Brantley v. State

• Decision Date: 25 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. S92P1127,S92P1127
• Citation: 262 Ga. 786,427 S.E.2d 758
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: BRANTLEY v. The STATE.

Page 758

427 S.E.2d 758

262 Ga. 786

BRANTLEY v. The STATE.

No. S92P1127.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 25, 1993.

Richard E. Allen, Augusta, Clive A. Stafford-Smith, Atlanta, for Brantley.

Michael C. Eubanks, Dist. Atty., Augusta, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Mary H. Hines, Staff Atty., Atlanta, for the People.

Richard E. Thomas, Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta.

CLARKE, Chief Justice.

This is a case in which a death sentence has been imposed. Jeffrey David Brantley was convicted by a jury in Burke County on two counts of murder and on one count each of aggravated assault, burglary and a firearms possession charge. He was sentenced to death on one of the two murder counts. He appeals. For reasons which follow, we affirm the convictions, but reverse the death sentence. ¹

1. Brantley and his wife were married in 1981 and divorced in 1986, in part due to an affair she apparently carried on with a man named Bill while Brantley was stationed in Germany with the Air Force. Brantley's wife was given custody of their two children.

On the afternoon of February 2, 1987, Brantley went to his former mother-in-law's residence to pick up his two children. When he left, he took his wife's pocketbook with him. In the pocketbook, he found a recent letter to his former wife from "Bill" in which Bill stated he missed her, thought of her every day, and would always think about the time they "had together." But, Bill wrote, although he would never "lose" his "love" for her, he was involved with someone else and "for now" they would have to just be "good friend[s]." He enclosed his telephone number.

Upon reading this letter, Brantley dropped his children off at a friend's house, and, telling his friend he was "going to kick some ass," he returned to the mother-in-law's house. Brantley burst through the door and began firing a nine millimeter pistol he had purchased earlier that day. He killed his former wife and her sister and critically injured his mother-in-law, shooting each of them several times. ²

Brantley then left to look for his former father-in-law, telling the friend with whom he had left his children that "people are going to learn not to [mess] with me" and that everything would be "all right" as soon as he found his father-in-law. After checking with the father-in-law's work place to see if he had returned from his truck route, Brantley was stopped by the police. A shoot-out ensued in which Brantley was injured before he finally surrendered.

The evidence supports the conviction on all counts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his first three enumerations of error, Brantley complains about some of the trial court's jury qualification rulings:

(a) Brantley contends prospective juror Allen should have been excused because he, in Brantley's words, "knew too much about the case" and "required evidence to be presented to overcome his belief" that Brantley was guilty.

Allen had talked to some of the witnesses in the case. Asked by the defendant if he had any "pre-conceived notions" about the guilt or innocence of the defendant Allen answered: "I wouldn't be able to say if he is guilty or not." Then, as requested, Allen described what he had heard, qualifying his testimony by saying things like, "Now that's what I heard," and "I don't know how true that is."

He did say, when pressed by the defendant, that if he "had to go on" what he had heard, "without hearing anything else," he would have to say Brantley was guilty. But, he testified, as a juror, he would "have to hear all of the facts to make up my mind."

Allen testified that he had no opinion about what penalty should be imposed if Brantley were found guilty. Asked if he thought a death sentence should be automatic if the defendant were found guilty of murder, Allen answered, no, because he had on occasion been "upset enough" with "people" that he "could just about do that myself."

Allen testified that he would not tend to believe a law enforcement officer over a lay witness, that he believed someone could be "so mad that they just ain't in their right mind," and that he would take mental illness or insanity into account when making his determination of guilt or innocence.

Finally, he testified his mind was not made up, that he would follow the evidence presented at trial, and that he would give Brantley the presumption of innocence to which he was entitled.

Allen never said, as Brantley contends, that he would require the defense to present evidence to overcome an opinion that Brantley was guilty.

Considering all the circumstances, including the juror's own opinion at his impartiality, the trial court did not err by denying Brantley's challenge for cause. See Walker v. State, 262 Ga. 694(1), 424 S.E.2d 782 (1993).

