Bradley v. State

• Decision Date: 29 April 2022
• Docket Number: 21A-CR-1790
• Parties: Latisha L. Bradley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Latisha L. Bradley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 21A-CR-1790

Court of Appeals of Indiana

April 29, 2022

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

Appeal from the Daviess Superior Court The Honorable Dean A Sobecki, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 14D01-1907-CM-1126

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Anne Medlin Lowe James Piatt Williams & Piatt, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BROWN, JUDGE.

[¶1] Latisha L. Bradley appeals her conviction for battery as a class B misdemeanor. Bradley raises several issues, which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting statements by Calvin Jackson on a recording taken from a law enforcement officer's body camera and in excluding an affidavit of Jackson; and

II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Bradley's conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2] On July 9, 2019, an argument between Bradley and Calvin Jackson began over the discipline of one of their children, and the disagreement continued through July 10th. On the second day, Bradley contacted dispatch for the Washington Police Department asking to speak with an officer, and after speaking with her briefly, Washington Police Officer Barry Hudson told her to come to the police station. Bradley brought three children with her to the station, and after she arrived, Officer Hudson spoke with her and Jackson on the steps outside of the station.

[¶3] On July 22, 2019, the State charged Bradley with battery as a class B misdemeanor. At the jury trial, Bradley represented herself pro se. The alleged victim, Bradley's partner Jackson, did not appear at the trial because the State was unable to locate and serve him with a subpoena.

[¶4] Officer Hudson testified that a disagreement between Bradley and Jackson began over the discipline of one of their children, and "the fight started on July 9th and it rolled into July 10th." Transcript Volume II at 53. He stated that dispatch received a call at 4:41 p.m. on July 10th, he spoke to Bradley over the phone, "she gave [him] a brief story" about "what had taken place that day," and the latest incident of physical violence in the disagreement had occurred thirty minutes prior to the call. Id. at 48. He agreed with the statement that Jackson reported that Bradley struck him on July 10th. When the prosecutor asked Officer Hudson to clarify if Jackson had stated the date on which he had been struck, Bradley objected and asserted that the statements referred to by Officer Hudson were hearsay and she could not confront her accuser. The court overruled the hearsay objection "under the excited utterance exception to hearsay" and stated that "[t]he other statements that you're talking about, quite frankly, don't enter into this argument over the hearsay, and we'll deal with whatever other statements there may be when you need to enter those into evidence." Id. at 52.

[¶5] Officer Hudson continued testifying, stating that his conversation with Jackson had been recorded on his body camera and, according to Jackson, on the 10th at 1:00 p.m., Bradley "doused him with windshield washer fluid," she "retrieved a knife from the kitchen and began to come after [Jackson] and [their] son," Jackson told her "that he was going to leave her, and she became angry again and struck him again," and she had hit him in the face. Id. at 53-54. Bradley did not otherwise object during the examination of Officer Hudson until the prosecutor moved to admit the body camera recording, arguing the video was inadmissible because it violated her "Fifth Amendment rights as well as [her] Sixth Amendment rights," and she stated that "[i]t's also inadmissible because it's hearsay and Officer Hudson has bias toward me." Id. at 55. The court overruled the objections and admitted the video into evidence.

[¶6] The prosecutor played portions of the body camera recording, and Officer Hudson answered accompanying questions. Officer Hudson testified that Jackson stated that Bradley beat him on July 9th and July 10th, and their children were crying and attempted to shield him from Bradley on the 10th. According to Officer Hudson, Bradley admitted that, on the 10th, she struck Jackson on his arm and head, and she stated, "I slapped him in the face, yes, I did." Id. at 58. On redirect, Officer Hudson testified that Bradley arrived at the police station "[w]ithin five, six minutes" after the original call to dispatch. Id. at 66.

[¶7] At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Bradley sought to admit "a sworn affidavit that was given to the Prosecution by Calvin Jackson." Id. at 73. The prosecutor objected to the document as hearsay. Bradley stated that Jackson was "not a protected person," "didn't show up today," the prosecutor had "not given [her] any chance to depose him, speak with him," and it was her "Sixth Amendment right to talk with [her] accuser." Id. at 74. The court sustained the objection and declined to admit the affidavit. The jury found Bradley guilty. The court sentenced Bradley to 180 days, ordered that she serve one weekend in jail, and suspended the remainder of the sentence to supervised probation.

Discussion

I.

[¶8] Bradley argues the admission of Officer Hudson's testimony concerning Jackson's statements on the recording and the court's exclusion of Jackson's affidavit violated her confrontation rights under the Indiana Constitution and Federal Constitution. She claims the trial court erred in admitting Officer Hudson's testimony about the body camera recording in which Jackson stated, in part that Bradley struck and poured windshield washer fluid on him. She also contends the court erred in not admitting Jackson's affidavit. With respect to Bradley's argument that she was denied her confrontation rights, because the issue is one of constitutional law, we review her claim de novo. See Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421-422 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo), trans. denied.

[¶9] The Indiana Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face[.]" Ind. Const. art. 1 § 13. Indiana's right to a face-to-face meeting is, "[t]o a considerable degree, . . . co-extensive" with the federal confrontation right. Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 756 (Ind. 2016). But while the language of Indiana's provision has much the same meaning and history as that employed in the Sixth Amendment, it has a special concreteness and is more detailed. Id.

When a witness states what the declarant said as here pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule, the constitutional requirement of a face-to-face meeting is fulfilled because the witness reporting the hearsay is on the stand. Id. In other words, "in that situation the declarant is not the witness." Id. Here, the witness recounting Jackson's out-of-court statements was Officer Hudson, testifying under oath, and Bradley confronted him face-to-face on cross-examination. Bradley's Indiana constitutional right of confrontation was therefore not violated. See id. at 756-757 (observing that "[t]he witnesses recounting [declarant's] out-of-court statements were the Paramedic and the Forensic Nurse, both of whom testified under oath and whom Ward confronted face to face" and holding that defendant's "Indiana constitutional right of confrontation was therefore not violated").

[¶10] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the introduction of testimonial statements by a non-testifying witness, unless the witness is "unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 757 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004)). The United States Supreme Court did not provide an exhaustive definition of "testimonial" statements. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354). Rather, it declared that the label "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Id. The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006). "In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant." Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-359, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). "To determine whether the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation is 'to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,' which would render the resulting statements nontestimonial, we objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties." Id. at 359, 131 S.Ct. at 1156 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266). "Formality is not the sole touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry . . . although...