Braman v. Babcock

• Decision Date: 01 March 1923
• Citation: 98 Conn. 549,120 A. 150
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BRAMAN v. BABCOCK ET AL.

120 A. 150

98 Conn. 549

BRAMAN v. BABCOCK ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Christopher L. Avery and James H. Webb, Judges.

Suit by Albert R. Braman against Mattie P. Babcock, executrix and trustee of the estate of Peleg S. Barber, deceased, and others. Demurrer to complaint sustained, judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. No error.

Arthur T. Keefe, of New London, for appellant.

Hadlai A. Hull, Frank L. McGuire, and Charles Hadlai Hull, all of New London, for appellee Eliza Merritt.

CURTIS, J.

The complaint alleges that Peleg S. Barber, of Stonington, Conn died in 1901, leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate in the probate court for the district of Stonington. Mattie P. Babcock was named therein as executrix and trustee and duly qualified as such in 1901.

Section 23 of this will is in the following terms:

" Section 23. I give and bequeath to my granddaughter Mattie P. Babcock the income or rent of the buildings now standing on High street in the town of Westerly, Nos. 38, 40 42, 44, 46 and known as the Barber Memorial Building during her natural life; she is to keep the buildings in good repair and keep them insured, pay all taxes as they become due and at her death, if she should leave any issues, the said building to be given to them, their heirs and assigns. It would be my wish that the name of said building should never be changed. And I now appoint Mattie P. Babcock trustee of said building during her natural life without bonds, and if the said Mattie P. Babcock should not leave any issues, then the said building shall be divided between Eliza Merritt Phebe Barber, Charles H. Braman, George Braman, Grace M. Barber, ______ Braman and Josephine Minzey. All the rest and residue of my estate I give to my granddaughter Mattie P. Babcock."

The plaintiff seeks in this action to have the court declared that he was the ______ Braman mentioned in this section of the will with such rights to property in Westerly, R. I., as were conferred upon ______ Braman by the terms of section 23 of the will.

The defendant Eliza Merritt demurred to the complaint upon the following grounds:

(1) The facts alleged in said complaint are not sufficient to support a proceeding under chapter 258 of the Public Acts of 1921, and do not state a cause of action within the scope of said chapter.

(2) It appears from the complaint that the subject-matter of said cause is situated in Westerly, state of Rhode Island.

(3) The plaintiff has an adequate remedy for relief, if he be entitled to any, on the facts stated other than by a proceeding under said chapter of said Public Acts hereinbefore referred to.

(4) A proceeding under chapter 258 of the Public Acts of 1921 is not an appropriate proceeding for the construction of the will referred to in said complaint.

(5) Chapter 258 of the Public Acts of 1921 is in violation of the Constitution of this state, because it attempts to confer upon the court powers not judicial, and requires the performance of acts not judicial in character.

The fifth ground of demurrer, that the declaratory judgment act (chapter 258 of the Public Acts of 1921) is unconstitutional, if sustained, bars the further prosecution of this action, and should properly be first considered. The basis of this claim is that the statute imposes upon the court the duty of performing nonjudicial functions. Our statute (chapter 258, Public Acts of 1921) is as follows:

Section 1. " The superior court shall have power in any action or proceeding to declare rights and other legal relations on request for such declaration whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."

Section 2. " The judges of the superior court shall make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this act."

In accord with section 2, the judges of the superior court have made rules to carry the act into effect, which are found in Practice Act 1922, p. 255. These rules are set forth in the margin.^[1]

The function that the statute imposes upon the court is to " declare rights and other legal relations" between proper parties, and it provides that " such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment." The act provides that--

" The judges of the superior court shall make such orders and rules as they deem necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this act."

As shown above, the judges of the superior court have made such rules. Such rules cannot alter the act, they can only give effect to its real purpose. Dunnett v. Thornton, 73 Conn. 6, 46 A. 158. We therefore turn to the rules to see if they are in accord with the real purpose of the act. We find that these rules are in accord with the real purpose of the act, and correctly indicate its purpose, which is for the superior court to render final judgments as to the existence or nonexistence of any right, power, privilege, or immunity, or of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege, or immunity may depend, whether the same now exists or will arise in the future. Also that the party seeking such a judgment must have an interest legal or equitable by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to his rights or other jural relations, and that there is an actual bone fide and substantial question or issue in dispute, or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties, and that all persons having an interest in the complaint are parties to the proceeding, or have reasonable notice, and the court is of the opinion that the parties should not be left to seek redress in some other form of procedure, and that issues of fact may be submitted to the jury, and the decision of the court shall be final and subject to review by appeal.

The superior court upon a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is therefore, under the act, dealing with an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations as to any right, power, privilege, or immunity, whether such now exists or will arise in the future, which requires settlement between the persons in interest, who are all parties to the proceeding or all in interest who have reasonable notice of it, and the court has power to render a final judgment subject to appeal.

The Connecticut Constitution does not in terms limit the exercise of judicial power to " cases and controversies," as is done in the Constitution of the United States. This limitation results in a possible narrowing of judicial power by the definition given to the term " cases and controversies." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 Sup.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246.

In dealing with another statute (now General Statutes, § 5113) entitled " Action to settle title to land," in the case of Dawson v. Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 61 A. 101 (1905), we held that this statute was constitutional although it authorizes any person claiming an interest in real estate or personal property to bring suit against any person or persons claiming an adverse interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse interest, and to settle the title to the property. We there said " a claim may be adverse, within the meaning of the statute, although no attempt has been made to enforce it," and that " to set it up [that is, to make the claim] is treated as of itself a sufficient injury to justify a suit," and that the statute " introduced, * * * a novel mode of judicial procedure, but it was fully in the power of the General Assembly thus to enlarge our methods of remedial justice." This statute was in substance an act authorizing a declaratory judgment in relation to one class of rights, although no attempt was being made to enforce an adverse claim as to such rights. In that case we held that a statute is constitutional which entitled one to proceed in a civil action to have a dispute or uncertainty as to his legal relations as to a right in real or personal property determined by a judgment settling his rights to such property, although no attempt was being made to enforce an adverse claim. See, also, Miles, Trustee, v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, 36 A. 55.

We have thus had before us as to one class of rights the question whether the General Assembly could under our Constitution authorize the courts to employ a novel mode of judicial procedure to settle the title to property when an adverse claim was made as to it, although no attempt had been made to enforce such claim, the novel mode of procedure being one, in substance, authorizing a declaratory judgment. We then held that the General Assembly could so enlarge our methods of remedial justice. Later, in 1917, in Ackerman v. Union & N.H. Trust Co., 91 Conn. 500, 100 A. 22, in reference to a claim that in that action the courts should of their own accord without statutory authority render declaratory judgments, we said:

" Our courts have carefully avoided encroachments upon the functions of the Legislature. * * * Neither new remedies, or the extension or curtailment of existing ones have been attempted by the rules [of court]. * * * If the courts are to exercise broader powers in this respect, the enlargement of their authority should come from legislative sanction. * * *"

We there by implication recognized the principle underlying the decision of Dawson v. Orange, supra, to the effect that the General Assembly could under our Constitution enlarge our methods of remedial justice by authorizing our courts to protect rights by the rendering of declaratory judgments.

We have held, in substance, in the...