(b) Brantley's only objection to prospective juror Crumbley was that she was incapable "of understanding common English," and would not comprehend complex testimony that might be presented. The trial court did not err by denying this challenge.

(c) Brantley did not challenge for cause prospective jurors Black or Banks. The trial court did not err by failing to excuse these jurors sua sponte. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243(7), 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

(d) The only objection to prospective juror Jenkins was that her husband's sister was the wife of a state's witness. Defense counsel stated, "I just feel like it falls within the relationship by consanguinity." The juror testified that theirs was not a close family, and she rarely saw the state's witness. There is absolutely nothing else in her testimony that would provide any basis for a challenge for cause. Relationship to a witness is not per se a ground for excusing a prospective juror. Spence v. State, 238 Ga. 399, 233 S.E.2d 363 (1977); McKee v. State, 168 Ga.App. 214, 308 S.E.2d 574 (1983).

(e) A sheriff's wife is not disqualified, per se from serving on a criminal trial jury. Although the sheriff assisted the prosecution with the jury selection, he was not a witness in the case. His wife had not discussed the case with him, and nothing else in her testimony supports a challenge for cause. The court did not err by overruling Brantley's challenge for cause. Ibid.

(f) Jurors Sapp and Johnson were properly excused for their opposition to imposing a death sentence. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206, 327 S.E.2d 168 (1985). We do not agree with Brantley that the voir dire examination of these prospective jurors was inadequate or that the examination established no more than that the jurors had "qualms" about imposing a death sentence. See Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880, 413 S.E.2d 710 (1992).

(g) The court did not err by denying Brantley's challenges to three prospective jurors on "reverse-Witherspoon" grounds. See, e.g., Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195(7)(e), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986). Although somewhat inconsistent at times, their testimony, in toto, supports the trial court's determination that they realistically could consider imposing a life sentence in a murder case. See Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 197 (fn. 3), 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984).

3. There was no improper limitation of the defense voir dire examination. Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215, 218(2b), 336 S.E.2d 762 (1985).

4. No issue of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges was raised at trial. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The issue may not be raised for the first time after trial. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243(21), 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987). Merely because Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), had not been decided at the time Brantley's case was tried does not excuse the procedural default. That a white defendant has standing to raise a Batson issue concerning the exclusion of black jurors was not a novel issue in 1989. The holding in Powers v. Ohio, supra, was clearly presaged in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), see Congdon v. State, 260 Ga. 173, 176-77, 391 S.E.2d 402 (1990) (Benham, J., dissenting), and was raised in numerous cases throughout the country--with some success--in the years preceding the Court's Powers decision.

5. In his 6th enumeration of error, Brantley complains of "improper and inaccurate hearsay" and "irrelevant emotionalism" on the part of the district attorney, claiming the prosecution sought to "stir up the jury with the continuous admission of inadmissible, highly prejudicial evidence," in the form of hearsay testimony by "angry relatives" of the victims.

(a) As we have held, previous difficulties between the accused and the deceased are admissible in a murder case to prove the defendant's bent of mind toward the victim. Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 112(7), 416 S.E.2d 78 (1992). ³ Brantley himself admitted that he struck his wife several times after he caught her kissing "Bill." This testimony was not hearsay. His mother-in-law testified that when her daughter returned from Germany, her face "was all bruised on one side" and "she was trying to cover it up with makeup." Brantley's father-in-law and surviving sister-in-law also testified that Brantley's wife's face was bruised when she returned from Germany. This testimony was not hearsay.

The mother-in-law testified that when Brantley returned to the States, he and his wife fought:

Well, they fought. He would go to work and come home and get mad. And he would throw stuff; break stuff. He kept the kids hysterical. Every afternoon they would come to my house, both her and the kids, crying, and he would be just throwing dishes, throwing anything, breaking it. And it just wasn't a happy home at all.

[They lived together] off and on for about a year. Because he would get--he was just so bad; he kept her and those kids upset so much they ran off from home. He would come home in the afternoon breaking up stuff. One afternoon he came home, got a gun, and went ahead and stood in front of...