Branch v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–12–01019–CV.,14–12–01019–CV.
• Citation: 422 S.W.3d 919
• Parties: Loretta BRANCH, Graylyn Judkins, and Wanda Ford, Appellants v. MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Sheila Thompson a.k.a. Sheila Branch a.k.a. Sheila Howard Thompson, Edward Branch Sr., and Roy Branch, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

422 S.W.3d 919

Loretta BRANCH, Graylyn Judkins, and Wanda Ford, Appellants

v.MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Sheila Thompson a.k.a. Sheila Branch a.k.a. Sheila Howard Thompson, Edward Branch Sr., and Roy Branch, Appellees.

No. 14–12–01019–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

Feb. 11, 2014.

Wanda Ford, Graylyn Judkins, Loretta Branch, Angleton, for Appellants.

Shannon Tigner, Angleton, Bernie Hauder, Dallas, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Justices BOYCE, CHRISTOPHER, and BROWN.

OPINION

TRACY CHRISTOPHER, Justice.

In this dispute over life-insurance proceeds, the deceased insured's former wife appeals the trial court's ruling that she is not entitled to the interpleaded funds. Her adult son and daughter also have attempted to appeal the judgment. We dismiss the daughter's appeal for want of prosecution and dismiss the son's appeal for want of jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment as it pertains to the deceased's former wife.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Monumental Life Insurance Company filed this interpleader action to resolve competing claims to the proceeds of a $10,000 policy insuring the life of Archie Branch Sr. (“Archie”). The policy was obtained during Archie's marriage to Loretta Young Branch (“Loretta”), and Loretta was the named beneficiary. Archie and Loretta divorced on May 3, 2011.¹ Six weeks later, Archie died.

According to Loretta, she demanded the insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary, but Monumental refused payment. Monumental learned that a newspaper obituary identified the following five people as Archie's children: Sheila Thompson (“Sheila”),² Edward Branch Sr. (“Edward”), Roy Branch (“Roy”); Wanda Ford (“Wanda”); and Graylyn Judkins (“Graylyn”). Monumental filed an interpleader action, and on February 24, 2012, the trial court signed an order allowing Monumental to deposit the insurance proceeds into the registry of the court. On or about that time, the trial court also dismissed Monumental from the case or granted a motion for a nonsuit; however, the record does not contain a motion to dismiss or for a nonsuit, any responses or replies to such a motion, or the order granting it.

The merits of the remaining parties' claims to the insurance proceeds were the subject of a one-day nonjury trial. Loretta was represented by one attorney, and Sheila, Edward, and Roy were represented by another. Wanda appeared pro se, and Graylyn did not appear at all. The trial court ruled that Loretta “has no legal claim or right” to the deposited funds, which instead belong solely to Archie's legal heirs. The trial court further ordered the money held in the court's registry until Archie's estate “has been properly probated” and the identity of his legal heirs has been determined.

Loretta timely filed a pro se notice of appeal, purportedly on behalf of herself, Graylyn, and Wanda; however, only Loretta signed the notice of appeal. Four weeks later, Loretta filed an amended notice of appeal, purportedly on behalf of herself and Graylyn, but again, the notice was signed only by Loretta. Five days later, Wanda signed and filed a pro se amended notice of appeal. Through counsel, Loretta filed an appellate brief raising issues on her own behalf, but the brief did not mention Graylyn or Wanda or include any arguments on their behalf.

We issued an order informing the parties that (a) Graylyn's appeal would be dismissed unless he filed a response demonstrating that the appeal should continue, and (b) Wanda's appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless she filed an appellate brief. Wanda did not respond, but Graylyn and Loretta signed a joint response in which they represented that Graylyn joined in Loretta's appellate brief.³ Under the circumstances, we will treat Graylyn's signed response as an amended notice of appeal that cures Graylyn's failure to sign the original pro se notice of appeal.

II. Issues Presented

In their first issue, Loretta and Graylyn argue that Loretta is entitled to all insurance proceeds—or alternatively, to a refund of all premiums paid—because the insurance policy attached to Monumental's petition is not the policy issued to Archie but instead is a sample policy that identifies a different insurer. In their second issue, they contend that the trial court erred in excluding evidence about Loretta's ownership interest or her right to the proceeds of the policy. They assert in their third issue that the trial court erred in determining that Loretta had no right to the insurance proceeds. They argue in their fourth issue that the trial court erred in dismissing Monumental from this suit because Loretta had a counterclaim against Monumental under the prompt-payment statute.

