Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, Afl-Cio, 95-497L.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-497L.,95-497L.
• Citation: 963 F.Supp. 90
• Parties: Dale F. BRAMBLE, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, Providence Rhode Island Area Local.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

963 F.Supp. 90

Dale F. BRAMBLE, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, Providence Rhode Island Area Local.

No. 95-497L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

May 2, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin J. McAllister, Brennan, Recupero, Cascione, Scungio & McAllister, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Allen P. Rubine, Providence, Paul F. Kelly, Anne R. Sills, Segal, Roitman & Coleman, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Chief Judge.

This case involves plaintiff's claim against his former union and employer, the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Providence Rhode Island Area Local (the "union"), under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Plaintiff, who served as union president for nineteen years, argues that the union violated the ADEA when it adopted a policy which linked a president's pay to his salary as an employee of the United States Postal Service and interpreted that policy as requiring a reduction of plaintiff's salary as president from $43,000 to $3,000 because plaintiff had recently retired.

This matter is before the Court on the union's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the union's motion is granted.

I. Facts

The following facts are undisputed, except as noted.

The union represents United States Postal Service workers who are employed in the Rhode Island region. Plaintiff served as union president for nineteen years. He was first elected in 1974, and, for the first eleven years, he worked full-time for the Postal Service while serving as president. As compensation, plaintiff received his salary from the Postal Service, as well as an additional $3,000.00 from the union, as required by the union constitution. In November of 1985, however, the union's members voted to make plaintiff a full-time employee of the union, a position for which plaintiff was paid the equivalent of his Postal Service salary with benefits (a level five top step clerk's position), plus the additional $3,000.00. Subsequently, plaintiff's salary was raised to a level six top step salary. This salary was paid by the union, although plaintiff simultaneously maintained his official status as an active United States Postal Service employee.

In late 1989, the union purchased a building in Johnston, R.I. to serve as its office and meeting hall. It is uncontested that the purchase and renovation of this building placed a financial strain on the union, and, as a result, the union implemented several changes. Membership dues were increased by 40%, and the union terminated the secretary-treasurer's status as a full-time union employee. Subsequently, the secretary-treasurer resigned from office. In addition, the president's salary was reduced to the salary for a level five top step clerk.

Plaintiff was most recently re-elected as union president in November of 1991. He was re-elected by a 35% vote in a close three-way race. In September of 1992, plaintiff accepted an early retirement package from the United States Postal Service. However, this did not then alter his status as union president.

Soon after plaintiff announced his retirement, some members of the union drafted a referendum to amend the union constitution with respect to the payment of the union president, an action that plaintiff contends was taken in direct response to his early retirement. The proposed amendment changed the president's salary from a fixed rate to a rate tied to the president's salary as an active Postal Service employee — a "no loss no gain rate" plus the required $3,000.00.

Ballots concerning the proposed amendment were mailed to the union's members in January of 1993, and, at the February meeting, the ballots were counted and the amendment passed. Immediately before the vote, one of the amendment's proponents stated: "I move that the Secretary Treasurer upon passage of the Referendum Question on Article 5 Section 1 immediately cease paying the retired President his full Postal salary."

The members of the union later adopted a second amendment to the union constitution at the June 1993 meeting in an effort to clarify the meaning of the first amendment. The second amendment provided that "the officer whose union duties necessitate absence from the postal duty assignment ... held by said officer, will receive no less than and no more than that officer would have received from the Postal Service with full attendance in said duty assignment." Pursuant to the two amendments, plaintiff's salary was reduced from approximately $43,000 (including the $3,000.00 required by the union constitution) to only the required $3,000.00. In addition, plaintiff's benefits package was terminated.

By letter dated March 10, 1993, plaintiff appealed the "no loss no gain" amendment to American Postal Workers Union ("APWU") National President Moe Biller. However, the APWU National Executive Board never interfered with the union's adoption or interpretation of the amendment.

Plaintiff resigned effective July 1, 1993. His replacement, Leo Cacicio, an active United States Postal Service employee, was 41 years of age at the time. Under the "no loss no gain" policy, Cacicio received approximately $51,000 per year (including the required $3,000.00), plus benefits, for serving as union president.

On or about July 13, 1995, plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("E.E.O.C."), charging the union with age discrimination. Before the E.E.O.C., the union claimed that the original amendment was adopted "to change an inequitable pay situation" in the compensation for the union president, a characterization that plaintiff vigorously disputes. On or about July 28, 1995, the E.E.O.C. gave plaintiff permission to withdraw his charge before a determination was reached.

In the present proceeding, plaintiff asserts that the union has violated § 623(a) and § 623(c) of the ADEA in its capacity as an employer and a labor organization respectively. First, plaintiff advances a disparate treatment claim. It is plaintiff's principal contention that his political opponents used his eligibility for retirement, a function of plaintiff's age, as a vehicle to force him from office. Alternatively, plaintiff brings a disparate impact claim, arguing that the amendment under which his salary was reduced is a facially neutral policy that disproportionately affects persons in the age class protected under the ADEA. Based on these theories, plaintiff seeks damages for loss of earnings, liquidated damages, restoration of employment benefits, costs of suit, and attorney's fees.

The union, however, argues that plaintiff has not supported a disparate treatment claim because he has not alleged discriminatory animus on the basis of age. Rather, the union argues that plaintiff has shown, at most, that his opponents in the union desired to remove him from office for political reasons. The union also emphasizes that the reduction in plaintiff's pay was based on plaintiff's "active pay status," a "reasonable factor other than age." In addition, the union contends that disparate impact claims are not cognizable-under the ADEA as a matter of law. Accordingly, the union asks that summary judgment be granted in its favor.¹

After hearing oral arguments on the union's motion for summary judgment, the Court took the matter under advisement. The motion is now in order for decision.

II. Standard of Decision

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment motions:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A "material" fact is one that "has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 2247, 132 L.Ed.2d 255 (1995). A dispute is only "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The movant must show that there is insufficient evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Garside v. Osco Drug. Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990). The nonmoving party must then "contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d at 735.

Courts are often hesitant to grant summary judgment when the issue at hand involves questions of intent. See Kand Med., Inc. v. Freund Med. Prod., Inc., 963 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir.1992). However, "summary judgment may be appropriate `[e]ven in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue. if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.'" Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir.1991).

III. Analysis

The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age" against individuals who are forty years of age or older. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S....