Brantley v. State

Decision Date04 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. A08A0107.,A08A0107.
Citation660 S.E.2d 846,290 Ga. App. 764
PartiesBRANTLEY v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Sonya R. Chachere-Compton, Atlanta, for appellant.

David McDade, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Roy Jake Brantley appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the offenses of habitual violator (OCGA § 40-5-58); driving under the influence of alcohol (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1)); failure to maintain lane (OCGA § 40-6-48), and impeding traffic flow (OCGA § 40-6-184). For the following reasons, we affirm.

Brantley claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his legal counsel provided ineffective assistance when counsel deceived him about the length of the sentence he could receive and failed to advise him on procedures for withdrawing the plea.

The record of the plea hearing shows that Brantley was represented by counsel when he entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to the charges with the understanding that he faced a maximum sentence of eight years to serve; that the length of the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that as a repeat offender he would not be eligible for parole if the judge imposed a prison sentence. The record also showed that, when Brantley plead guilty, he understood the nature of the charges; admitted he committed the charged offenses, and that he was fully advised of the consequences of the plea. After the trial judge sentenced Brantley to a total of eight years, with six of those years to serve in confinement, Brantley immediately informed the court that he wanted to withdraw the plea because it was entered through "coercion and deception." When asked by the court to explain, Brantley said that his legal counsel gave him the impression that he was going to get a lesser sentence. Brantley subsequently filed a written pro se motion to withdraw the guilty plea, alleging that, because his trial counsel deceived him, he pled guilty expecting to receive a three-year sentence. At the hearing on the withdrawal motion, Brantley's counsel testified that Brantley understood that, after he pled guilty, counsel would ask the trial judge to consider a sentence in the three to four-year range, but that he made no promise to Brantley that he would receive a three-year sentence. Counsel testified that, prior to the plea hearing, he explained to Brantley the nature of the nonnegotiated plea, and that Brantley understood there was no guarantee as to the length of the sentence the judge would impose. Brantley testified at the hearing on the withdrawal motion and confirmed that counsel's testimony "basically was true, and he didn't promise me that he would get me three years...." Nevertheless, Brantley testified that he told counsel he was going to withdraw his guilty plea if he did not get a three-year sentence, and that trial counsel "didn't tell me that it was impossible [to withdraw the plea] after the sentence was pronounced."

Even a defendant who waives his right to trial and enters a guilty plea is entitled to effective legal assistance. In order to show a constitutional violation of this Sixth Amendment right, however, the defendant must make a two-prong showing. He must demonstrate that his counsel erred and also establish the reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. With regard to the performance prong, the question is whether the attorney's...

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7 cases
  • Smith v. The State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 28, 2010
    ...defendant that may result from a criminal conviction. See Padilla, 558 U.S. at ----, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. See also Brantley v. State, 290 Ga.App. 764, 766, 660 S.E.2d 846 (2008) (describing collateral consequences as those that do not lengthen or alter the sentence pronounced by the trial cou......
  • Taylor v. The State, A10A0026.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 8, 2010
    ...consequence, a direct consequence of a guilty plea is one that lengthens or alters the pronounced sentence. Brantley v. State, 290 Ga.App. 764, 766, 660 S.E.2d 846 (2008). Put another way, “[t]he distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a plea[ ] ... turns on whether the re......
  • Mahaffey v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 18, 2020
    ...trial court that he cannot withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right after his sentence is pronounced. See Brantley v. State , 290 Ga. App. 764, 766, 660 S.E.2d 846 (2008) (explaining that the defendant had no constitutional right to be informed that after his sentence was pronounced, h......
  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 2010
    ...Hubbard, 301 Ga.App. at 390, n. 13, 687 S.E.2d 589. 13 See Vaughn, 298 Ga.App. at 670-671, 680 S.E.2d 680. 14 See Brantley v. State, 290 Ga.App. 764, 765, 660 S.E.2d 846 (2008). ...
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