III. Dismissal of Wanda's Appeal

Because Wanda failed to file an appellate brief as ordered, we dismiss her appeal for want of prosecution. SeeTex.R.App. P. 42.3(b).

IV. Dismissal of Graylyn's Appeal

“An appealing party ‘may not complain of errors which do not injuriously affect him or which merely affect the rights of others.’ ” Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex.1982) (quoting Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex.1973)); Gilchrist v. Carroll, No. 14–10–00901–CV, 2011 WL 5999012, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 1, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Although Graylyn was a party to this action in the trial court, he has standing to appeal only if the judgment prejudiced his own interests. See Trojacek v. Estate of Kveton, No. 14–07–00911–CV, 2009 WL 909591, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In the judgment under review, the trial court addressed only Loretta's claims. Although the judgment is adverse to Loretta, it does not affect Graylyn's rights. Because Graylyn does not have standing to appeal a judgment that is adverse only to his mother's interest, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over his appeal. See id., 2009 WL 909591, at *4 (dismissing appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to appellant who attempted only to challenge the judgment on behalf of her sister and nieces). We accordingly dismiss Graylyn's appeal for want of jurisdiction. SeeTex.R.App. P. 42.3(a).

V. Merits of Loretta's Appeal

We generally address first those points that, if sustained, would require us to reverse and render judgment rather than to reverse and remand. SeeTex. R.App. P. 43.3 (when reversing a judgment, the appellate court must render judgment unless a remand is required). We therefore begin with Loretta's first and third issues, because if we were to sustain either issue, it might be possible to render judgment. We then address her second and fourth issues, because if we were to sustain those issues, we could only remand the case for further proceedings.

A. Monumental's alleged failure to attach the correct policy to its pleading does not establish Loretta's right to judgment on any of her claims.

In her first issue, Loretta argues that she is entitled to the insurance proceeds or to a refund of all premiums paid because Monumental failed to attach the correct insurance policy to its pleading. She asserts that the policy attached to Monumental's petition is a sample policy of People's Benefit Life Insurance Company rather than the Monumental policy insuring Archie's life. She contends that Monumental accordingly “has nothing before the court to show the terms and conditions of the alleged policy,” and that she therefore is entitled to all insurance proceeds or at least to a refund of all premiums paid for the policy.

Loretta cites no authority that Monumental was required to attach the policy to its pleadings. SeeTex.R.App. P. 38.1(i) (arguments must be supported by citation to appropriate authorities and to the record). Monumental was permitted—but not required—to attach a copy of the policy, quote it, or summarize it. SeeTex.R. Civ. P. 45 (setting forth pleading requirements); Tex.R. Civ. P. 59 (explaining that “written instruments, constituting, in whole or in part, the claim sued on ... may be made a part of the pleadings by [attaching and filing copies or originals] or by copying the same in the body of the pleading in aid and explanation of the allegations”) (emphasis added); see also Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494–95 (Tex.1988) (“Rule 45 does not require that the plaintiff set out in his pleadings the evidence upon which he relies to establish his asserted cause of action.”).

Loretta also is mistaken about the burden of proof: Monumental was not required to show that Loretta was or was not entitled to any of the relief she sought. In an interpleader action, “each claimant has the burden of proving its own claim and its relative priority as to all other claimants.” Northshore Bank v. Commercial Credit Corp., 668 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Worden v. Thornburg, 564 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). It therefore was Loretta's responsibility to show that she had a superior right to any interpleaded funds she claimed. Monumental's purported failure to offer evidence disproving her claims is no evidence that Loretta was entitled to prevail.

We overrule this issue.

B. Loretta failed to establish her right to judgment.

Loretta also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that she has no right to the interpleaded insurance proceeds. Where, as here, the case was tried without a jury and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed, we will uphold the trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the record, implying the necessary fact findings. Rosemond v. Al–Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex.2011) (per curiam). Loretta does not explicitly state whether she challenges the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the implied findings, but she asserts that she is entitled to the life-insurance proceeds. She does not contend...