Bramlette v. Superior Court of Merced County
| Citation | 78 Cal.Rptr. 532,273 Cal.App.2d 799 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 09 June 1969 |
| Parties | Allan Glenn BRAMLETTE et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California by their Attorney Pat HALLFORD, District Attorney in the County of Merced, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 1157. |
Allan Glenn Bramlette, Phillip Frank Oldenhage, Carolyn Casados and Daniel Joseph Freitas have petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition, or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus, to require the Superior Court of Merced County to quash the information against them for possession of marijuana, the felony denounced by section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code. This court issued an order to show cause and a hearing was had, in due course, on the question whether or not the police officer of the City of Merced had cause to halt the panel truck in which they were riding and, after investigation, to arrest the petitioners and charge them with the crime.
The arrest took place at Merced very late on the night of February 16, 1969, and a verified complaint was filed in the Merced Judicial District accusing them of possession of marijuana. The defendants were arraigned in the justice court on February 18, 1969, and after a preliminary examination on March 4, 1969, they were held to answer.
On March 7, 1969, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Merced County. When arraigned in that court on March 24, 1969, they moved to set aside the information on the ground that, under section 995 of the Penal Code, there was no reasonable or probable cause for the commitment. Petitioners' motion was denied and their trial was set for May 6, 1969. In due course, the defendants filed this petition (Hood v. Superior Court, 220 Cal.App.2d 242, 245, 33 Cal.Rptr. 782), claiming that stopping the vehicle occupied by petitioners was unlawful and that, as a consequence, all evidence acquired as a result was inadmissible. (Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319; People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658.)
It appears to us that the evidence heard at the preliminary examination was sufficient to authorize the arrest and that, consequently, the petitioners are not entitled to either of the writs which they seek.
Gary E. Starbuck of the Merced Police Department was on patrol duty during the early morning hours of the date of arrest; at about 12:30 a.m., he noticed a panel truck parked in an alleyway of a residential section of the city. He drove his patrol vehicle into the alley within a car length of the panel truck and noted that it was actually blocking the alley; while he believed that he could have cited the owner of the vehicle for improper parking, he did not do so but backed out of the alley and resumed his patrol. Starbuck made a mental note that the vehicle was a 1946 Ford panel truck, but this automobile had not been reported to him or to the police department as a suspected car, and he had no warning at that time of any unlawful activity in the neighborhood. The officer passed by another extrance of the alley once again at approximately 1 o'clock but could not ascertain whether the panel truck was still parked there. However, within a short time thereafter he noted that the vehicle was moving slowly on a quiet, desolated street in the vicinity. As a police officer, he was thoroughly familiar with the neighborhood, but he had never seen the panel truck before that night and he decided to stop it to ascertain who was driving the car and what it was doing in that lonely portion of the city, in accordance with his usual practice to stop vehicles apparently lingering at night or in the early morning hours in a quiet and rather desolate area of the city. He said that he followed this custom so that he could keep accurate track of what was happening in the nighttime in portions of the town where activities of this kind were unusual. When he turned on his red light and approached the vehicle, he asked the driver, Phillip Frank Oldenhage, and the two others in the front seat, Carolyn Casados and Daniel Freitas for their identification, which they readily gave him, showing that each of them was under the age of 21 years. Bramlette and John A. Guerra were seated in the body of the truck on the floor back of the driver's seat. Bramlette, also under 21 years of age, produced proper identification, but Guerra in a slurred voice said that he did not have any identification; from his appearance the officer concluded that he, too, was under 21 years of age. The officer knew from the appearance of Guerra when he shined his flashlight upon him, and from his slurred speech that he 'was under the influence of something.' Starbuck went to the rear of the panel truck, opened the door, and asked Guerra to step out, which the latter did. At that time, Officer Starbuck noticed a paper sack in the rear of the truck near the place where Guerra had been sitting; there protruded from the sack the neck and handle of a gallon jug of wine. Guerra's slurred speech, the odor of wine on his breath, and his difficulty in maintaining his balance made it evident that Guerra was intoxicated. The bottle, although of a gallon size, was only one-fourth full of wine and the stopper was not on the bottle; these facts led Starbuck to conclude that the gallon jug had been in use. The officer advised the occupants of the vehicle that they were being arrested for possession of an alcoholic beverage in violation of section 25662 of the Business and Professions Code, as they were under 21 years of age. Officer Starbuck summoned Officer James Marz of the Merced Police Department to assist him; and, after making sure that the arrested minors could not escape, the officers made a further investigation of the panel truck. Officer Starbuck had previously noted that there were multiple marijuana seeds on the front seat and on the floor board. Further investigation of the car showed three pipes containing marijuana debris, pipe cleaners, a cigarette rolling machine, and plastic bags of marijuana on a protruding portion of the framework above the passengers' front seat, placed in position so that all of the items were readily available to occupants of the vehicle. The amount of marijuana found, according to Starbuck, was about 'one-half a lid,' or about enough to make ten cigarettes. The smell of marijuana and marijuana debris were in the pipes. The defendants were then also advised that they were being charged with the possession of marijuana and they were given a 'pat-down' for weapons. Additional marijuana was found in the pockets of two jackets in the back of the panel truck, and, after the suspects were taken to the police department, Officer Marz found in the patrol car in which they were transported two match boxes under the front seat and one plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana and marijuana 'roaches.' As the officer had inspected his patrol car prior to transporting the defendants, and the contraband was not present at that time, it is a legitimate inference that the contraband in the patrol car, including the two match boxes which contained marijuana 'roaches,' had been placed there by one or more of the transported suspects.
Petitioners assert that Officer Starbuck did not have a right to stop the panel truck. In order to maintain this position, they quote some of the testimony given by the officer which, as they argue, shows that he was interfering without cause with peaceable citizens in making the inquiry which did. This attitude does not take into consideration the objective facts which faced the officer at the time he stopped the vehicle and made inquiries as to the identification of the persons who occupied the car. The situation which obtains objectively in such circumstances must be considered in deciding whether a policeman has a right to act in the way that Starbuck did.
What is the function of a police patrol? Obviously, it is to help preserve the peace in a...
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