Brads v. First Baptist Church of Germantown, Ohio

• Decision Date: 18 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 13653,13653
• Citation: 624 N.E.2d 737,89 Ohio App.3d 328
• Parties: BRADS, Appellee, v. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF GERMANTOWN, OHIO, Appellant. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 328

89 Ohio App.3d 328

624 N.E.2d 737

BRADS, Appellee, v. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF GERMANTOWN, OHIO, Appellant. ^*

No. 13653.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.

Decided June 18, 1993.

Christopher J. Cornyn, Springboro, for appellee.

Mark R. Chilson, Dayton, for appellant.

GRADY, Presiding Judge.

Defendant First Baptist Church of Germantown, Ohio ("Church") appeals from a judgment in favor of its former pastor, C. Marvin Brads, on his claim that the Church breached its contract to pay him retirement benefits. The Church argues that there was insufficient evidence of a contract, and that if there was a breach of contract, the Church should be permitted to specifically perform instead of being ordered to pay lump sum damages. The Church also argues several evidentiary errors. We find no error, except as to the damages order. The matter will be remanded for a new trial on that issue.

I

Marvin Brads became pastor of the First Baptist Church of Germantown, Ohio, in January 1958. In June 1971, Brads suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. While Brads was recuperating, an officer of the Church told Brads that the Church had voted to pay his full salary for the remainder of his lifetime. That promise was unperformed because Brads subsequently recovered and resumed his pastoral duties.

In April 1980, Brads again encountered heart problems. Upon the advice of his doctor, Brads approached the deacons of the Church about retirement. Brads proposed that his salary be reduced after retirement through a series of gradual step-downs, to an amount approximately one-third of the salary he was then receiving. Brads' proposal was accepted by the deacons. Under the terms of their agreement the Church placed Brads on disability retirement status, conferred an honorary title on him, gave him office space in the church, and allotted him retirement benefits according to the agreed step-down schedule. Brads was required to aid, assist and advise whomever the Church called as a new pastor, to the extent Brads' health would allow.

Brads and the Church deacons jointly recommended to the congregation that it adopt the agreement, which the congregation did, unanimously, at a regularly called business meeting in 1980. Brads then left his position as pastor and his benefits commenced.

In 1985, the congregation was advised by a Church officer that the benefits paid to Brads under the 1980 agreement should continue for Brads' lifetime. The congregation once again unanimously approved and reaffirmed the agreement.

Brads received his benefits from 1980 through early July 1990, when he was notified by Church officials that he had been dismissed from the membership of the Church and that no more payments would be made to him. Other benefits, such as free office space, were also discontinued.

On December 21, 1990, Brads filed an action against the Church and other defendants based on several claims, including breach of contract. Through a series of amended complaints and dismissals of parties and claims, Brads' cause of action was finally reduced to a single claim against the Church, that the Church had breached its contract to pay Brads' retirement benefits for life.

A motion for summary judgment by the Church was overruled by the trial court. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on Brads' breach of contract claim. The defense offered by the Church was that there was no legally binding contract that required the Church to pay Brads' benefits for his life and that the payments to Brads had been a gift by the Church.

Motions by the Church for a directed verdict were overruled. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brads. Motions by the Church for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial and remittitur were overruled. This timely appeal by the Church followed.

II

For its first assignment of error the Church claims:

"The trial court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellant in regard to the claims of plaintiff-appellee in the amended complaint, where the facts and evidence available to the court, pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, construed most strongly in favor of plaintiff-appellee, demonstrated no genuine issue of material fact and it appeared from such evidence that reasonable minds could only come to but one conclusion: that a legally enforceable contract for a lifetime payment was never created."

Civ.R. 56(C) provides:

" * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor."

The burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact falls upon the moving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 8 O.O.3d 73, 375 N.E.2d 46. A motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial. Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095. All evidence submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment must be construed most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. Morris v. First Natl. Bank (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 25, 50 O.O.2d 47, 254 N.E.2d 683. Before summary judgment may be granted the court must find that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that favors the movant. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267. In reviewing summary judgment an appellate court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Osborne v. Lyles (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 587 N.E.2d 825. When the evidence is so viewed, if reasonable minds can come to differing conclusions, the motion for summary judgment should be overruled. Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 21 O.O.3d 267, 424 N.E.2d 311.

The Church correctly observes that at the trial of this breach-of-contract action the burden of proving the existence of a valid, binding contract was on plaintiff Brads. To constitute a valid contract the following must be present:

" * * * parties capable of contracting; a lawful subject matter; a sufficient consideration; a meeting of the minds of the parties; an actual agreement between the parties to do or to forbear doing the thing proposed in the agreement; and a compliance with the law in respect of any formal requisites which may pertain to the contract." (Footnotes omitted.) 17 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 440-441, Contracts, Section 11.

One of the elements essential to a valid contract is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the terms of the contract. Noroski v. Fallet (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 77, 2 OBR 632, 442 N.E.2d 1302.

The Church argues that the evidence submitted in connection with its motion for summary judgment demonstrates that there was no "meeting of the minds" between Brads and the Church that the payments by the Church to Brads were to be for his lifetime. The Church points out that the word "lifetime" was never used in the April 1980 contract. Thus, the Church argues, because an element necessary to the formation of a valid contract is missing, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that no valid, binding contract existed.

Brads states, in both an affidavit and a deposition, that in April 1980, he and the deacons recommended a plan, which the Church accepted, providing for disability retirement and a salary step-down to one-third of his regular salary, which he was to receive for life. Brads also states that the Church reaffirmed the agreement in 1985.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brads, as we are required by Civ.R. 56(C), we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact was presented by the evidence, that is, whether there was a meeting of the minds between Brads and the Church that the payments by the Church to Brads were to continue for his lifetime, and that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on this issue. Thus, the trial court properly overruled the motion for summary judgment by the Church.

This assignment of error is overruled.

III

For its second and third assignments of error, the Church states:

"The trial court erred in overruling defendant-appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, where, upon examination of the materiality of the evidence, there was no evidence of substantial probative value to support a finding of an essential element of a legally binding contract: consideration.

"The trial court erred in denying defendant-appellant's motion for a directed verdict, where the pleadings and evidence presented by plaintiff-appellee demonstrated that defendant-appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no probative evidence to support a finding of an essential element of a legally binding contract: consideration."

We will consider these assignments of error together, as both are based upon the same claim, a lack of consideration.

Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides for motions for a directed verdict.

"A court may properly grant a motion for a directed verdict...