Brady v. Place

• Decision Date: 17 December 1925
• Citation: 41 Idaho 747,242 P. 314
• Parties: B. W. BRADY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM PLACE, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

242 P. 314

41 Idaho 747

B. W. BRADY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM PLACE, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 17, 1925

STATUTES-REPEAL BY IMPLICATION-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-PROCEDURE-INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT-"TRIED"-TRIAL BY JURY-CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY-ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTE-QUESTIONING CONSTITUTIONALITY-FINDINGS OF FACT-EVIDENCE-INSUFFICIENCY.

1. A subsequent statute does not repeal an earlier one by implication, unless the two are irreconcilable and inconsistent.

2. The provision of C. S., sec. 6270A, that, on appeal from the industrial accident board to the district court, the case shall be "tried" by the district court, does not imply a trial on the facts.

3. The right to a trial by jury was a common-law right, and is strictly enforceable only as to rights, remedies and actions triable by jury under the common law, and not necessarily as to new or different rights or remedies not in existence or in contemplation of the constitution when adopted.

4. A party seeking to enforce a statute, or to avail himself of its provisions, may not question its constitutionality.

5. Held, that certain findings of fact and the decision of the industrial accident board herein are contrary to law.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Kootenai County. Hon. W. F. McNaughton, Judge.

Appeal from judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the industrial accident board denying an award in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation law. Reversed and remanded.

Judgment of the district court reversed, and cause remanded with instructions to direct the industrial accident board to make and enter an award in favor of appellant. Costs to appellant.

E. V Boughton, for Appellant.

"The cause of the injury is not required to be proved with absolute certainty." (McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Ida. 773, 203 P. 1068.)

The legislature has no power to prescribe a jurisdiction for the district court less broad than that contained in sec. 20 of art. 5 of the constitution. (Fox v. Flynn, 27 Ida 580, 150 P. 44.)

The constitution contemplates that the district court shall have jurisdiction of all cases, both at law and in equity, and claimant was entitled to a jury trial, as provided by sec. 7 of art. 1.

If this court should determine that the claimant is entitled to compensation upon the record as submitted, it would be justified in ordering the district court to enter judgment in favor of claimant. (Johnston v. A. C. White Lumber Co., 37 Ida. 617, 217 P. 979.)

A. H Conner, Attorney General, and Herbert Wing and John W. Cramer, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondents.

"The well-settled rule that forbids this court to reverse a trial court in cases in which the evidence is conflicting but sufficient to sustain a decision applies to the findings of fact made by the industrial accident board in cases of this kind, and is applicable likewise to the district court in reviewing the decisions of said board, the jurisdiction of said courts in such cases being limited to a review of questions of law." (McNeil v. Panhandle Lbr. Co., 34 Ida. 773, at 783, 203 P. 1068; Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Ida. 707, at 721, 218 P. 356.)

Issues of law, as well as issues of fact, are tried. (C. S., sec. 6836, C. S., sec. 6270.)

Construing these two sections together, it is plainly apparent that upon appeal from the decision of the industrial accident board, the court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of questions of law, and upon such appeal the court shall try those questions of law.

The provisions of the constitution that guarantee a right to trial by jury refer to the right as it existed at the date of the adoption of the constitution. (Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Ida. 87, 96 Am. St. 256, 53 P. 211; Shields v. Johnson, 10 Ida. 476, 3 Ann. Cas. 245, 79 P. 391; Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554.)

TAYLOR, J. Wm. E. Lee, Budge and Givens, JJ., concur.

OPINION

TAYLOR, J.

B. W. Brady was employed as a barber by William Place, in Coeur d'Alene, for approximately two years immediately preceding March 1, 1922, During the last week in February of that year, sometime between the morning of Thursday, the 23d, and the evening of Sunday, the 26th, a sliver of wood pierced the thumb of Brady's right hand. Infection of a serious nature ensued, necessitating hospital care and medical treatment. As a result of the injury, Brady's right hand and forearm became permanently disabled.

Brady instituted this proceeding before the industrial accident board against William Place, the employer, and the state insurance fund, as surety, to recover compensation under the workmen's compensation law. A hearing was held before a member of the industrial accident board. The claimant introduced evidence tending to prove that the sliver pierced his thumb while he was building a fire in a stove in the barber-shop in which he was employed, either on Thursday or Friday morning. The defendants introduced evidence tending to show that the claimant told Place, his employer, and W. B. Camblin, a coemployee, on Monday morning, February 27, 1922, that the sliver pierced his thumb while he was putting wood in a stove in his own home on Sunday evening, February 26th. The commissioner made findings of fact and rulings of law adverse to the claimant, denied an award, and dismissed the proceeding.

On petition for review before the industrial accident board, additional evidence by depositions was submitted and considered by the board in conjunction with a review of the whole case. The board rendered its decision, including findings of fact, rulings of law, and an order that no award be made to the claimant and that the proceeding be dismissed. The claimant appealed to the district court, filing therein, besides the notice of appeal, a "formal demand for a trial de novo in the district court, and for a trial by jury." The district court denied this demand, and, after reviewing the decision of the board, entered judgment affirming the decision, from which judgment claimant appeals.

Appellant's specification of errors will be treated in order. He first contends that the provision of C. S., sec. 6270, that "on such appeal (from the industrial accident board to the district court) the jurisdiction of said court shall be limited to a review of questions of law," is repealed by C. S., sec. 6270A (Sess. Laws 1921, p. 479), which provides that "the case thereafter shall be tried by the court," and that the latter provision means a trial de novo on questions of both law and fact. A subsequent statute does not repeal an earlier one by implication, unless the two are irreconcilable and inconsistent. They should be harmonized if possible by reasonable construction. The language of the act of 1921 creating C. S., sec. 6270A, recites that C. S., c. 236, is amended by inserting therein, immediately following C. S., sec. 6270, a new section, designated sec. 6270A. The provision of C. S., sec. 6270A, that "the case thereafter shall be tried by the court," is not irreconcilable or inconsistent with the provision of C....