Brantley By and Through Brantley v. INDEPENDENT

• Decision Date: 13 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3-95 CIV 674.,3-95 CIV 674.
• Citation: 936 F. Supp. 649
• Parties: Byron BRANTLEY, a Minor, By and Through Denise Brantley, His Parent and Guardian, and Denis Brantley, Plaintiffs, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 625, ST. PAUL PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

936 F. Supp. 649

Byron BRANTLEY, a Minor, By and Through Denise Brantley, His Parent and Guardian, and Denis Brantley, Plaintiffs, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 625, ST. PAUL PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. 3-95 CIV 674.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

August 13, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sonja D. Kerr, Inver Grove Heights, MN, for Plaintiff.

Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, LLP by Karen A. Janisch, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

ORDER

ALSOP, Senior District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant moves for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)¹ and summary judgment on all but one of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred when Ms. Brantley unilaterally placed her son in a private school. Because there are genuine issues of material fact, Plaintiffs' motion will be denied and, pending submission of additional evidence, if any, Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to the IDEA will be decided on the administrative record. Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Procedural History

Byron Brantley is a sixteen year-old, part African-American and part Native-American student. Prior to fourth grade, Byron was enrolled in the Kansas City, Missouri school district. Byron's family moved to Minnesota for his 4th grade school year (1990-91) and he was enrolled in Dayton's Bluff Elementary School in the St. Paul School District (the "District"). Byron did not receive any special education services during this year.²

In 5th grade (1991-92) and 6th grade (1992-93), Byron attended another District school, Museum Magnet, because his family had moved. He received special education services at the end of his fifth grade year and during his sixth grade year pursuant to an Individual Education Plan ("IEP") developed by the District in May, 1992. Byron had disciplinary problems during his sixth grade year and was suspended for numerous days, the number of which remains in dispute by the parties. Ms. Brantley, Byron's mother and a named plaintiff in this action, alleges certain incidents surrounding these alleged suspensions were racially motivated.

In the spring of 1993, Byron's IEP team developed a new annual IEP for Byron. However, because the Museum Magnet School only provides education for children through the sixth grade, Byron was required to enroll in a new school. Ms. Brantley requested that he be enrolled at Benjamin Mays Junior High School ("Benjamin Mays") but admission was denied. The District claims that Byron was denied enrollment at Benjamin Mays because his application was filed after the April 3, 1993 deadline and because of racial quotas required by the District's state approved desegregation plan. The District's enrollment committee instead determined that Byron could enroll at Capitol Hill School ("Capitol Hill"), which is a "gifted and talented" school for grades K-8. Byron attended Capitol Hill for the first semester of his 7th grade education (Fall 1993) and received special education services during this semester. Byron was then transferred to Highland Middle School for the second semester of his 7th grade education (Spring 1994). In January and February, 1994, a revised IEP was developed which provided Byron with 750 minutes of direct special education services and 25 minutes per week of services from the school social worker.

On June 10, 1994, Ms. Brantley requested a special education due process hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 ("IDEA"), claiming Byron had been and was presently being denied a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") as guaranteed by the IDEA. A due process hearing was held over nine non-consecutive days after being extended over Plaintiffs' objection.³ Plaintiffs requested interim relief from the Hearing Officer ("HO"), but were denied such relief. Instead, the HO determined that Byron's "stay put" program was at Highland Junior High School pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).

Unhappy with the stay put program for Byron, Ms. Brantley arranged for him to attend St. Bernard's Catholic High School for his 8th grade year (1994-95). Ms. Brantley then requested that the HO determine whether she was entitled to reimbursement of tuition, private tutoring costs, and transportation costs related to Byron's attendance at St. Bernard's (hereinafter "St. Bernard's related costs"). On December 2, 1994, the HO issued her decision finding that the District had denied Byron FAPE since the end of his fifth grade year (Spring 1992) and awarded compensatory education.⁴ On February 28, 1995, the HO issued a supplemental decision granting the request for reimbursement of St. Bernard's related costs.

The District submitted a notice of appeal on March 30, 1995. The Hearing Review Officer ("HRO") concluded that Byron had been denied FAPE and awarded two years of compensatory education but reversed the HO's supplemental decision that Plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement for St. Bernard's related costs.

B. The Present Lawsuit

Plaintiffs filed the present suit in federal district court on July 21, 1995 seeking recovery on four different grounds. First, Plaintiffs seek review of the HO and HRO decisions pursuant to the IDEA. Plaintiffs claim Byron was denied FAPE for five years⁵ and seek the following as damages: (a) general and punitive damages for the failure to provide Plaintiff with FAPE; (b) compensatory education in the form of money equal to four years' education at St. Bernard's⁶; (c) a future placement at St. Bernard's or a similar institution as part of Byron's regular education; and (d) reimbursement for the 1994-95 school year when Byron actually attended St. Bernard's. Second, Plaintiffs claim the District discriminated against Byron on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. § 363.03. Third, Plaintiffs claim the District discriminated against Byron on the basis of his race in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the MHRA Minn.Stat. § 363.03, by subjecting him to a racially hostile environment and by failing to admit him to Benjamin Mays Junior High School for the 1993-94 school year. Finally, Plaintiffs claim the District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying Byron his right to a timely due process decision secured by federal law.

Both parties agree that Plaintiffs' IDEA claims are properly resolved by a future motion for decision based on the administrative record. The Court will receive additional evidence to supplement the administrative record provided the submitting party establishes a "solid justification" for such evidence. Independent School District No. 283 v. S.D., 88 F.3d 556 (8th Cir.1996). However, the parties also agree that the Court may determine, as a matter of law, whether damages are available pursuant to the IDEA for compensatory education in the form of money to place a child at a private school and whether general or punitive damages are available under the IDEA.⁷ Plaintiffs have demanded a jury trial on all remaining non-IDEA claims. The Court must determine whether these remaining claims are viable in light of the IDEA and whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It should be used as a tool to isolate and dispose of claims or defenses that are either factually unsupported or based on undisputed facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1987). Summary judgment is proper, however, only if examination of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party reveals no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The test for whether there is a genuine issue of material fact is two-fold. First, the materiality of a fact is determined from the substantive law governing the claim. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit are relevant on summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 707, 98 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988). Second, any dispute of material fact must be "genuine." A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. It is the non-moving party's burden to demonstrate that there is evidence to support each essential element of his or her claim.

B. IDEA Claims

Plaintiffs seek four forms of relief pursuant to the IDEA. First, Plaintiffs seek general and punitive damages for the failure to provide Plaintiff with FAPE. Second, Plaintiffs seek compensatory education for a period of four years in the form of money equal to the cost of four years' education at St. Bernard's. Third, Plaintiffs seek a future placement at St. Bernard's or a similar institution as part of Byron's regular education pursuant to his IEP. Fourth, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for St. Bernard's related costs for the 1994-95 school year when Byron actually attended St. Bernard's. The IDEA provides that, in any action brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the court "shall grant such relief as the court determines is...