Shields v. Johnson

Decision Date31 December 1904
PartiesSHIELDS v. JOHNSON
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

EQUITY PLEADING-JURY TRIAL MAY BE DENIED.

1. Where an action is brought in the district court by the party actually in possession of the property in controversy, for the purpose of quieting title to his leasehold estate, under the provisions of section 4538, Revised Statutes, it is a suit in equity, and neither party, as a matter of right, is entitled to a jury.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court of Latah County. Honorable Edgar C Steele, Judge.

Action to enjoin defendants from entering the premises of plaintiff to commit waste. Judgment for plaintiff from which defendant appeals. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

Stewart S. Denning and George G. Pickett, for Appellants. All authorities cited by them are cited in the opinion.

Forney & Moore, for Respondent, cite no authorities not cited in the opinion.

STOCKSLAGER J. Sullivan, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concur.

OPINION

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

STOCKSLAGER, J.

--The complaint in this action alleged that the defendants Johnson were and are husband and wife, and on the tenth day of October, 1900, were the owners of certain real estate in Latah county; that on that date said Johnsons, as parties of the first part, and plaintiff herein as party of the second part, for a valuable consideration therein expressed, entered into a contract or agreement, by the terms of which it is shown that plaintiff leased said real estate for a term expiring on the first day of December, 1904, with the privilege, at the option of the party of the second part, for a two years' extension, at the price hereinafter mentioned. It is shown by the lease that the parties of the first part are to furnish all the material necessary to keep the fences in good repair on the said property, and the party of the second part to furnish necessary labor to put such material in use. It is also shown by the terms of this lease or contract that the party of the second part had an option to buy all of said land at the time of any rental payment at the price of $ 4,500, and in case party of the second part should elect to purchase, then his rental payment at that time should be part of the $ 4,500. It was provided that the rental for the first four years should be $ 250 per annum, payable not later than the first day of November of each year, and before the crop is removed from said land, if before that date, and in case the party of the second part shall continue the lease for the additional two years, then the rental should be $ 300 per annum. There is also a provision in the lease that provides, if default shall be made in the payment of said rent or any portion thereof, when due, and for thirty days thereafter, the said lessors, their agents, etc., may re-enter and take possession, and at their option terminate the lease.

Plaintiff alleges that he entered into the possession of said premises after the execution of the lease and has faithfully kept and performed all of its terms and conditions; that the defendants, and each of them, claim an estate and interest in and to said premises, or some part or portion thereof, adverse to the intent of plaintiff which said claim or estate or interest of defendants, or either of them, is to plaintiff unknown. That such claim of defendants, or either of them, is without right, title or interest, paramount to plaintiff's right therein and plaintiff's right or possession thereof.

Plaintiff, for a further cause of action against defendants, alleges that about March, 1904, the defendants conspired together to wrong, cheat and defraud plaintiff, and to oust and eject plaintiff from possession of said premises, and in pursuance of said conspiracy upon the part of defendants and in furtherance thereof, and for the purpose and with the unlawful and wrongful intent to wrong, cheat and defraud plaintiff, and to oust and eject him from the possession of said premises, the said defendant, Frank Frazier, at various and divers times during said month of March, 1904, in the absence of the plaintiff from said premises, and without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, and against his will, has entered upon said premises, and has committed waste thereof to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $ 500, with intent upon the part of said defendants, and each of them, to wrongfully and unlawfully cheat and defraud plaintiff.

The answer admits that plaintiff took possession of the premises as alleged in his complaint, but denies that he has done or performed faithfully or otherwise the conditions of his contract, or that plaintiff is entitled to the quiet and peaceable possession of the premises up to or until the first day of December, 1904. Admits that the defendants, and each of them, claim "an estate and interest in and to said premises and to every part and portion thereof adverse to the interests of the plaintiff's right of possession thereof; but denies that said claim, estate or interest of the defendants, or either of them, is or was at any of the times in plaintiff's complaint mentioned, to the plaintiff unknown, but defendants allege the fact to be that during all of the times in plaintiff's complaint mentioned, the defendants, Frank M. Johnson and Emma A. Johnson, were the owners in fee, in the possession of and entitled to the possession of the land and premises, in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint specifically described--all of which was at all times in said complaint mentioned well known to the plaintiff herein; denies that the claims of the said defendants, or either of them, is without right. For answer to the second cause of action, denies that about March, 1904, or at any other time, or at all, defendants, or either of them, conspired together or otherwise to cheat and defraud plaintiff, or that the defendant, Frank Frazier, at various and divers times since March, 1904, in the absence of said plaintiff from said premises, or without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, has or did enter the premises or committed waste. . . .

"Defendants, for a further and separate answer and defense, allege the contract set out in the complaint, and then allege that during the year 1903 plaintiff herein refused and neglected to pay the rent for the year 1903; that after said rent became due, defendants, Frank M. Johnson and Emma A. Johnson, his wife, commenced an action in the district court of the second judicial district of Idaho in and for Latah county, said action being brought for the recovery of the rents due under the terms of the said lease, and in said action defendants elected to and so alleged that they 'optioned to' and did thereby terminate said lease and all the rights of the lessee thereunder on account of the said lessee therein, the plaintiff herein, failing to pay said rent when due according to the terms and conditions of said lease."

That after the trial of said action in said court the judge of said court made and entered a decree as follows (we only note the portion of this decree that has a bearing on this case):

"Wherefore, by reason of the law and the findings aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, Frank M. Johnson and Emma A. Johnson, his wife, do have and recover of and from said defendant, M. J. Shields, the sum of $ 250 as rents due and owing at the time of the commencement of this action from defendant to plaintiff herein, for rent due under the terms of the lease in controversy herein for the year 1903, and in evidence herein, together with interest on said sum at the rate of seven (7) per cent per annum from December 1, 1903, and costs.

"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendants take nothing in this separate answer and equitable defense and cross-complaint."

They next allege that by virtue of said decree awarding them $ 250 for rent unpaid for the year 1903, they had a right to and did terminate said lease and all of the rights of said M. J Shields ther...

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21 cases
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    • United States
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    ...date of the adoption of the constitution. Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 53 P. 211, 96 Am.St.Rep. 256; Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476, 79 P. 391, 3 Ann.Cas. 245; Morton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 P. 1014; Johnson v. Niichels, 48 Idaho 654, 284 P. 840; Fogelstrom v.......
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    ...55 P. 542, 545 (1898) ("In equitable actions in this state neither party is entitled to a jury as a matter of right."); Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476, 79 P. 391 (1904); Johnson v. Niichels, 48 Idaho 654, 659-661, 284 P. 840, 842 (1930) ("It is the settled rule of this court that a defend......
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