Brannigan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
| Decision Date | 17 March 1953 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | BRANNIGAN v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
James F. Rosen, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Peter Marcuse, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).
Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was George C. Conway, Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).
Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.
The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal of the administrator and vacating an award of unemployment compensation to the plaintiff. The question presented is whether the plaintiff is entitled to unemployment compensation when, upon his voluntary retirement from his employment, he received from his employer a sum of money equal in amount to eighteen months' wages at his regular rate of pay.
The plaintiff was employed for thirty-two years by D. A. Schulte, Inc., hereinafter called the company, as clerk and manager in one of its stores in Bridgeport. He voluntarily retired on June 2, 1951, at the age of sixty-seven. Since then, he has been totally unemployed. He applied for unemployment compensation and registered for work with the state employment service on June 10, 1951, but it has not referred him to any employment. He is currently receiving social security benefits in the amount of $68.50 each month. Prior to January 1, 1948, the company had no retirement plan. The plaintiff's union, in cooperation with other unions of the company's employees, urged the company to adopt one. The company found, upon investigation, that a plan whereby qualified retired employees received a retirement allowance until death would cost more than the company could afford. Consequently, on January 1, 1948, the company and the unions acting in behalf of the employees entered into an agreement which provides that any employee who reaches the age of sixty-five and who has been in the company's employ for five years or more 'shall be entitled to severance pay by reason of age and length of service.' The plan was financed entirely by the company. Under its terms the plaintiff was entitled to receive upon retirement, and did receive, $5055.80, which represented eighteen months' pay, less federal income tax and social security deductions.
General Statutes, § 7508, provides that '[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits * * * (4) during any week with respect to which the individual has received or is about to receive remuneration in the form of (a) wages in lieu of notice or dismissal payments or any payment by way of compensation for loss of wages, or any other state or federal unemployment benefits * * *.' We do not consider the question whether the payment made to the plaintiff was within that part of the clause of the statute which disqualifies a claimant if he receives 'wages in lieu of notice or dismissal payments'. The plaintiff stopped working voluntarily and made application for the severance pay available to him under the agreement. It suffices to say that notice or dismissal payments are usually associated with a termination of the employment relationship for reasons primarily beyond the control of the employee. See note, 147 A.L.R. 151. We rest our decision of the case upon the answer to the question whether the money paid to the plaintiff was a 'payment by way of compensation for loss of wages'.
Almost the identical issue was before us in Kneeland v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 630, 88 A.2d 376. The plaintiff in that case had been retired and was receiving payments pursuant to a pension plan provided by the employer. He also was entitled to old-age benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Although he had registered for work with the state employment service, he had not been referred to any job. We held, 138 Conn. at page 636, 88 A.2d 376, that he was disqualified for unemployment compensation. The facts in the Kneeland case differ from those in the instant case only in that in the Kneeland case the pension payments were to be made periodically over an extended...
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Connecticut State Medical Soc. v. Connecticut Bd. of Examiners in Podiatry
...425 A.2d 581 (1979). This case presents a question of law turning upon the interpretation of a statute. See Brannigan v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 572, 577, 95 A.2d 798 (1953); Bridgeport v. United Illuminating Co., 131 Conn. 368, 371, 40 A.2d 272 (1944). Both the board and the trial court h......
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Hock v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
... ... statutory authority in support of such disqualification ... See, Thornbrough v. Gage, 234 Ark. 15, 350 S.W.2d ... 306 (1961); Brannigan v. Administrator, Unemployment ... Compensation Act, 139 Conn. 572, 95 A.2d 798 (1953); ... Pyrdol v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, ... ...
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Hock v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
...in support of such disqualification. See, Thornbrough v. Gage, 234 Ark. 15, 350 S.W.2d 306 (1961); Brannigan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 139 Conn. 572, 95 A.2d 798 (1953); Pyrdol v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 27 Conn.Sup. 168, 233 A.2d 146 (1967); Glo......
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Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care
...425 A.2d 581 (1979). This case presents a question of law turning upon the interpretation of statutes. See Brannigan v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 572, 577, 95 A.2d 798 (1953); Bridgeport v. United Illuminating Co., 131 Conn. 368, 371, 40 A.2d 272 We conclude therefore that the trial court's ......