Bradshaw v. Jones

• Decision Date: 18 October 1899
• Citation: 52 S.W. 1072,103 Tenn. 331
• Parties: BRADSHAW v. JONES.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

52 S.W. 1072

103 Tenn. 331

BRADSHAW v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 18, 1899

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; W. R. Hicks, Judge.

Action by G. A. Jones, through Henry Jones, her father, as next friend, against John Bradshaw. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Templeton & Carlock, for appellant.

Shields & Mountcastle and S. G. Heiskell, for appellee.

WILKES J.

The plaintiff, who is a minor, by her father, as next friend sued the defendant for $10,000 damages for seduction. There was a trial before the court and a jury, and verdict for $5,000. A remitter of $2,750 was entered, and judgment was rendered for $2,250 and costs, and defendant has appealed and assigned errors.

It is said there is no evidence to support the verdict. The main contention is that, upon the testimony of the plaintiff herself, it is not a case of seduction, but simply a case of illicit intercourse, indulged in voluntarily by both parties and without such promises, inducements, solicitations, or importunity as would make it seduction. It is difficult to draw the line between seduction and mere illicit intercourse which is not actionable. Our cases go as far as any to sustain the action. In Reed v. Williams, 5 Sneed, 580, it was said that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant had used flattery or made false promises to accomplish his purposes, but it would be sufficient if the seduction resulted from the solicitation and importunity of the defendant to indulge in criminal intercourse, in consequence of which she consented. The court said it is enough that, by any means or acts, he tempted or persuaded his victim to the surrender of her chastity. This case is approved in Franklin v. McCorkle, 16 Lea 628, and the court said: "The cause of action is complete under our law, without any promise of marriage, or anything more than solicitation and importunity, to which the female yielded." It is further said in that case that the surrender of chastity is the cause of action; the means by which this is induced is immaterial, except in aggravation of damages. Both of these cases are referred to in Graham v. McReynolds, 90 Tenn. 678, 18 S.W. 272, and approved, and the learned special judge in that case says that persuasion alone is sufficient if yielded to, and the force of the holding is emphasized by the dissent of Lea, J., that persuasion alone should not be held sufficient. Id., 90 Tenn. 704, 18 S.W. 272. In the later case of Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342 et seq., 39 S.W. 341, the trial judge charged the jury that, in order to constitute seduction, it was not indispensable that the man use seductive arts or promises, but any act or promise or deception of the man, by which he overcomes the scruples of the woman, and induces her to have unlawful sexual intercourse with him, would constitute the offense. But if the woman, without being deceived, and without any false promises, deception, or artifice, voluntarily submits to the connection, the law affords her no remedy, and she cannot recover. The exception was made by the defendant, and it was insisted, that the law was too strongly stated against him; but it was said to be not erroneous, but a plain, simple statement of the law, that any jury could understand and not misconstrue. It was a case where it was claimed there were promises of marriage made to accomplish the act. We cannot hold that consent or willingness upon the part of the female to the act of intercourse will prevent its being a case of seduction. On the contrary, the willingness of the female is one of the essential elements of seduction, and is the feature which more than all others distinguishes seduction from rape. The crucial question in the case is, does the willingness arise out of the sexual desires or curiosity of the female, so that she only needs opportunity for the commission of the act, or is that willingness induced by some act, representation, or statement of the man, in the absence of which there would be no willingness upon the part of the woman? In the latter case, there is seduction; in the former, there is not. The courts have never defined what acts would be sufficient, nor how pressing should be the importunities, nor how often repeated the solicitations, to make the case one of seduction. It would be impossible to formulate any state of facts that would be required. It will be seen, however, from our decisions, that any act, solicitation, or statement, which...