Brancaccio v. State, 95-4135

• Decision Date: 06 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-4135,95-4135
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903 Victor BRANCACCIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 597

698 So.2d 597

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

Victor BRANCACCIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 95-4135.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Aug. 6, 1997.

Certification Denied Sept. 15, 1997.

Roy Black and Christine M. Ng of Black, Srebnick & Kornspan, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sharon A. Wood and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney Generals, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLEIN, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison. He had admitted the killing, and the only issue for the jury to determine was whether he had the mental capacity to form the intent necessary to commit the crimes. We must reverse for a new trial because the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on appellant's primary defense, which was that he was involuntarily intoxicated as a result of the medication he was taking pursuant to a prescription.

Appellant, who was 16, gave a statement to the police explaining that he had had a fight with his mother over what they were having for dinner and went for a walk to cool down. He encountered a stranger who asked him to stop cursing and called him low class. He punched her repeatedly, led her to a vacant lot, and continued to punch her and kick her. When a car came along he became frightened and ran home.

He returned to the scene the next morning to ask the woman if she needed help, but she did not respond. The medical examiner testified that the woman had suffered at least four severe and potentially fatal blows to her head, as well as massive trauma to her chest, and that she would not have been alive at that point. Appellant then went shopping for car parts, but returned later in the day with newspaper and unsuccessfully attempted to set her body on fire. He then left and returned with spray paint, painting her body red in order to cover up his fingerprints.

Appellant's defense was that the medication he was taking, which was prescribed to him during his recent confinement in a mental hospital, had caused him to lose control. Two months prior to the killing, appellant had been committed to a mental health center pursuant to the Baker Act, § 394.451, Florida Statutes (1995), after threatening to kill his parents and himself. His parents then moved him to the Savannas Mental Hospital for treatment, where appellant was placed on Zoloft, a drug used to treat depression. The hospital also diagnosed appellant as suffering from alcohol abuse, attention deficit disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. ¹ The hospital noted a change in appellant's personality after he was placed on Zoloft, in that appellant became more irritable, loud, had increased energy and was given to angry outbursts. Appellant had apparently attempted suicide while at the hospital by holding his breath.

A psychiatrist testifying for the defense, Dr. Wade Myers, testified that Zoloft may have had a reaction which was opposite to what it was supposed to have had in appellant, causing hypomania. ² The medical warnings for the drug state that the following side effects are infrequent but possible: "aggressive reactions, amnesia, anxiety, delusions, depersonalization, depression, aggravated depression, emotional instability hallucinations, neurosis, paranoid reaction, suicidation and suicide attempts." "Infrequent" is medically defined as occurring between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1000 patients.

Dr. Myers examined appellant after his arrest and concluded that he suffered from major depression, possible bipolar disorder, alcohol abuse, a learning disability, and a probable brain injury. Appellant had been born prematurely and spent seven days in intensive care for oxygen deprivation. Also, at the age of two, he had nearly drowned and had to be resuscitated. His IQ is just above retarded.

Dr. Myers concluded that appellant did not have the ability to form the intent to commit first degree murder based on his mental deficiencies and his involuntary intoxication by the Zoloft.

Another expert who testified for the defense, Dr. Peter R. Breggin, testified that in his opinion, Zoloft could have had amphetamine like effects, and could have "pushed him over." Under the Freedom of Information Act, Dr. Breggin was able to obtain information reported by doctors and pharmacists regarding reactions to the drug. Dr. Breggin found 22 reports tying the drug to hostile reactions, 57 reports linking the drug to an aggravation reaction, 55 suicide attempts, and 64 reports linking the drug to increased agitation. These reports suggest that the drug can cause a loss of impulse control. He opined that the hospital records from the mental hospital where appellant was confined indicate that he was experiencing a similar reaction to the drug. Dr. Breggin diagnosed Brancaccio with substance induced mood disorder brought on by Zoloft.

The State rebutted appellant's experts with experts of its own, who testified that appellant was capable of forming the intent to commit murder and kidnapping. They did agree that he suffered from major depression, but were of the opinion that he was not involuntarily intoxicated because of the Zoloft.

The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder (felony murder), and kidnapping. His primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his theory of defense, involuntary intoxication.

The defense of involuntary intoxication has been explained in an article which collects cases from various states which permit it as follows:

Generally speaking, an accused may be completely relieved of criminal responsibility if, because of involuntary intoxication, he was temporarily rendered legally insane at the time he committed the offense. And again speaking generally, the courts have considered one to be involuntarily intoxicated when he has become intoxicated through the fault of another, by accident, inadvertence, or mistake on his own part, or because of a physiological or psychological condition beyond his control.

The practice of relieving one of criminal responsibility for offenses committed while in a state of involuntary intoxication extends back to the earliest days of the common law. Involuntary intoxication, it appears, was first recognized as that caused by the unskillfulness of a physician or by the contrivance of one's enemies. Today, where the intoxication is induced through the fault of another and without any fault on the part of the accused, it...