Miles v. Strong

• Decision Date: 09 October 1896
• Citation: 36 A. 55,68 Conn. 273
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MILES et al. v. STRONG et al.

36 A. 55

68 Conn. 273

MILES et al.

v. STRONG et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 9, 1896.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Ralph Wheeler, Judge.

Action by Samuel A. Miles, trustee, and another, against Charles K. Strong and others, to quiet title to certain land. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

George P. Carroll, for appellants.

William B. Stoddard and Seymour C. Loomis, for appellees.

TORRANCE, J. This is the third attempt to obtain a construction of the will of Selah Strong in behalf of one of the devisees. See the cases of Miles v. Strong, 60 Conn. 393, 22 Atl. 959, and id., 62 Conn. 95, 25 Atl. 459. The devisee, Ernest Strong Miles, is a grandson of the testator, and his father was the executor under the will. They are the plaintiffs in this suit, and the defendants are heirs at law of the testator. Under the fourth and fifth clauses of said will, certain real estate in Milford in this state was devised to Ernest, and the eighth clause, with reference to these devises, contains the following provision: "The foregoing devises to the said Ernest Strong Miles are, subject to the charges aforesaid [certain charges in favor of the widow about which no question is now made], to him and his heirs forever: provided, however, that if he, the said Ernest Strong Miles, shall die before he attains his majority, or without leaving lawful issue surviving him, and without having disposed of all the lands by this will devised to him either by deed or by will, then, and in either of these events, it is my will that all said lands herein devised to the said Ernest Strong Miles, and not by him disposed of, shall descend to and be distributed among my heirs at law, and those who legally represent them." The contest between these parties relates to the construction of this eighth clause.

On the 19th of May, 1890, Ernest became of age, and immediately following that event he by deed, in trust for himself during life and for his wife and children after his decease, conveyed the real estate so devised to him to his father; and thereupon the first of the two cases above mentioned was brought. In that case one of the present plaintiffs, as executor of Selah Strong, some eight years after the estate of his testator had been fully and finally settled and distributed, asked to have this eighth clause of the will construed; and this court held, in effect, that under the circumstances his request came too late, and advised the superior court to dismiss the complaint. After this the present plaintiffs brought the second of the above cases against the present defendants, alleging, in substance, that the defendants claimed some interest in or title to said land under the eighth clause of said will, which claims constituted a cloud upon the then plaintiffs' title, which they asked to have removed. This court in that case said: "The complaint in this case in effect asks a court of equity to take jurisdiction of a mere legal question relating to the title to land, and as incidental to the determination of that question to construe this will in advance of a trial at law. We think this cannot be done, under our practice, in a proceeding of this kind." Miles v. Strong, 62 Conn. 103, 25 Atl. 460. Thereupon the judgment of the superior court, holding the contrary of this, was reversed. Subsequently, in that court, upon the facts as they appeared of record, the issues were found for the defendants, and judgment for costs was rendered in their favor. In this condition of affairs, chapter 66 of the Public Acts of 1893 was passed, which reads as follows:

"Section 1. An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in real property, against any person or persons who claim to own the same, or any part thereof, or who claim to have any estate either in fee, for years, for life, in reversion, or remainder, or any interest in the same, or any lien or incumbrance thereon, adverse to the plaintiff, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest, or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes, and to quiet and settle the title to the same.

"Sec. 2. The complaint in such action shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff's claim, interest, or title, and shall name the person or persons who claim such adverse estate or interest.

"Sec. 3. Each defendant shall, in his answer, state whether or not he claims any estate, interest in, or incumbrance on said property, or any part thereof, and, if so, the nature and extent of the estate, interest, or incumbrance which he claims, and he shall set out the manner in which, and the sources through which such estate, interest, or incumbrance, is claimed to be derived.

"Sec. 4. No judgment for costs shall be rendered in such action against any defendant who, by his answer, disclaims all estate, interest in, or incumbrance on said property, but costs shall be taxed in his favor at the discretion of the court. But the court shall, in such cases, without further proof, render judgment that such defendant has no estate, interest in, or incumbrance on said property, or any part thereof.

"Sec. 5. The court shall hear the several claims and determine the rights of the parties, whether derived from deeds, wills, or other instruments, or sources of title, and may determine the construction of the same, and render judgment determining the questions and disputes, and quieting and settling the title to said property."

This act was approved April 19, 1893, and took effect upon its passage, and on the next day the present suit was begun. The complaint describes the property in question, states the origin and nature of the plaintiffs' claims thereto as derived under said will and trust deed, and sets out the will, the return of the distributors, and the trust deed. It also names the defendants as the persons who claim an adverse estate or interest in the land described, and alleges, in paragraph 8, that "the defendants claim that they have some interest in said property adverse to the plaintiffs." The relief claimed is: (1) That the defendants shall state the nature, extent, and source of the estate or interest which they each claim. (2) An adjudication of the several claims of the parties, and the determination of their several rights. (3) An adjudication quieting and settling the title to said property. One of the defendants, Mira R. Strong, in her answer disclaimed all right and title to the property in question, and she is not a party to the present appeal. The other defendants demurred to the complaint, mainly on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act of 1893, and the demurrer was overruled. Then the defendants answered over, setting up as a first defense the former judgment in the case of Miles v. Strong, 62 Conn. 95, 25 Atl. 459, in bar of this suit, and as a second defense they denied the allegations of paragraph 8 of the complaint. In their reply the plaintiffs admitted the existence of the former judgment, but denied that it was upon the merits, and the issue upon this point was found in favor of the defendants. After this the court; on the plaintiffs' motion, ordered the defendants to state in their answer what their claim or interest, if any, in said real estate was, and the nature, extent, and origin of it. Thereupon the attorneys for the defendants filed a writing setting out, in substance, that the defendants claimed a contingent interest in said land under the will of Selah Strong. Thereupon the plaintiffs were permitted, against the objection of the defendants, to file a second and third reply to said first defense, in which they alleged, in substance, that the former judgment was no bar, because it was simply a judgment that the then plaintiffs were not entitled, under the law as it then was, to the relief which they then sought, and that the law had been changed in this respect by the act of 1893. Ultimately the parties were at issue upon a denial of the allegations of these replies, and the issues were tried to the court, and found in favor of the plaintiffs. The issue framed upon the second defense, denying the eighth paragraph of the complaint, was tried to the jury, and upon that a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs.

Upon the trial to the jury, the plaintiffs offered in evidence the original files in the two cases before mentioned, which contained, among other matters, answers signed by the attorneys of record therein, which answers tended to show that the defendants then made certain claims to the land in question. To this evidence the defendants objected, on the ground (1) that, if any such claims were made, they were made prior to the passage of the act under which the present suit was brought, and therefore the evidence was not relevant upon the question whether those defendants had made such claims subsequent to the passage of the act; (2) that the admission of such evidence would give the act a retrospective effect; (3) that it did not appear that said attorneys had any authority to make any admissions that might be the basis of a cause of action against said defendants. The court overruled the objections and admitted the evidence. The plaintiffs also offered in evidence the papers filed in the present case by the attorneys for the defendants in compliance with the orders of the court hereinbefore mentioned. The defendants objected to this evidence on the ground (1) that it did not appear that defendants' counsel had any authority to make any admissions that would be the basis of a cause of action against them; (2) because the admissions in said papers, if any, were made after this action was brought, and therefore were not admissible as tending to show that at the time the action was brought the defendants had made the claims alleged in the complaint; (3) because such admissions did not tend to show any cause of action. The evidence was admitted over the...