Brannan v. Board of Sup'rs of De Soto County

• Decision Date: 11 January 1926
• Docket Number: 25167
• Citation: 106 So. 768,141 Miss. 444
• Parties: BRANNAN et al. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF DE SOTO COUNTY. [*]
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

106 So. 768

141 Miss. 444

BRANNAN et al. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF DE SOTO COUNTY. ^[*]

No. 25167

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 11, 1926

Division B

Suggestion Of Error Overruled February 8, 1926.

APPEAL from circuit court of De Soto county, HON. GREEK L. RICE Judge.

Appeal to the circuit court by O. F. Brannan and others from an order of the board of supervisors of De Soto county consolidating school districts. The order was affirmed by the circuit court, and Brannan and others appeal. Reversed and judgment rendered.

Reversed.

Holmes & Bowdre, for appellants.

I. The election held on May 31, 1924, is void and neither the lands embraced in the Poplar Corner school district nor the two and one-half sections of land embraced in the Brewer school district are legally annexed to the Horn Lake consolidated school district, because the order of the school board, of date May 31, 1924, which was certified to the board of supervisors, does not state or show that a majority of the school patrons of the territory to be added, which was described in the said order, presented a petition to said school board, as required by chapter 198, Laws of 1922. Prior to chapter 198, Laws of 1922, territory could not be added to an existing consolidated school district. Williams v. Lee, 132 Miss. 739. The order of the board of supervisors does not state that the board finds that a petition was presented to the school board signed by a majority of the school patrons of the territory to be added. Neither does the order to the school board recite that a majority of the school patrons residing in the territory to be added presented a petition for the annexation of said territory. The order of the school board simply recites that they have acted upon a petition of a majority of the patrons of the Poplar Corner school district, but the territory described as the Poplar Corner school district embraces two and one-half sections of land in the Brewer school district.

Their jurisdiction to act is obtained by a petition presented by a majority of the school patrons of the territory to be added and this must affirmatively appear in each of their said orders. Chapter 198, Laws of 1922; Williams v. Lee, 137 Miss. 746. Judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction must show on their fact the courts' jurisdiction to act. This matter is fully discussed in 23 Cyc. 1082. See, also, Steen v. Steen, 25 Miss. 513; Shaffarans v. Terry, 12 S. & M. 690; Hinton v. Perry, 84 Miss. 546; Boutwell v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Miss. 343. The order of the school board must show affirmatively their jurisdiction. Boutwell v. Jasper, 128 Miss. 344. See, also, Barrett v. School District, 123 Miss. 378.

The statute provides that a petition must be presented to the school board by a majority of the patrons residing within the territory to be added. In this case there was a petition presented by a majority of the patrons of the Poplar Corner school district only, and the patrons of the Brewer school district were wholly ignored. Therefore, the school board did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of an order made by it. See Liddell v. Noxapater, 129 Miss. 513; Williams v. Lee, 132 Miss. 501. The case of Adams v. Bank, 103 Miss. 744, fully discusses the jurisdiction of the board of supervisors in the exercise of a statutory power. The principle involved in this case is no different from that involved in Wallace v. Tucker, 104 Miss. 83; Craft v. DeSoto County, 79 Miss. 618; Lumber Co. v. Jefferson Davis County, 133 Miss. 235.

Therefore, under the authority of the statute and the decisions of the supreme court of Mississippi, territory cannot be added to an existing consolidated school district, where the school board and the board of supervisors did not acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter by a proper petition signed by a majority of the school patrons residing within the territory to be added, and said school board and board of supervisors must set out affirmatively in their order facts which show their jurisdiction of the subject matter.

Burch, Minor & McKay, for appellee.

I. Authorities need not be cited for the proposition that no one may complain of any action of the board of supervisors unless it appears affirmatively that they were affected by it or had an interest in the subject-matter. Coleman v. Carr, Walker 258; DeJanette v. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Natchez R. Co. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 718.

