Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care

• Decision Date: 03 June 1986
• Citation: 509 A.2d 1050,200 Conn. 133
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. COMMISSION ON HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE.

Page 1050

509 A.2d 1050

200 Conn. 133

CONNECTICUT HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. COMMISSION ON HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 1986.

Decided June 3, 1986.

J. Michael Eisner, with whom were Jeanette C. Schreiber and, on brief, R. Jeffrey Sands, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Maite Barainca, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before SHEA, DANNEHY, CALLAHAN, JACOBSON and KULAWIZ, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs, thirty-four hospitals in Connecticut ¹ (hereinafter hospitals), have appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the defendant, commission on hospitals and health care (hereinafter commission). The hospitals claim that the trial court erred: (1) by applying improper standards in its review of the declaratory ruling issued by the commission; and (2) by failing to reverse the declaratory ruling of the commission and to hold that the commission has no authority to regulate capital expenditures that are under the statutory threshold dollar amounts set forth in General Statutes § 19a-155. We find no error.

On September 23, 1982, the hospitals filed with the commission a petition for a declaratory ruling on three questions pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 4-176, ² a statement in support of the petition and an appendix. The commission voted to consider the petition and held a hearing on December 15, 1982, at which the hospitals presented evidence and testimony in support of the requested ruling. Subsequent to that hearing, the enactment of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-215 (now General Statutes §§ 19a-154 and 19a-155), effective on May 26, 1983, caused the first two questions raised by the hospitals in the petition to become moot. The only issue raised by the request for a declaratory ruling which has not become moot and the only issue we will consider involves the extent of the commission's jurisdiction over capital expenditures. On that issue, the hospitals sought the following declaratory ruling: "[A] capital expenditures budget submitted to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section 19-73o(a) (now Section 19a-156[a] does not prevent a hospital desiring to undertake additional capital expenditures (not in its capital expenditures budget and not exceeding the minimum jurisdictional dollar amounts set forth in Section 19-73m [now Section 19a-155], from freely undertaking such additional capital expenditures without Commission review or approval unless they are undertaken in conjunction with new services or functions subject to Commission approval under Section 19-731 (now Section 19a-154) of the Connecticut General Statutes." The commission issued its declaratory ruling on September 13, 1983, in which it rejected the hospitals' requested ruling and held that commission approval is required for any capital expenditures, as defined in the regulations, which are not in the approved capital budget, regardless of whether or not the amount of such expenditure falls below the threshold of General Statutes § 19a-155. The hospitals appealed this decision. On November 27, 1984, the Superior Court, Mack, J., issued a memorandum of decision affirming the commission's declaratory ruling.

The question at issue arises out of the language contained in General Statutes §§ 19a-156 ³ and 19a-155. ⁴ General Statutes § 19a-155 provides in relevant part: "(a) ... [A]ny health care facility or institution ... proposing a capital expenditure exceeding six hundred thousand dollars, or the acquisition of major medical equipment having a cost exceeding four hundred thousand dollars, including the leasing of equipment or a facility, which expenditure was not included in a budget approved under section 19a-156, shall submit a request for approval of such expenditure to the commission ...." General Statutes § 19a-156 provides in relevant part: "(a) Every hospital ... shall submit annually to the commission its proposed operating and capital expenditures budget for its next fiscal year .... The commission shall review such proposed budget and may, with the consent of the facility or institution, informally discuss such budget with representatives of the facility or institution. The commission shall notify the facility or institution of its approval, denial or modification of such budget not later than forty-five days before such proposed adoption date. ... [T]he commission shall order the institution to adopt a budget which the commission deems acceptable for the coming fiscal period....(c) In the event of unforeseen and material changes in circumstances during any fiscal year, any hospital or health care facility or institution which has submitted a budget to the commission pursuant to the provisions of this section may submit a proposed revised budget to said commission pursuant to regulations adopted by the commission."

"There are clear indications in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes §§ 4-166--4-189; that the legislature intended that the administrators issue declaratory rulings based on their interpretations of statutes." Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 356, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977). The commission therefore was correct in giving its interpretation of whether General Statutes §§ 19a-155 and 19a-156 provide that additional capital expenditures which are not in the capital expenditures budget and which do not exceed the threshold amounts under § 19a-155 can be freely undertaken without review or approval by the commission.

We first address whether the Superior Court applied the proper standards in its review of the declaratory ruling issued by the commission. General Statutes § 4-183(g) allows judicial modification of a decision of an administrative agency "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." The trial court appears to have focused its analysis on whether the commission's declaratory ruling interpreting the statutes was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. We do not believe that review of the declaratory ruling should have been so limited. "Although the factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies are to be given considerable weight by the courts; see General Statutes § 4-183(g); Board of Aldermen v. Bridgeport Community Antennae Television Co., 168 Conn. 294, 298-99, 362 A.2d 529 (1975); Westport v. Norwalk, 167 Conn. 151, 355 A.2d 25 (1974); 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law §§ 645, 675; it is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law. N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 487 F.2d 1143, 1170-71 (D.C.Cir.1973), aff'd, sub. nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 94 S.Ct. 2737, 41 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 69." Real Estate Listing Service, Inc. v. Real Estate Commission, 179 Conn. 128, 138-39, 425 A.2d 581 (1979). This case presents a question of law turning upon the interpretation of statutes. See Brannigan v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 572, 577, 95 A.2d 798 (1953); Bridgeport v. United Illuminating Co., 131 Conn. 368, 371, 40 A.2d 272 (1944).

We conclude therefore that the trial court's standard of review was, in the present case, too limited. This conclusion, however, does not require reversal. Rather, we will review the commission's declaratory ruling with our focus on whether the ruling was correct as a matter of law.

The commission asserts that its declaratory ruling is consistent with the expressed intent of the legislature. "It is well settled that a statute must be applied as its words direct. Dental Commission v. Tru-Fit Plastics, Inc., 159 Conn. 362, 365, 269 A.2d 265 [1970]; Obuchowski v. Dental Commission, 149 Conn. 257, 265, 178 A.2d 537 [1962]." New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478, 485, 362 A.2d 785 (1975). The statutory provisions in question are unambiguous. "[I]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction." Id. " 'It has often been said that the legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say. Wiegand v. Heffernan, 170 Conn. 567, 581, 368 A.2d 103 (1976); Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 452, 364 A.2d 167 (1975); Sillman v. Sillman, 168 Conn. 144, 148, 358 A.2d 150 (1975).' Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980). Where the language used is clear and unambiguous, we will not speculate as to some supposed intention. Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, [181 Conn. 1, 6, 434 A.2d 293 (1980) ]." Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 231, 477 A.2d 988 (1984). Further, where the legislative intent is clearly and unambiguously expressed in the words of the statutes, there is no need for a review of their legislative history. Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, 196 Conn. 546, 550, 494 A.2d 564 (1985).

The commission's declaratory ruling is consistent with the unambiguous language of the statutes in question and therefore consistent with...