Bratton v. Couch, 2006 Ohio 6799 (Ohio App. 12/21/2006), 05 CA 25.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05 CA 25.,05 CA 25. |
| Citation | 2006 Ohio 6799 |
| Parties | Della M. Bratton, Plaintiff-Appellant v. David Couch, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Gary M. Smith, Graham & Graham, 17 North 4th Street, P.O. Box 340, Zanesville, Ohio 43702, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Randall L. Lambert, Lambert, McWhorter & Bowling, 215 South Fourth Street, P. O. Box 725, Ironton, Ohio 45638, and John C. Albert, Jeffrey D. Houser, Crabbe, Brown & James, 500 South Front Street, Suite 1200, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hon. John W. Wise, P. J., Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J., Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
{¶1} Appellant Della Bratton ("appellant") appeals the decision of the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees Gary Woodward, David Hooper, Phillip Horner, Ronald Grove, Ronald Moore, Bruce Dozer, Carl Dodrill and Morgan County ("County Appellees"). The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees Morgan County MRDD, the Mary Hammond Adult Activity Center, Inc. ("MHAAC"), David Couch and Gilbert Melragon ("MRDD Appellees"). The following facts give rise to this appeal.
{¶2} On December 10, 2001, appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory and equitable relief, as well as restitution for sums paid or collected as a result of the passage of tax levies in Morgan County. Between 1996 and 2001, the MRDD Appellees were involved in tax levies for the purpose of furthering, facilitating, operating and funding programs and activities for mentally retarded and/or developmentally handicapped persons involved with MRDD Appellees. Appellant claims the County and MRDD Appellees included the words "Mary Hammond" on the 19961 and 20012 ballot which the community understands to mean the adult workshop, in order to pass the levies. Appellant further alleges that funds from these two levies did not go exclusively to the workshop, but instead went to the operation of the Morgan County MRDD.
{¶3} Appellant's initial complaint set forth six causes of action. On February 5, 2002, MRDD Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. On September 25, 2002, the trial court granted said motion. Appellant appealed to this Court and we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter to the trial court. See Bratton v. Couch, et al., Morgan App. No. CA02-012, 2003-Ohio-3743. Upon remand, appellant's claims were as follows: (1) an alleged violation of R.C. 2923.34 (Ohio Corrupt Practices Act) as to the 1996 and 2001 tax levies; (2) an alleged violation of R.C. 2723.01(illegal levy or collection of taxes); and alleged fraud and misrepresentation.
{¶4} Upon remand, MRDD and County Appellees both moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted appellees' respective motions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and sets forth the following assignments of error for our consideration:
{¶5} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE EXTENT, IF ANY, THE COUNTY DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARGUMENTS AS TO THE STATUE (SIC) OF LIMITATIONS OR IMMUNITY WERE CONSIDERED IN GRANTING THEIR MOTION.
FAILED TO SATISFY THE INITIAL OR ULTIMATE BURDEN IMPOSED ON THEM BY CIV.R. 56.
{¶7}
{¶8} Our standard of review is de novo, and as an appellate court, we must stand in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35. Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate, and we need not defer to the trial court's decision. See Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412.
{¶9} Civ.R. 56(C) provides:
{¶10}
{¶11} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary judgment if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some evidence that demonstrates that the nonmoving party cannot support its claim. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 1996-Ohio-107.
{¶12} In her First Assignment of Error, appellant maintains the trial court erred if it considered County Appellees' summary judgment arguments regarding the statute of limitations or immunity issues in granting their motion for summary judgment because these issues were previously addressed by this Court in appellant's first appeal.
{¶13} Specifically, appellant contends County Appellees again asserted immunity and statute of limitations arguments in their motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues County Appellees were barred from raising these issues following the first appeal of this matter. In the first appeal, we determined appellant's Corrupt Practices Act claims as to the 1996 tax levy were not time barred; that none of her claims as to the 2001 tax levy were time barred; and that neither the County nor the MRDD Appellees had immunity from suit.
{¶14} In its judgment entry granting County Appellees' motion for summary judgment, we cannot determine whether the trial court considered the immunity and statute of limitations issues. The trial court merely stated in its judgment entry that County Appellees were entitled to summary judgment:
{¶15} "* * * [A]fter construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party and having determined that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and further that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the Motion for Summary Judgment is made * * *. Judgment Entry, Nov. 9, 2005, at 1.
{¶16} In Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the doctrine of the law of the case mandates that lower courts apply the law as determined by appellate courts on legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings at both the trial and reviewing levels. We find no evidence, in the record, that the trial court reconsidered the issues of immunity and the statute of limitations or failed to follow the law of the case regarding these issues.
{¶17} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶18} Appellant maintains, in her Second Assignment of Error, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on behalf of County Appellees because their motion failed to satisfy the initial or ultimate burden imposed on them by Civ.R. 56. We disagree.
{¶19} In her brief, appellant argues County Appellees failed to satisfy their initial burden under Civ.R. 56. This initial burden required County Appellees to inform the trial court of the basis for their motion and identify those portions of the record that demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. In doing so, County Appellees were required to specifically point to some evidence that demonstrated appellant could not support her claim. Appellant claims County Appellees' motion for summary judgment was supported only by generalized, conclusory, and unsupported allegations that appellant lacked evidence to support her claims. Appellant further maintains County Appellees pointed to no specific evidence, in the record, to affirmatively demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact existed.
{¶20} Having reviewed the record in this matter, we conclude County Appellees met their burden by submitting the deposition testimony of David Couch, the superintendent of Appellee Morgan County MRDD Board, and Scott Roberts, the production manager for Appellee Morgan County MRDD Board. The testimony contained in these depositions explains the relationship between Appellee Morgan County MRDD Board and Appellee MHAAC. Mr. Roberts testified that Appellee Morgan County MRDD Board provides administrative staffing and supervision at Appellee MHAAC. Depo. Scott Roberts at 26. Further, all of the funds collected by the levies went to Appellee Morgan County MRDD Board in accordance with the ballot language. Appellee MHAAC received no funds from the tax levies. Id. at 25-26.
{¶21} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, once County Appellees explained the relationship between Appellee...
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