The record here is entirely lacking in proof that these objecting parties were residents or taxpayers of the district in controversy. If a bill in equity is filed, no one would contend that a mere statement in the caption or body of the bill is any evidence whatever of that statement. Particularly is this true where the pleading in question is not signed or sworn to by the parties, but is merely signed by the counsel.

Complainants never offered to show that they were taxpayers or residents of the district. Greenwood v. Henderson, 84 Miss. 804. The case must be decided upon the bill of exceptions and that alone and "it is not in the power of the board of supervisors to consent to any other mode of trial" in the circuit court. Bridges v. Supervisors, 57 Miss. 255.

II. Validity of board's orders. The ground of objection is that the order of the school board failed to recite such a petition as the statute requires. For the law governing the subject of annexation, see chapter 198, Acts of 1922.

It is claimed that such a petition is jurisdictional; that the school board and board of supervisors are courts of special and limited jurisdiction and that their orders are void for failure to recite jurisdictional facts. In the first place, it may be doubted whether such a petition is a jurisdictional fact. In Hunt v. Mann, 136 Miss. 590, it was contended that the election was void because the successful candidate's name was not put on the ballot pursuant to a petition signed by fifty electors. The court held, however, that, conceding such a petition to be required by the statute, its absence would not afford ground for setting aside the election. But we are not compelled to rely upon that proposition. The rule as to the necessity of recitation of jurisdictional facts in orders of boards like these has its qualifications. See Rogers v. Board, 115 Miss. 331.

The court will observe that there is no averment or offer to prove that the petition presented to the school board and referred to in its order was not actually signed by a majority of the school patrons residing in the territory to be annexed. The objection is purely a technical one that such a petition is not recited in the order. Bearing this in mind, it seems clear that the annexation in question is not void because of the failure to recite, in the order of the school board, the petition of patrons. The existence of such a petition is the important question. North Carrolton v. Carrolton, 113 Miss. 21.

Aside from all the foregoing, these appellants cannot complain of the absence of a petition for the reason that their appeal from the action of the board comes too late. Ferguson v. Board, 14 So. 82.

Argued orally by H. D. Minor, for appellee.

OPINION

ANDERSON, J.

The appellants appealed to the circuit court of De Soto county from an order of the board of supervisors (appellee) of that county, effecting the annexation of adjoining territory to the Horn Lake consolidated school district in said county. The appeal was taken under section 80, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 60), which provides for an appeal for any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors, or the municipal authorities of a city, town, or village. The record in the case is therefore a bill of exceptions setting out the proceedings before appellee. The following is deemed a sufficient statement of the case to bring out the questions involved:

The bill of exceptions taken by appellants to the action of appellee has the following caption:

"Bill of exceptions of Brannan, Mr. Moreton, J. F. Lively, Mrs. C. T. Knight, and other taxpayers of said Poplar Corner school district, too numerous to mention."

Following the caption is a recital that the objections of appellants were presented to appellee at the latter's July meeting 1924. Then follows a copy of appellants' objections, the caption to which recites that appellants were taxpayers of Poplar Corner school district, the territory sought to be annexed to the Horn Lake consolidated school district. Then follows in the bill of exceptions a copy of the order of the school board annexing to the Horn Lake consolidated school district certain territory specifically described in the order as constituting the Poplar Corner school district. Among other things, this order recites that a petition of the patrons of the Poplar Corner white school district to annex the territory of said district to the Horn Lake consolidated school district came on for hearing, and was examined by appellee, "and found that a majority of the patrons of the said school have signed said petition." There is an absence in the bill of exceptions of any recital that appellants introduced evidence, or offered to introduce evidence, that they would be taxed or otherwise affected by the consolidated of the two districts. The only evidence, if that be evidence, of appellants' being aggrieved by the consolidation, is the recital in the caption of the bill of exceptions and in the caption of appellants' objections to the consolidation made a part of the bill of...