued a second Certification of Necessity in July 2018. The 2018 Certification "certifie[d] to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky the need to eliminate one circuit court division in the 31st Judicial Circuit Floyd Circuit Court." The 2018 Certification also stated: "Pursuant to HB 348 (2018), Section 9, implementation herein shall have a delayed effective date of January 2, 2023; no further Certification of Necessity shall be required of this Court."
Bradley initiated this action in Franklin Circuit Court in October 2020. The original plaintiffs were Former Supreme Court Justice Janet L. Stumbo and Brandis Bradley, individually, and as President of the Floyd County Bar Association. Stumbo and Bradley argued that HB 348's elimination of one division of general jurisdiction in the Floyd Circuit Court violates Section 112(3) of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that "the General Assembly having power upon certification of the necessity therefor by the Supreme Court, to change the number of circuit judges in any judicial circuit." Specifically, Stumbo and Bradley contend that passage of HB 348 before this Court's 2018 Certification of Necessity was procedurally improper under Section 112(3) of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Commonwealth intervened as a defendant in this action and moved to dismiss. Then, Stumbo and Bradley filed a motion for summary judgment. The Franklin Circuit Court simultaneously granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and granted, in part, and denied, in part, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. In its mixed ruling, the circuit court first dismissed Stumbo for lack of standing. Then, the court concluded that HB 348 was unconstitutional because it violated the purported procedure by which the branches must act under Section 112(3) of the Constitution. Even so, the circuit court found Sections 6 and 7 of HB 348 to be valid under the principles of judicial comity, reasoning that "the Kentucky Supreme Court essentially ratified the General Assembly's actions by issuing the 2018 Certification of Necessity."
Bradley, but not Stumbo, appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Stumbo entered a notice of appearance as co-counsel for Bradley before the Court of Appeals. After the case was fully briefed and oral argument was heard, the Court of Appeals recommended transfer to this Court under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 74.02(5). We accepted transfer and ordered an expedited briefing schedule. We now address the parties’ arguments on appeal.
"We review the trial court's issuance of summary judgment de novo and any factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous."2 Whether a party has standing is a jurisdictional question of law that is reviewed de novo.3
The Commonwealth raises two threshold—potentially dispositive—issues for our consideration. First, the Commonwealth contends that Bradley's direct brief before this Court does not comply with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure ("CR"). Second, the Commonwealth argues that Bradley lacks standing. We address each argument in turn.
CR 76.12(4) provides the appropriate form and content for briefs. Parties who cavalierly disregard the requirements of CR 76.12(4) do so at their own peril. "A brief may be stricken for failure to comply with any substantial requirement of [ ] Rule 76.12."4 Moreover, an appellate court has discretion to either disregard a particular argument5 or dismiss an appeal altogether for noncompliance with CR 76.12.6
In granting transfer from the Court of Appeals, we ordered an expedited briefing schedule and stated that each party was permitted to submit a direct brief to this Court. As a result, submission of a direct brief to this Court was left within the parties’ discretion. Even so, upon choosing to submit a brief to this Court, the parties were required to comply with CR 76.12, unless the Court directed alternative briefing instructions.
The Commonwealth is correct that Bradley's direct brief does not comply with CR 76.12 in several respects. For instance, the brief does not comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v), which require "ample" citations "to the record" to support a party's factual assertions. Indeed, Bradley's statement of the case totals only three sentences and includes no citations to the record.
Moreover, CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires parties to include an argument section "with ample supportive references to the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review." But here, Bradley's argument section is less than four pages long, cites only one case, and includes no statement regarding preservation of issues for appellate review.
Instead of complying with the requirements of CR 76.12, Bradley sought to rely on the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals. The practice of incorporating briefing from other courts by reference is not permitted by our civil rules or caselaw. This Court is not obliged to scour the briefs filed in lower courts to find what arguments the parties advance on appeal, what legal authority supports those arguments, and the factual basis underlying those arguments. If parties choose to file a brief before this Court, they must comply with the substantive requirements outlined in CR 76.12.
Of course, as Bradley points out, this action comes to us in an unusual procedural posture. This case was fully briefed before the Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court after oral argument before the Court of Appeals but before the Court of Appeals rendered any decision. And we acknowledge Bradley's likely frustration with transfer of the matter after full briefing and oral argument before the Court of Appeals. But upon deciding to file a direct brief in this Court, Bradley was required to comply with CR 76.12, and she failed to do so here.
Even so, "[w]hen an appellate advocate fails to abide by [ CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) ] our options are: (1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike the brief or its offending portions; or (3) to review the issues raised in the brief for manifest injustice only."7
Considering the unusual procedural posture of this case, we exercise our discretion to overlook the deficiencies in Bradley's direct brief and proceed with review.
"[T]he existence of a plaintiff's standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the courts of this Commonwealth."8 This Court has adopted the federal standard for constitutional standing espoused in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife .9 "[A]ll Kentucky courts have the constitutional duty to ascertain the issue of constitutional standing, acting on their own motion, to ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court, because the issue of constitutional standing is not waivable."10 This practice "conforms to the general understanding of...
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Graham v. Adams
...of its members 'only if its members could have sued in 13 their own right.'"[3] Id. (quoting Bradley v. Commonwealth ex rel. Cameron, 653 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Ky. 2022)). We have previously set forth the quantum of proof required for an association to demonstrate that its members could sue in t......