Brant v. State, 45A03-8803-CR-69

• Decision Date: 20 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 45A03-8803-CR-69,45A03-8803-CR-69
• Citation: 535 N.E.2d 189
• Parties: Philip BRANT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 189

535 N.E.2d 189

Philip BRANT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 45A03-8803-CR-69.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

March 20, 1989.

Daniel L. Bella, Crown Point, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Philip Brant is appealing his conviction of theft, a Class D felony. IND. CODE Sec. 35-43-4-2 (1985 Supp.) After a jury verdict, Brant was sentenced to a term of two years. Here, on appeal Brant raises several issues which can be restated as:

(1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment; and

(2) whether Brant was denied a fair trial by the State's alleged failure to disclose a witness's criminal history.

The facts most favorable to the jury's verdict tend to establish that Brant was hired by Bruce Cooper to work as a car salesman at Cooper's B & K Auto Sales in Crown Point, Indiana. Brant was to be paid solely on a commission basis, although he also performed occasional mechanical repair work, for which he was paid directly. Additionally, Cooper permitted his employees, including Brant, to use his cars for personal errands.

On April 30, 1987, Cooper became aware of a car that was for sale for $150.00. He knew that Brant's car had recently broken down and consequently Cooper and Brant agreed that Cooper would buy the car for Brant. In turn, Brant was to pay for the car by performing certain specified mechanical repairs on other cars at the lot and by earning sales commissions. Pursuant to this agreement, Brant took Cooper's check to the car's seller and returned with the car and the title which had been endorsed with Brant as the purchaser, but was not notarized. Cooper testified that he was unaware of the endorsement, and although he let Brant freely use the car, Cooper put the document in his desk with the titles for the other vehicles in his inventory.

Over the next week Brant's work habits became erratic. He only occasionally appeared at the car lot, and he did none of the work specified by his agreement with Cooper. Another car lot employee testified that on May 5, 1987, Brant came to the office and spoke with Cooper on the phone. Cooper testified that the conversation was a heated argument about Brant's poor job performance. After the argument Brant turned to the other employee and said, "I'll settle with Bruce later." Brant then removed the title for the car from Cooper's desk and left the lot.

After this, Brant did not reappear at the lot, nor did he make any attempt to contact Cooper. Sometime shortly afterwards, Brant tried to trade the car. Brant was unsuccessful, because he altered the title and used a false affidavit which the license branch detected and refused. Brant was ultimately charged with and convicted of stealing the automobile title.

Brant's initial argument, here on appeal, is that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for theft of the title. To sustain a conviction for theft there must be proof that the defendant exerted unauthorized control over another's property with intent to deprive the owner of the property's value or use.

IND. CODE Sec. 35-43-4-2 (1985 Supp.);

Wilson v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1014. In the present case, Brant does not dispute the essential facts, but he does argue that the title is not "property" as meant by the theft statute, that he did not exert control over another's property, and that he did not have the requisite criminal intent when he took the title from Cooper's desk.

As always, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, but instead will only look to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the jury's verdict, to see if there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment. See e.g. McBroom v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 725. Application of this standard to the present case demonstrates that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence on which it could have based its verdict.

IND. CODE Sec. 35-41-1-2 (1982 Ed.) states, in part, that " '[p]roperty' means anything of value." In Busam v. State (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 118, this Court held that there only need be evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the item in question had value. There is no requirement that the item have any particular value or that a specific value be proven. In this case, defense counsel, on cross-examination of Cooper, established that it would cost money to replace the title that Brant took. This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the title had value and, therefore, was property within the meaning of the theft statute.

There is equally sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Brant exerted control over another's property. Contrary to Brant's argument, the State was not required to prove that Cooper was the absolute owner of the title. Instead the State only needed to establish that Cooper was in rightful possession of the title. Bridges v. State (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 207. Review of the facts presented reveals that although Brant had an interest in the car, Cooper rightfully possessed the title. The agreement between Cooper and Brant provided that Cooper would retain the title until payment was made. Since payment had not been made, Cooper was still the rightful possessor when Brant wrongfully removed the title, and the jury did not err.

Brant also argues that there was insufficient evidence as to his criminal intent. As repeatedly stated, intent is a mental function and...