Bradley v. Fenn

• Citation: 103 Conn. 1,130 A. 126
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 30 July 1925
• Parties: BRADLEY ET AL., SELECTMEN, v. FENN ET AL.

130 A. 126

103 Conn. 1

BRADLEY ET AL., SELECTMEN, v. FENN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 30, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Litchfield County; Leonard J. Nickerson Judge.

Action by Edwin A. Bradley and others, Selectmen of Thomaston against Arthur H. Fenn and others. Judgment for defendants and plaintiffs appeal. Error, judgment set aside, and cause remanded, with directions.

Clayton L. Klein, of Waterbury, and J. Howard Roberts, of Thomaston, for appellants.

Samuel A. Herman, of Winsted, for appellees.

CURTIS, J.

This action is brought by the selectmen of Thomaston under General Statutes, § 1650, as amended by chapter 114 of the Public Acts of 1921, to compel the son and grandsons of one Jane Fenn to contribute to her support from the time of the service of the complaint. There is no controversy that Jane Fenn is a poor person, between 80 and 85 years of age, and unable to support herself, with a settlement in Thomaston, and that in April, 1923, she was duly committed to the Connecticut Hospital for the Insane at Middletown, where she has since remained. The cost of maintenance of said Jane Fenn at that hospital is $6.32 per week. All over the statutory sum of $3 paid by the town of Thomaston has been and is paid by the state, and the state was represented at the trial. The defendants are Arthur H. Fenn, a son of Jane Fenn, now 57 years of age, Frank Fenn, a grandson of Jane and son of Arthur, 28 years of age, Philip L. Fenn, a grandson of Jane and son of Arthur, 22 years of age, Merton W. Fenn, a grandson and son of Arthur, a minor 20 years of age. The first question presented by the record is whether, under the statute, a minor can be a party defendant in such an action. We are of the opinion that a minor " able to provide support" may be a defendant. Whether or not the minor is " able to provide support" is not a preliminary question, but a question to be proved on the trial as against any other defendant relative. This statute, which incorporates a rule of public policy, does not intend to excuse minors, of means and able to provide support, from the duty of contributing to the support of poor relations within the statutory degree of relationship, and thus impose the burden upon the public. See, in this connection, Fitzgerald v. Donoher, 48 Neb. 852, 67 N.W. 880; McClay v. Worrall, 18 Neb. 44, 24 N.W. 429.

In view of this ruling the case must be remanded, with directions to restore the minor as a defendant, and to grant the motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and to proceed with the case against Merton W. Fenn. The court ruled that no cause of action was proved against any of the defendants. If that ruling was correct, the judgment in their favor should stand. The court ruled that, under the statute, properly construed, the facts found would not support the conclusion that Jane's son, Arthur, or either of her grandsons, Frank or Philip L., was able to contribute to her support. We think this conclusion cannot legally and logically be drawn from the facts found.

Whether or not a relative is able to contribute to the support of a poor relation is a conclusion of fact to be drawn from the facts found as to the situation in life of such person, including his accumulated means, his ability and capacity for earning money. Such conclusion of fact is open to attack as a question of law if claimed to have been illegally or illogically drawn from the subordinate facts.

As to the construction of the statute, we said in Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 157, 44 A. 41: " This statute is a remedial one, and to be liberally construed." It is remedial in relation to the poor person, and, in relation to the public bodies upon whom the support falls if not borne by the relations, the liberal construction is to be applied in the interests of such parties. A liberal construction does not mean an unreasonable one.

We turn then to the findings as to the son, Arthur, and the grandsons, Frank and Philip L., to consider whether the conclusion that they are not able to contribute is legally or logically drawn from the facts. The court found as to Arthur as follows:

" The defendant Arthur H. Fenn is the only surviving son of the said Jane Fenn, is 57 years of age, and has a small tract of land with an old house and barn thereon, located in a remote part of the town of Thomaston, which he purchased in 1919 from his mother, the said Jane Fenn, for $1,300. The money to pay for such land was furnished by the wife of said Arthur, who drew the same from a savings bank in Waterbury where she had it deposited. He gets his potatoes and garden vegetables from the farm, which also includes other land belonging to his wife. The stock on said farm, consisting of two cows and one horse, is not owned by said Arthur. His earnings for the year prior to the time of trial was about $235. That sum, with what he obtained from the farm, he used to support his wife and two children aged 8 and 12 years. His income was insufficient, and he was helped by his other

...