Brannen v. Brannen

• Citation: 21 N.W.2d 459,237 Iowa 188
• Decision Date: 05 February 1946
• Docket Number: 46817.
• Parties: BRANNEN v. BRANNEN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

21 N.W.2d 459

237 Iowa 188

BRANNEN v. BRANNEN.

No. 46817.

Supreme Court of Iowa

February 5, 1946

Raymond E. Hanke and Powers, Sloane, Woodcock & Orebaugh, all of Des Moines, for appellant.

Carl A. Burkman, of Des Moines, for appellee.

GARFIELD Justice.

Plaintiff Edna Brannen and defendant Paul Brannen were married in August, 1927. Their home was in Des Moines. They separated in December, 1944. This action for divorce, commenced in January, 1945, was tried the following June. The decree granted plaintiff a divorce, custody of the children (a girl 17, a boy 14, and a girl 8), and alimony. Defendant's first contention here is that the evidence is insufficient to prove he was 'guilty of such inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of his wife.' See section 10475, Code 1939.

I. In cases of this kind the findings of the trial court are entitled to much weight. Neff v. Neff, Iowa, 20 N.W.2d 916, 917, and cases cited. There is sufficient support in the evidence for the trial court's finding that defendant was guilty of such inhuman treatment as to endanger plaintiff's life. We reach the same conclusion.

It is well settled that there may be inhuman treatment which is a cause for divorce, without physical violence. Neff v. Neff, supra and cases cited. However, here there is evidence of physical violence. Open and brazen admissions of adultery have been held to amount to such inhuman treatment. Schnor v. Schnor Iowa, 17 N.W.2d 375, 157 A.L.R. 628, and Annotation 631. Conduct of one spouse with others of the opposite sex, even without adultery, may constitute inhuman treatment. Annotation 157 A.L.R. 628, 636-640. Excessive sexual demands upon the wife may amount to such treatment. Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 185 N.W. 91; 17 Am.Jur. 187 section 76; 14 Iowa Law Review 266, 270. It has been frequently held that unwarranted charges of infidelity may constitute inhuman treatment. Williges v. Williges, 215 Iowa 960, 247 N.W. 222; Schneckloth v. Schneckloth, 209 Iowa 496 499, 228 N.W. 290, and cases cited; Annotation 143 A.L.R. 623.

Plaintiff testified: When defendant was angry he would grab her by the neck and hurt her; shortly before her boy was born defendant struck her and knocked her against the sink--she and her doctor were both concerned about her condition; when the boy was a baby defendant pulled her out of bed, 'knocked her around with his fists' and kicked her with his heavy work shoes because she didn't want to get up in a cold house but wanted him to fix the fire; on another occasion he beat her with his fist and as a result medical attention was required; he had a violent uncontrollable temper; he used profane and abusive language toward her in the presence of the children; on one occasion defendant threatened to strike her with a milk bottle but a boarder stepped in and stopped him; 'he often said he would slap her damn mouth, knock her teeth down her throat and things like that.'

Plaintiff also testified: Six years before the trial defendant contracted a venereal disease (he admitted this but offered the improbable explanation that he acquired the disease from cleaning toilets at his place of work); during the three months he was treated for the disease, plaintiff was required to keep his medicines, wash his clothes separately and sleep with him (but it does not appear defendant communicated the disease to her); before each child was born defendant intimated to plaintiff that he did not want children and suggested an abortion; 'before my boy was born he suggested a doctor that some woman he had relations with suggested to him to go to'; with few exceptions, defendant demanded that plaintiff have intercourse with him every night.

One of the principal sources of trouble between the parties was that defendant frequently made improper advances toward other women who reported such conduct to plaintiff. Plaintiff's 23-year old sister and 38-year old half-sister both testified that defendant made improper advances toward them at numerous times. Another woman told of such conduct by defendant toward her on one occasion. Plaintiff testified defendant told her he had desires toward her younger sister and 'never would be satisfied until he had sexual relations with her'; defendant frequently called himself 'God's gift to women'; he 'told her of his association with other women all along'; when plaintiff asked him to refrain from such conduct, he promised he would. Plaintiff said the cause of the final separation was defendant's failure to keep his promise not to bother other women, especially her sister, and her inability to trust him. At this time defendant, with an oath, threatened to strike plaintiff with a flashlight.

There is also substantial evidence that defendant made unwarranted charges of infidelity against his wife.

Defendant admitted some of plaintiff's testimony but denied much of it. However, some of his answers, especially regarding some of his conduct with other women, were evasive and hard to believe. As is usual, defendant's version of some of the incidents testified to by plaintiff differs from hers. The trial judge evidently believed plaintiff's story in the main. We think he was justified in so doing.

Of course, the inhuman treatment that is a cause for divorce must endanger life. Code, section 10475; Klepper v. Klepper, 234 Iowa 1138, 1142, 15 N.W.2d 213, 215; Siverson v. Siverson, 217 Iowa 1167, 1171, 251 N.W. 653, and cases cited. There is sufficient showing that defendant's treatment of his wife impaired her health and thereby endangered her life.

II. We find no merit in defendant's contention that plaintiff's testimony lacks the corroboration required by Code, section 10474.

The main reason that corroboration is required is to prevent collusion between the parties. Davis v. Davis, 228 Iowa 764, 768, 292 N.W. 804; Annotation 65 A.L.R. 169, 175; 17 Am.Jur. 337, section 384. Corroboration may be by either direct or circumstantial evidence, tending to establish the grounds alleged. It is not necessary that the corroboration alone sustain the decree or that it support all parts of plaintiff's testimony. Such a strict requirement might often frustrate justice, because of the privacy of domestic relations. Davis v. Davis, supra, and cases cited; Klepper v Klepper, 234 Iowa 1138, 1142, 15 N.W.2d 213,...