Brantley v. City of Horn Lake

• Decision Date: 04 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–CA–01555–SCT.,2012–CA–01555–SCT.
• Citation: 152 So.3d 1106
• Parties: William T. BRANTLEY v. CITY OF HORN LAKE, Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

152 So.3d 1106

William T. BRANTLEY

v.CITY OF HORN LAKE, Mississippi.

No. 2012–CA–01555–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Dec. 4, 2014.

Keith M. Alexander, Southaven, Ben Alexander, attorneys for appellant.

Roy Jefferson Allen, Lyon, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

Opinion

KITCHENS, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. William T. Brantley filed a personal injury action against the City of Horn Lake seeking to recover monetary damages for injuries he sustained due to the alleged negligence of a member of the City's fire department. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, and Brantley now appeals to this Court. Finding that the City is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On May 10, 2010, Brantley lacerated his forehead

while repairing his pickup truck at his residence in Horn Lake. Brantley called for an ambulance to transport him to Baptist–DeSoto Hospital. Stephen Lowery was a member of the ambulance crew that responded to Brantley's call. Lowery was a firefighter for the Horn Lake Fire Department but also was licensed as an emergency medical technician (EMT) and was trained as an ambulance driver. Upon arriving at his home, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel bandaged Brantley's wound, and he was transported to the hospital in the ambulance. Lowery was the driver of the ambulance. As the ambulance crew was unloading Brantley at the hospital, Lowery lost control of the stretcher Brantley was on and dropped him. As a result, Brantley alleges he sustained damages, including medical bills and expenses.

¶ 3. Brantley filed a complaint against the City on April 27, 2011, alleging that the members of the Horn Lake Fire Department's ambulance crew were negligent in failing to control the stretcher when it collapsed with him on it. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit under the MTCA, specifically Section 11–46–9(1)(c) of the Mississippi Code. That section provides immunity from suit for governmental employees engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities in relation to police or fire protection. Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(c) (Rev. 2012). In response to the motion, Brantley filed three items: a response to the City's asserted undisputed material facts and a statement of additional material facts, a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and the affidavit of Brantley.

¶ 4. On May 7, 2012, the circuit court judge entered an order denying summary judgment, holding that Brantley's affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact. On May 10, 2012, the City submitted a rebuttal supporting its motion for summary judgment and argued that the order denying summary judgment and its rebuttal brief had crossed in the mail. On August 13, 2012, the City filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on the same grounds. The circuit court granted the City's renewed motion for summary judgment and entered an order staying the case.

¶ 5. Brantley has appealed to this Court, arguing that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment for two reasons. First, Brantley argues that the conduct that caused his injury is not protected by the fire-protection exemption of the MTCA. Brantley also argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. This Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties to discuss the applicability of the discretionary-function exemption of the MTCA, Section 11–46–9(1)(d) of the Mississippi Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. The Mississippi Legislature has determined that governmental entities and their employees shall be exempt from liability in certain situations outlined in the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9 (Rev. 2012). “This exemption, like that of qualified or absolute immunity, is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation.” Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So.2d 1028, 1029 ( ¶ 8) (Miss.2003). Accordingly, “immunity is a question of law and is a proper matter for summary judgment[.]” Id. This Court reviews the application of the MTCA de novo. Lee v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 999 So.2d 1263, 1266 ( ¶ 8) (Miss.2008).

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. At issue in this case are two exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity enumerated in Section 11–46–9 of the Mississippi Code. First, Section 11–46–9(1)(c), the police-or-fire-protection exception, provides immunity from claims “[a]rising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury.”Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(c) (Rev. 2012). Second, Section 11–46–9(1)(d), the discretionary-function exception, provides immunity from claims “[b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused[.]” Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012). We shall discuss these two exemptions from liability separately.

I. Whether a claim for an injury occurring during a transport by an ambulance service is subject to the fire-protection exemption of the MTCA.

¶ 8. Brantley argues that the MTCA's fire-protection exemption is inapplicable to this case because Lowery, although technically a firefighter, was not engaged in an activity directly related to fire protection when he allegedly caused Brantley's injury.¹ In response, the City argues that Section 11–46–9(1)(c) does not require the action in question to be directly related to fire protection, and that responding to a 911 injury call fits directly within a firefighter's job description.

¶ 9. Section 11–46–9(1)(c) does not speak to the precise scope that should be given to the phrase “fire protection.” We agree with the trial court that this provision is ambiguous and overly broad. When a statute is ambiguous or silent on a specific issue, this Court must “carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.” Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 937 ( ¶ 8) (Miss.2005). “All words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning; but technical words and phrases according to their technical meaning.” Miss.Code Ann. § 1–3–65 (Rev. 2014). See also Estate of Klaus v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 972 So.2d 555, 557–59 (Miss.2007) (holding that the MTCA must be read in pari materia with the provisions of Title 1 of the Mississippi Code).

¶ 10. This Court has not previously interpreted the scope of the phrase “fire protection” in Section 11–46–9(1)(c). However, the Court of Appeals recently decided two cases dealing with the scope of the phrase. First, in Herndon v. Mississippi Forestry Commission, 67 So.3d 788 (Miss.Ct.App.2010), the Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether the fire-protection exemption of the MTCA applied to an employee of the Mississippi Forestry Commission (“MFC”). In Herndon, the forestry commission employee was tasked with driving a transport truck to pick up a bulldozer that “was needed for fire-protection services as Pearl River County was under a state of emergency as a result of Hurricane Katrina[.]” Id. at 790 (¶ 2). On his way to pick up the bulldozer, the state employee was involved in an automobile accident with the plaintiff. Id. at 791 (¶ 4). The plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against the forestry commission, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the agency based in part on immunity under Section 11–46–9(1)(c). Id. (¶ 5). On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the MFC was not an agency contemplated by the police-or-fire-protection exemption. Id. (¶ 8). The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, finding that the MFC is statutorily authorized to “prevent, control, and extinguish forest fires [.]” Id. at 792 (¶ 9) (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 49–19–3(b) (Supp.2009)). The MFC employee worked as a forest ranger, and fire-suppression duties were part of his job description. Id. (¶ 10). Thus, the Court of Appeals held that [Section 11–46–9(1)(c) ] does not limit such immunity to police officers and fire departments. It merely states that the duties or activities must relate “to police or fire protection.” Id. The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the MFC employee merely was performing “maintenance work,” finding that immunity under the MTC also applied to “ordinary duties related to police and fire protection.” Id. at 793 (¶ 11).

¶ 11. More recently, in Land v. Attala County Board of Supervisors, 116 So.3d 1085 (Miss.Ct.App.2012), the Court of Appeals was presented with a case involving conduct with an equally tangential relation to “fire protection.” In Land, a group of county firefighters was responding in a fire engine to a reported automobile accident. Id. at 1086 (¶ 4). Upon reaching the scene of the accident, the firefighters accidentally ran over the decedent, who had been involved in the accident and subsequently had collapsed in the roadway. Id. The decedent's beneficiaries filed a wrongful death suit against the county, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the county based on MTCA immunity. Id. (¶ 5). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1088 (¶ 11). Interestingly, the only disputed issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the firefighters had acted in reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of the decedent, a question not before this...