Bradshaw v. Kinnaird

• Decision Date: 24 October 1958
• Citation: 319 S.W.2d 475
• Parties: Garland BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. Ann Bell Caldwell KINNAIRD and Virgil G. Kinnaird, Jr., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 475

319 S.W.2d 475

Garland BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. Ann Bell Caldwell KINNAIRD and Virgil G. Kinnaird, Jr. Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 24, 1958.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1959.

James F. Clay, Danville, for appellant.

Pierce Lively, Danville, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

Plaintiff Bradshaw brought this action to recover part of the purchase price of a farm sold to him by defendants Ann and Virgil Kinnaird. The jury returned a verdict for defendants.

In 1950 plaintiff and one Divert purchased the farm from defendants for the sum of $80,000. A month later plaintiff bought Divert's interest. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1281 et seq., the federal administrative agency created thereby was empowered to set the acreage of tobacco which could be grown on a farm. In 1950 the records of the government office indicated that the farm in question had a 14.3 acre tobacco base. The evidence shows that both parties believed that the farm had such a tobacco base.

In the years 1951 and 1952 plaintiff was allotted a 14.9 acre tobacco base, and in 1953 he was permitted to raise 13.4 acres of tobacco. Thus, for the years 1951 through 1953 the farm had an average authorized tobacco yield of 14.4 acres.

For the year 1954 plaintiff's allotted tobacco acreage was substantially reduced, and this is the subject of the controversy. In the years prior and subsequent to 1950 the principal defendant, Virgil Kinnaird, had leased on a year to year basis a farm owned by the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway which adjoined the farm in question. In 1954 it was discovered that the 14.3 tobacco base, applicable to plaintiff's farm, in fact included not only that farm but also the farm owned by the railway company and leased by defendants. Virgil brought this to the attention of the government office, which reduced the base of the plaintiff's farm by 34.9 percent, transferring such percentage to the farm owned by the railway. Plaintiff was then permitted to raise only 9.2 acres of tobacco on his farm. It is for this reduction in the tobacco base that the plaintiff seeks an adjustment in the price he paid for the farm.

Plaintiff based his suit on a number of theories: Fraud; misrepresentation; quasi contract; unjust enrichment; and mutual mistake. However, because we believe that the facts support the theory of mutual mistake, it is not necessary to consider plaintiff's other contentions.

From the record it is clear that both parties believed that the farm had a 14.3 tobacco base. Since the base was actually applicable to both farms, there was an obvious mutual mistake. There is no doubt that the mutual mistake was one of a material fact. To a substantial degree the value of a tobacco farm is determined by the tobacco acreage that the federal agency permits the farmer to raise. The record leaves us with no doubt that if in 1950 it were known that the tobacco base was 9.2 rather than 14.3 acres, the value of the farm would have been appreciably less. Thus there was existent a mutual mistake of material fact.

In this jurisdiction mutual mistakes have long been recognized as being actionable. Neale v. Wright, 130 Ky. 146, 112 S.W. 1115; Belknap v. Bank of Prospect, 259 Ky. 385, 82 S.W.2d 504; Silver v. Overhead Door Co., 311 Ky. 650, 225 S.W.2d 115. However, the usual remedies for a mutual mistake have been recision of the transaction or reformation of the contract or deed. In this action appellant sought neither, but rather sought to recover a sum not in excess of $15,450, representing the difference between $80,000, the price paid for the farm, and the value of the farm had it been known that it was a 9.2 acre tobacco farm. Thus plaintiff is seeking restitution for that part of the subject matter which he did not receive because of the mutual mistake.

No case has been cited which permits or denies restitution in a case similar to the one before us. However, the facts justify some form of relief. Plaintiff did not receive that for which he bargained, i. e., a 14.3 tobacco base. It is apparent that the purchase price would have been less if it were known at the time of the transaction that the then existent tobacco base was only two-thirds of 14.3. Since it would be impracticable to rescind the transaction and since no question of reformation is here...