Branca v. Branca
| Decision Date | 17 March 1982 |
| Citation | 443 A.2d 929 |
| Parties | Raffaele BRANCA, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Lorenzo BRANCA and Domenica Branca, his wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, Cross-Appellants. and Maria Branca a/k/a Maria Volpe, Defendant Below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Court of Chancery. Reversed and Remanded.
Thomas Herlihy, III (argued) of Herlihy & Herlihy, Wilmington, for appellant, Raffaele Branca.
John A. Faraone (argued) Wilmington, for appellees, cross-appellants, Lorenzo and Domenica Branca.
Lawrence F. Hartnett (argued) Wilmington, for appellee Maria Branca/Volpe.
Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and HORSEY, JJ.
This appeal concerns whether lenders (parents) should be granted an equitable lien upon real estate purchased by borrower (their son) for the amount of their otherwise unsecured loan after the real estate was placed in joint names with his spouse-to-be.
The lending parents (plaintiffs) appeal the Court of Chancery's denial to them of any relief (legal or equitable) against their son's former wife, Maria (defendant), concerning a transaction found by the Court to have been a loan, not a gift, by the parents but to have been made solely to their son, Raffaele. 1
The Court found the parents had furnished the entire consideration ($35,000) for the real estate purchase and that the purpose of the loan had been to enable their son and Maria, his bride-to-be, to have their own home upon their marriage. The Court thereby rejected Maria's contention that the money represented a gift from Raffaele's parents. But, as stated, the Court also rejected the parents' contention that their loan had been made to Maria as well as Raffaele. The Court did so because, in its words, the evidence was insufficient to find Maria to have been "a party to any repayment agreement."
The Court then found that Raffaele, by directing that the deed to be delivered at settlement "show both himself and (Maria), his intended wife, as the grantees ..., thereby made a gift to Maria of a one-half interest in the house." And the Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Maria thereafter "ever entered into any legally binding agreement to subject her half interest in the property to an equitable lien or a constructive trust." The Court also rejected the plaintiff-parents' alternative contentions that either an agency relationship existed between Maria and Raffaele or that a confidential relationship existed between Maria and plaintiffs-as not established by the evidence.
On the above findings, the Vice Chancellor ruled that no equitable lien, by way of either a resulting or a constructive trust, could be impressed on the real estate as security for the parents' loan; and that plaintiffs were only entitled to a judgment of $35,000 against their son-upon his failure to repay the loan following the break-up of the marriage three years later.
The appeal is from the Court's final order directing the real estate to be sold with the net proceeds distributed one-half to plaintiffs and the other half to Maria, subject to a minor offset.
The Vice Chancellor recognized that much of the testimony (of which all from plaintiffs was introduced through an interpreter) "might adduce sympathy for the plaintiffs." 2 However, he concluded, wrongly we think, that it "was totally irrelevant to the legal issues in (the) case." We think the Court thereby failed properly to apply equitable principles in a familial factual setting which quite clearly called for equitable relief-to prevent unjust enrichment.
Accepting the Vice Chancellor's findings of fact, we conclude that plaintiffs were entitled, as a matter of law, to have an equitable lien impressed upon the real estate, including Maria Volpe's interest therein-to reflect plaintiffs' $35,000 investment therein-a sum which was established to have represented plaintiffs' life savings.
While in the usual case an equitable lien is impressed to reflect an express agreement that the property to be liened was intended to be held as security for the obligation of the promisor, Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Newcomb, Del.Ch., 21 A.2d 723 (1941), a lien may also be impressed out of recognition of general equitable principles of right and justice. Acacia v....
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...and the fact that title is in the name of another is for some incidental reason. Greenly v. Greenly, 49 A.2d at 129; Branca v. Branca, Del.Supr., 443 A.2d 929 (1982). See also 5 Scott, The Law of Trusts § 440 (3rd ed. 1967); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 454 (rev. 2nd ed. 1977). ......
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...lien upon the house built by the couple. In ruling that the parents were entitled to an equitable lien, this Court, citing Branca v. Branca, 443 A.2d 929 (Del.1982), stated as (1) While in the usual case an equitable lien is impressed to reflect an express agreement that the property to be ......
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Neyland v. Neyland, 55973
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Addy v. Piedmonte, Civil Action No. 3571-VCP (Del. Ch. 3/18/2009)
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