Bradley v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-223,79-223
• Citation: 378 So.2d 870
• Parties: Jimmy BRADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 870

378 So.2d 870

Jimmy BRADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 79-223.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 21, 1979.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Michael E. Raiden, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Appellant Jimmy Bradley was charged in a single information with two counts of burglary and one count of dealing in stolen property. Upon defense motion the trial court severed the burglary charges from the charge of dealing in stolen property and two separate trials followed. Having been convicted on all counts in each trial, appellant now contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence at the burglary trial testimony concerning the offense of dealing in stolen property and allowing into evidence at the trial for dealing in stolen property testimony relating to the two burglaries. He asserts that admission of this evidence relating to other crimes went beyond the dictates set out under the Williams Rule (Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959)).

All of the charges against appellant arose out of three separate burglaries allegedly committed by appellant and Albert Moore. The first burglary, of the residence of Ruth Fleming, occurred on the evening of June 15, 1978. A coin collection taken during this burglary was subsequently sold to a coin dealer, who identified appellant as one of the two men from whom he had purchased the coins. The second and third burglaries occurred on the evening of June 28, 1978. On that evening, Mary R. King awoke to find two men inside her home. The men threatened her, and she gave them five dollars, which was all the money she had. That same evening, Marie Muller was awakened by two men inside her home. The two intruders took about eighteen dollars from Muller. Neither King nor Muller was able to identify appellant as one of the burglars. However, appellant's coperpetrator testified and identified appellant as the other burglar.

During the course of appellant's trial for the Muller and King burglaries, the state, over objection, introduced evidence under the Williams Rule concerning the Fleming burglary and the offense of dealing in stolen property. Similarly, during the trial for dealing in stolen property, the trial court allowed the state to present evidence of the Muller and King burglaries. Appellant contends that in both trials the evidence of the "collateral offenses" had no relevant purpose other than to show bad character or criminal propensity and thus was inadmissible under Williams v. State, supra.

At the outset, we once again point out that the Williams Rule is not a rule of exclusion, but rather is a rule of admissibility. In Williams the supreme court made it quite clear that evidence of other crimes is admissible if such evidence is relevant to prove any fact in issue other than the bad character of the accused or his propensity to commit criminal acts.

After a review of the record, we can see no valid basis for introducing evidence of the Fleming burglary during the trial for the Muller and King burglaries. While it is true that all three burglaries occurred in the same neighborhood within two weeks of each other, somewhat similar "fabric marks" were found in each residence, and entrance was gained through a window in each instance, we hold that the evidence of the Fleming burglary had no relevance to the Muller and King burglaries other than to show bad character and criminal propensity on the part of appellant. As such it was inadmissible. More than a mere similarity between the collateral crimes and the offense with which the defendant is charged is necessary. Davis v. State, 376 So.2d 1198 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Duncan v. State, 291 So.2d 241 (Fla.2d DCA), Cert. denied, 297 So.2d 833 (Fla.1974); Cf. Dinkens v. State, 291 So.2d 122 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); See also Paul v. State, 340 So.2d 1249 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), Cert. denied, 348 So.2d 953 (Fla.1977); Drayton v. State, 292 So.2d 395 (Fla.3d DCA), Cert. denied, 300 So.2d 900 (Fla.1974).

There is even less basis to justify introducing the evidence of dealing in stolen property in the trial for the two burglaries, or to justify introducing evidence of the two burglaries in the trial for dealing in stolen property. The evidence of the dealing in stolen property had no relevance to the Muller and King burglaries;...