Bradshaw v. CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DIST., 02CA0940.

• Citation: 98 P.3d 886
• Decision Date: 11 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02CA0940.,02CA0940.
• Parties: Donna T. BRADSHAW and Ken Bradshaw, personally and as parents and next friends of Mia Bradshaw; and Mia Bradshaw, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, and the Board of Education of Cherry Creek School District No. 5, in its official capacity, a Colorado municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

98 P.3d 886

Donna T. BRADSHAW and Ken Bradshaw, personally and as parents and next friends of Mia Bradshaw; and Mia Bradshaw, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, and the Board of Education of Cherry Creek School District No. 5, in its official capacity, a Colorado municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02CA0940.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

September 11, 2003.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing January 15, 2004.

Certiorari Denied October 18, 2004.

Kutz & Bethke, William P. Bethke, Kristin A. Kutz, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Banta, Hoyt & Everall, L.L.C., Richard J. Banta, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Opinion by Judge CRISWELL.¹

In this public school disability discrimination case, plaintiffs, Donna T. and Ken Bradshaw, personally and as parents and next friends of Mia Bradshaw, their minor daughter, appeal the trial court's judgment in favor of defendants, Cherry Creek School District No. 5 and its Board of Education. We affirm the judgment.

Mia was born with cranio-facial deformities and, as a result, experiences hearing and visual impairments and a distinctive appearance. As determined by the trial court, Mia is a child with a disability, who is entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (2002)(IDEA).

At the beginning of the 1996-97 school year, the Bradshaws lived in the district and enrolled Mia in second grade at Willow Creek Elementary School. During that school year, however, the Bradshaws moved out of the district, but Mia was allowed to complete the second grade at Willow Creek. In addition, she also attended the third and fourth grades at Willow Creek by reapplying each year for interdistrict enrollment.

However, the district denied her application to reenroll in the fifth grade for the 1999-2000 school year. As grounds for the denial, the school principal stated that Mia's special education program exceeded the district's capacity limit and that the school was not accepting special education students who live outside its attendance area.

The Bradshaws requested review of the principal's denial in two ways. They first appealed to the district's admission appeals committee as permitted by district policy. Based on the Bradshaws' written submissions, the committee concluded that the denial was made for reasons permitted under district policy, and therefore, it upheld the decision.

Second, the Bradshaws simultaneously sought relief through the hearing procedures under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 C.F.R. § 104.36. After briefing by the parties, a hearing officer dismissed the proceeding, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed that ruling.

While the ALJ's review was pending, the Bradshaws moved back into the district and reenrolled Mia at Willow Creek as a resident student within its attendance area. They incurred moving costs and other expenses as a result.

The Bradshaws initiated two civil actions. In the first, they alleged numerous grounds for relief, based on the district's admission appeals committee procedures. They sought a declaratory judgment that the district had violated the Colorado school choice statutes, §§ 22-32-116(2)(b) and 22-36-101(1)(b), C.R.S.2002, and that it had deprived them of procedural due process of law.

In their second complaint, the Bradshaws alleged that: (1) the foregoing state statutes are incorporated into the IDEA, and the district's violation of those statutes denied Mia a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in violation of that statute; (2) the district is liable to them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the committee's violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution; and (3) in denying Mia admission based on her disability and in refusing to allow her to continue in her previous program until she moved back into the district, the district engaged in intentional and invidious discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

All parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the Bradshaws' motion and granted the district's motion. The Bradshaws' appeals from the dismissal of both cases have been consolidated.

I.

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Such a judgment is a drastic remedy that is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c); Shaw v. Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33-J ex rel. Bd. of Educ., 21 P.3d 446 (Colo.App.2001).

II.

The Bradshaws contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their claim for declaratory relief that the district violated the school choice statutes, §§ 22-32-116(2)(b) and 22-36-101(1)(b), C.R.S.2002. We disagree.

Initially, we note that this claim is not moot. In their complaint, the Bradshaws alleged that they had incurred the cost of moving back into the district when Mia was wrongfully denied reenrollment at Willow Creek. As a result, they sought ancillary equitable relief akin to damages, as well as declaratory relief. The trial court is authorized to grant both declaratory and further relief as may be necessary and appropriate. See C.R.C.P. 57(h); cf. Carney v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 30 P.3d 861 (Colo.App.2001)

(case is moot only if the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect).

A.

The Bradshaws first contend that Mia was entitled to reenroll for the 1999-2000 school year at Willow Creek as a former district resident under § 22-32-116(2)(b). We disagree.

That statute provides:

If a pupil is enrolled in an elementary school and becomes a nonresident subsequent to the time of enrollment or becomes a nonresident during the time period between school years, the school district shall allow the pupil to remain enrolled in or to reenroll in said elementary school [subject to certain requirements that are not relevant to the issue here presented].

(Emphasis added.)

When construing a statute, reviewing courts should first consider the statutory language and give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. If the meaning is unambiguous, courts should not resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction, such as the legislative intent. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo.2000).

Here, we conclude that the statute is unambiguous. If the child becomes a nonresident of the district during the school year, the child may "remain enrolled" for that school year. If the child becomes a nonresident after the end of that school year, but before the start of the next year, the child is entitled to "reenroll" for the following year.

However, a child who became a nonresident during the school year and "remain[ed] enrolled" during the school year is given no right to "reenroll" for the following school year. Reenrollment is limited to those students who become nonresidents during the time period between school years and extends only to the following school year.

The Bradshaws, relying upon a single statement made by the sponsor of the bill which became § 22-32-116(2)(b), assert that this statute grants to every child who becomes a nonresident, irrespective of when that event occurs, the right to "reenroll" during each of the following school years, until that child completes the whole of the elementary education offered by that school. We disagree.

The bill's sponsor said, during his introductory remarks to the committee, that the bill was intended to allow a nonresident child to fulfill his or her "tenure" at the school—a term that he did not define or describe. Hearing on H.B. 94-1174 before the House Education Committee, 59th General Assembly, Second Session (Feb. 7, 1994).

As we have noted, however, we do not consider the statute to be ambiguous in any manner. Hence, we may not consider legislative history when interpreting it. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., supra. Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the legislator's remarks, we would not change our conclusion as to the meaning of the statutory language.

Here, then, because Mia became a nonresident during the school year, § 22-32-116(2)(b) entitled her to complete that year in Willow Creek. Thereafter, however, this statute did not apply to her later requests to reenroll at that school for subsequent years.

B.

The Bradshaws also contend that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to their claim under the general school choice provision, § 22-36-101, C.R.S.2002. They maintain that the district applied the incorrect staffing standard to determine whether the relevant program, known as the "core group," had space and that the teaching staff actually had time to help Mia. Again, we disagree.

Section 22-36-101(3)(a), C.R.S.2002, requires a school to allow a child who is not a resident of the district to enroll in that school, unless "[t]here is a lack space or teaching staff within a particular program or school requested, in which case, priority shall be given to resident students applying for admission to such program or school."

It was under the aegis of this statute that Mia was allowed to enroll in Willow Creek for her third and fourth grade programs, and the district relied upon this statute in denying her request to enroll in the fifth grade program.

The district's regulation provides that a program shall be considered closed to any nonresident if that enrollment would exceed the district's staffing standard. This standard for special education programs does not limit the number to be enrolled for special education programs generally. Instead, it limits the number for each of eight specific special education programs, including "learning disabled" and "ILC."

The parties stipulated to a definition of the core group, and...