Brandy W. v. Kijakazi
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-02990-AJB |
| Decision Date | 14 February 2022 |
| Parties | BRANDY W., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, [1] Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff Brandy W. brought this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying her applications for social security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act.[3] For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on or around June 12 2015, alleging disability commencing on June 7, 2015. [Record (hereinafter “R”) 525, 529]. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. [R397-404, 408-413]. Plaintiff then submitted an untimely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) along with a statement of good cause, which was dismissed. [R391-92, 414-18]. The Appeals Council reversed the ALJ's dismissal, and an evidentiary hearing was held on August 21, 2019. [R393, 38-61]. The ALJ issued a decision on September 17, 2019, denying Plaintiff's application on the ground that she had not been under a “disability” at any time through the date of the decision. [R12-31]. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on May 15, 2020, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [R1-6].
Plaintiff then filed her action in this Court on July 18, 2020, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. [Docs. 1, 6]. The answer and transcript were filed on January 11, 2021. [Docs. 14, 15]. On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 20]; on May 13, 2021, the Commissioner filed a response in support of the decision, [Doc. 21]; and on May 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 22]. The parties did not request oral argument. [See Dkt.]. The matter is now before the Court upon the administrative record, the parties' pleadings, and the parties' briefs, and it is accordingly ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, psychological, or physiological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)-(3).
The burden of proof in a Social Security disability case is divided between the claimant and the Commissioner. The claimant bears the primary burden of establishing the existence of a “disability” and therefore entitlement to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether the claimant has met the burden of proving disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999), superseded by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000), [4] on other grounds as stated in Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2018). The claimant must prove at step one that she is not undertaking substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must prove that she is suffering from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits her ability to perform basic work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At step three, if the impairment meets one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 (Listing of Impairments), the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a listed impairment, she must prove that her impairment prevents performance of past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The claimant's RFC is the most that she can still do despite her limitations and is assessed after an evaluation of the relevant record evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3). The Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work available in the national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. To be considered disabled, the claimant must prove an inability to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists. Id.
If at any step in the sequence a claimant can be found disabled or not disabled, the sequential evaluation ceases and further inquiry ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Despite the shifting of burdens at step five, the overall burden rests on the claimant to prove that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2; Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), as recognized in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).
A limited scope of judicial review applies to a denial of Social Security benefits by the Commissioner. Judicial review of the administrative decision addresses three questions: (1) whether the proper legal standards were applied; (2) whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings of fact; and (3) whether the findings of fact resolved the crucial issues. Washington v. Astrue, 558 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1296 (N.D.Ga. 2008); Fields v. Harris, 498 F.Supp. 478, 488 (N.D.Ga. 1980). The Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and the Commissioner applies the proper legal standards, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
“Substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be enough to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1180; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the Court] must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary of the ALJ's findings, the ALJ decision will not be overturned where “there is substantially supportive evidence” of the ALJ's decision. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast, review of the ALJ's application of legal principles is plenary. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Walker, 826 F.2d at 999.
Plaintiff Brandy Wilcoxson was 36 years old on the alleged onset date and was 41 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. [R22]. She has a high school education and a limited work history. [R22]. Plaintiff has performed past relevant work as a fast-food worker, store laborer, and a fast-food manager. [R29-30]. Plaintiff alleges disability as of June 7, 2015, due mostly to neck and back injuries. [R22].
At the hearing before the ALJ on August 21, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel stated that Plaintiff was disabled under Listing 1.04 due to cervical spondylosis[5] and lumbar bulging discs.[6] [R43]. Plaintiff testified that she was currently employed as a security officer at a school for adults obtaining their GEDs, working four days per week for three hours each shift. [R44-45]. Plaintiff also testified that in the preceding years, she had a cleaning business, but her son performed the cleaning jobs for her, and that she had been a fast-food manager before getting injured. [R45-46]. Plaintiff stated that she had also worked at a Chico's warehouse as a packer. [R46-47]...
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