Bradshaw v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 06-13182.

• Citation: 486 F.3d 1205
• Decision Date: 15 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-13182.,06-13182.
• Parties: Leola BRADSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, a governmental agency, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

486 F.3d 1205

Leola BRADSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, a governmental agency, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-13182.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 15, 2007.

Michael T. Burke, Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & McDuff, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael F. McAuliffe, McAuliffe Law Group, PL, West Palm Beach, FL, for Bradshaw.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BIRCH, FAY and CUDAHY,^* Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns a state's purported limitation on judgments against itself and its agencies, and what effect such a limitation has on a federal court judgment for violations of parallel federal and state civil rights statutes. A federal jury returned a verdict in favor of Leola Bradshaw against her employer, the School Board of Broward County, Florida, finding that Bradshaw's supervisor had sexually harassed her in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It found her entitled to $500,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. Unfortunately for her, that verdict does not support an enforceable $500,000 judgment because of federal and state law limits on compensatory damage awards. The parties dispute how much she should get: Bradshaw claims, and the district court agreed, that she is entitled to a $400,000 judgment; the School Board claims she is entitled only to $300,000.

Bradshaw's award is limited only by the combined effect of state and federal law limits on damages. The jury was not instructed to apportion its award of damages between Bradshaw's federal law and state law claims, which is as it should be. The substantive prohibitions of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act are not importantly different—indeed, the Florida CRA apes the relevant language of Title VII almost perfectly, compare Fla. Stat. § 760.10(a)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)—and the very same conduct violates both statutes. Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1195 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2004); Natson v. Eckerd Corp., 885 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004). To declare that any part of Bradshaw's injury could be remedied under only one of the two statutes would be senseless; it would be equally improper to let part of her injury go unremedied absent a legislative command to do so. So if Title VII cannot remedy the full extent of her injury because of its damage cap, then the remaining portion of her injury should be remedied as much as possible under the Florida CRA, and vice versa. Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2005); Hall v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 678-80 (6th Cir. 2003); Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2002); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 509-510 (9th Cir. 2000); Martini v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (D.C.Cir. 1999); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997).

We turn, then, to the relevant federal and state law limiting Bradshaw's recovery, starting with the federal cap. Compensatory damages may be awarded under Title VII for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), but the statute limits the award to certain fixed amounts, depending on how many people the defendant employs. The School Board in this case employs more than 500 people, so up to $300,000 may be awarded under Title VII for Bradshaw's suffering. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).

The federal cap does not limit damages under parallel state laws, however; Congress expressly disclaimed any such intention. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7 & 2000h-4. If possible, then, the remaining $200,000 of Bradshaw's jury verdict should be thrown into a judgment under the Florida CRA.

Normally that would be possible; the Florida CRA, unlike Title VII, contains no general damages cap. However, it does limit the "total amount of recovery against the state and its agencies and subdivisions," which the parties agree includes the School Board. Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). Recovery against the state "shall not exceed the limitation as set forth in s. 768.28(5)," a section of the Florida code captioned "Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions":

The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions therefor, which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $200,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $100,000 or $200,000 as the case may be; and that portion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. (emphasis added)

The parties' dispute concerns the effect of this provision. Bradshaw reads it to cap her recovery under the Florida CRA at $100,000, much like her recovery under Title VII is limited to $300,000. Arithmetic and the imperative to secure her the fullest possible recovery would produce a total judgment of $400,000. The district court agreed with her.

In so doing, it ignored an important difference between the two statutes. The Title VII provision caps only "the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section," 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (emphasis added), and other provisions of Title VII disclaim any intent to limit awards under other statutes. Section 768.28(5), by contrast, limits the size of "a claim or a judgment by any one person." One might read "claim" to indicate a claim under a particular statute, a cause of action, but Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5) limits the size of a claim or judgment, and a judgment can be based on multiple causes of action. Consequently, courts have read it to limit the entire judgment that an individual plaintiff can recover in a single case, regardless of the number of causes of action upon which the judgment is predicated. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Shapiro, 847 So.2d 981, 984-85 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2003) (holding that § 768.28(5) limits "how much a plaintiff can recover," regardless of the number of underlying factual incidents); Comer v. City of Palm Bay, 147 F.Supp.2d 1292, 1297-98 (M.D.Fla. 2001) ("This $100,000 per plaintiff limit is not affected by the presence of more than one underlying claim."); Sch. Bd. of Broward County v. Greene, 739 So.2d 668, 670 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1999) ("Greene is limited to $100,000 notwithstanding that Greene prevailed on two separate theories of recovery."); Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1452 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the provision "contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity up to $100,000 per plaintiff").¹

The result, in cases under both Title VII and the Florida CRA, is a state discrimination remedy sensitive to the size of a parallel federal remedy, which proportionately shrinks as the federal remedy grows. Say Bradshaw worked for a smaller employer, one with less than one hundred employees. Then she could recover only $50,000 of compensatory damages under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). Florida's sovereign immunity limit would not apply until the total judgment reached $100,000, so Bradshaw's $500,000 verdict would win her a $100,000 judgment ($50,000 under Title VII; $50,000 under the Florida CRA).

What would happen to Bradshaw's total recovery if the School Board employed between 100 and 200 employees, raising the potential Title VII recovery to $100,000? 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B). Nothing. Because the state law sovereign immunity limit applies to the entire judgment, the change only lets federal law eat up more of the limit. Bradshaw would still be entitled to a $100,000 judgment (all of which could be assigned to Title VII, if that mattered).

Of course, where Title VII authorizes an award greater than $100,000, the Supremacy Clause ensures that Florida can do nothing to limit the size and execution of a federal award. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Bowman v. City of New Orleans, 914 F.2d 711, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1990); Arnold v. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17, 843 F.2d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1988); Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1982); Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1980). In the present case, federal law conclusively permits Bradshaw to recover at least $300,000. But at the same time Florida law does nothing to extend the judgment the $100,000 limit has already been reached and Florida has not obligated the School Board any further.

Bradshaw argues that the Civil Rights Act contains anti-preemption provisions that, oddly enough, preempt Florida's limits on its remedy. She invokes the Act's 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4, which disclaims any intent to occupy the field of antidiscrimination law while nonetheless invalidating any state law "inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof." But Florida's limited remedy is consistent with Title VII, which permits states to enact their own antidiscrimination laws, but does not require states to do so, or to have them enforced with any particular remedy. There is "no statutory language or legislative history suggesting that the federal interest in state fair employment laws extends any farther than saving such laws from preemption by Title...