Brakeman v. Compass
| Decision Date | 06 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:16-01344-JEO |
| Parties | KRYSTAL BRAKEMAN, Plaintiff, v. BBVA COMPASS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
In this action, Krystal Brakeman ("Plaintiff") claims that her former employer, BBVA Compass ("Compass"), denied her a promotion and discharged her in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Doc.1 1 ("Complaint" or "Compl."). The cause now comes to beheard on Compass's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 17). Upon consideration, the court2 concludes that the motion is due to be granted.
Pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., a party may move for summary judgment claims asserted against it. Under that rule, the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," relying on submissions "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has met that burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
Both the party "asserting that a fact cannot be," and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support their assertions by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," or by "showing that the materials cited do notestablish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Rule 56(c)(1)(A), (B), Fed. R. Civ. P. In its review of the record, a court must credit the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000). At summary judgment, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Compass is an international banking and financial institution. It hired Plaintiff in January 2011, whereupon she began working as a "Collector II" at Compass's Call Center in Decatur, Alabama. Her direct supervisor was Lisa Sharp, a "Client Service Manager II." After Sharp retired on July 1, 2015, Summer Hastings was promoted to replace her, thereby becoming Plaintiff's supervisor. Hastings reported to Senior Vice President Keith Alderson, who, in turn, reported to Senior Vice President and Director of Collections Michael Frye.
Plaintiff's claims in this case are based on two adverse employment actions. First, she contends that, in June 2015, she was passed over for a promotion to"Collections Client Service Advisor III," which the parties and many of the witnesses colloquially refer to as a "Team Lead" position. Compass ultimately awarded that job to another Compass employee, LaTasha Clemons. Second, Plaintiff challenges her termination, which occurred on September 14, 2015. In short, Plaintiff's theory is that Hastings played a role in both adverse actions, at least as a "cat's paw" that influenced the decisions formally made by others. Specifically, Plaintiff posits that Hastings harbored animus against her because she, Plaintiff, had depression, anxiety and panic attacks that rendered her disabled for purposes of the ADA and caused her to miss work on intermittent FMLA leave. Plaintiff claims that Hastings also resented her for complaining in July 2015 that a co-employee, Susan Talmadge, had made remarks that Plaintiff, who is in a same-sex marriage, took as harassment based on religion and her sexual orientation. The court further outlines below the evidence underlying Plaintiff's claims, starting with the promotion she did not receive.
Compass internally posted that it was seeking applicants for the Team Lead opening on June 10, 2015. The person to be selected would report to the Client Service Manager II, which was then still occupied by Sharp. It was understood, though, that Sharp would be retiring and that the new Team Lead would thus be reporting to Hastings as Sharp's successor. (Doc. 19-8 at 2-16 ("Hastings Dep.")at 12-13). Indeed, when Clemons submitted an application for the vacancy on June 18, 2015, the internal recruiter in Compass's Human Resources ("HR") Department, "Talent Partner" Melissa Edwards, sent an email not to Sharp but, rather, to Hastings asking her to review Clemons's attached resume and "provide feedback" to HR. (Doc. 21-4 at 3-4; Hastings Dep. at 12-13; Doc. 19-1 at 2-35 ("Edwards Dep.") at 30-32, 34-37).
It is also clear, however, that Sharp was intimately involved in selection process for the Team Lead. To wit, after Hastings received the aforementioned email from Edwards, she forwarded it without comment to Sharp, who then scheduled Clemons for an interview at 1:30 p.m. on Friday, June 26, 2015. (See Doc. 21-5). That interview was originally to be conducted jointly by Sharp; Hastings; and another Collections Department manager, Maurice Greer. (Id.) Because Hastings was going to be out of the office on June 26th, she asked that the interview be reset. That request was denied, however, so the interview proceeded without her. Nonetheless, in anticipation of the interview, Hastings and Sharp discussed Clemons's "performance and leadership skills," and they were "in agreement that [Clemons] would make a good candidate for [the position]." (Hastings Dep. at 16). Hastings denies having discussed any other potential candidates with Sharp.
At 4:04 p.m. on June 26th, Sharp sent an email to Edwards stating: "We have interviewed Latasha Clemons and would like to extend the offer to her." (Doc. 21-4 at 3; see also Edwards Dep. at 39, 56). Two minutes later, Edwards sent a reply to Sharp stating, [. (Doc. 21-4 at 6). Then, at 4:12 p.m., Edwards sent another reply to Sharp, copied to Hastings and Keith Alderson advising, "I will extend the offer to Latasha Clemons." (Id. at 2-3). Clemons ultimately accepted that offer and assumed the Team Lead position.
When the above emails were exchanged on the afternoon of June 26th, Plaintiff had not submitted an application for the Team Lead vacancy. Rather, it was not until the next morning, Saturday, June 27th, that Plaintiff applied. Specifically, Compass's online applicant tracking system shows, and Plaintiff does not contest, that her first attempt to submit an application was at 8:34 a.m. on June 27th, but it was rejected as "incomplete," whereupon she resubmitted another at 9:55 a.m. that was accepted. (See Doc. 19-1 at 58; Pl. Dep. at 167-68).
For her part, Hastings denies involvement in the decision to fill the Team Lead vacancy other than by forwarding Edwards's email to Sharp and by favorably opining generally on Clemons's candidacy in her discussion with Sharp before Clemons's interview. Plaintiff testified in her deposition, however, that that, whileshe was "actually filling out the application," Hastings came to her and said: (Pl. Dep. at 114). At another point, Plaintiff characterized that exchange this way: "Whenever I applied for the new job position, [Hastings] told me that I was more than - more than qualified to perform the new position's responsibilities, but, unfortunately, due to my medical condition, she would have to choose another - another person." (Id. at 157; see also id. at 168-69 ); id. at 170 ()4.
Over the course of "two or three days" in July 2015, a co-worker in Plaintiff's area, Susan Talmadge, made several remarks to Plaintiff and in her presence to the effect that Talmadge and other employees "need[ed] to talk to [Plaintiff] about Jesus" and "about getting a man in her life." (Pl. Dep. 208-09,210). Plaintiff, who is married to a woman, was offended, taking the comments as harassment based on religion and her sexual orientation. When asked how many times she heard Talmadge make the comments, Plaintiff couldn't recall and that she was "unsure" whether it was more than five. (Id. at 210).
On July 15th, Plaintiff approached Greer and complained about what Talmadge had said. (See Docs. 21-9, 21-10; Pl. Dep. at 171, 208-09, 212, 221). Greer responded by contacting his supervisor, Alderson, who, in turn, consulted with Edwards in HR. (See Doc. 21-10 at 3; Edwards Dep. at 42-49). The next day, July 16th, with Alderson present, Greer verbally counseled Talmadge on Compass's policy of "diversity and inclusion,"5 cautioning her to keep her workplace discussions "professional and respectful." (Doc. 21-10 at 3). Plaintiff acknowledges that, after she complained to Greer, she...
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