Braxton v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-5358,90-5358
• Citation: 111 S.Ct. 1854,114 L.Ed.2d 385,500 U.S. 344
• Parties: Thomas BRAXTON, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

500 U.S. 344

111 S.Ct. 1854

114 L.Ed.2d 385

Thomas BRAXTON, Petitioner

v UNITED STATES.

No. 90-5358.

Argued March 18, 1991.

Decided May 28, 1991.

Syllabus

At a hearing at which petitioner Braxton pleaded guilty to assault and firearm counts, but not guilty to the more serious charge of attempting to kill a United States marshal, the Government presented facts—to which Braxton agreed—showing, inter alia, that, after each of two instances in which marshals kicked open his door, Braxton fired a gunshot "through the door opening," and the shots lodged in the door's front. Over Braxton's objections, the District Court later sentenced him as though he had been convicted of the attempt to kill count, relying on a proviso in § 1B1.2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual. Although § 1B1.2(a) ordinarily requires a court to apply the Sentencing Guideline most applicable to the offense of conviction, the proviso allows the court, in the case of conviction by a guilty plea "containing a stipulation" that "specifically establishes" a more serious offense, to apply the Guideline most applicable to the stipulated offense. The Court of Appeals upheld Braxton's sentence.

Held: The court below misapplied the § 1B1.2(a) proviso. Pp. 346-351.

(a) This Court will not resolve the question whether Braxton's guilty plea "contain[ed] a stipulation" within the proviso's meaning. The Commission—which was specifically charged by Congress with the duty to review and revise the Guidelines and given the unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences would be given retroactive effect—has already undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate a conflict among the Federal Circuits over the precise question at issue here. Moreover, the specific controversy before the Court can be decided on other grounds. Pp. 347-349.

(b) Assuming that Braxton's agreement to the Government's facts constituted a "stipulation," that stipulation does not "specifically establis[h]" an attempt to kill, as is required by the proviso. At best, the stipulation supports two reasonable readings—one that Braxton shot across the room at the marshals when they entered, and one that he shot before they entered to frighten them off. There is nothing in the latter reading from which an intent to kill—a necessary element of the attempt to kill count—could even be inferred. Pp. 349-351.

903 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.1990), reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Stephen J. Cribari, Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Stephen J. Marzen, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

At about 7 a.m. on June 10, 1988, four United States marshals arrived at Thomas Braxton's door with a warrant for his arrest. One of the marshals, Deputy Jenkins, knocked. There was no answer, though they could hear someone inside. Thirty minutes later the officers returned with a key to Braxton's apartment. Jenkins knocked again; and again received no answer. He unlocked the door, only to find it secured with a chain-lock as well—which he broke by kicking the door open. "[C]ontemporaneous with the door opening, a gunshot was fired through the door opening. The gunshot lodged in the front door just above the doorknob. That's the outside of the front door." App. 17. The door slammed shut and the officers withdrew. A moment later, Jenkins again kicked the door open. Another shot was fired, this too lodging in the front of the door, about five feet from the floor. The officers again withdrew, and the area was barricaded. Braxton, who had fired the shots, eventually gave himself up, and was charged in a three-count indictment with (1) an attempt to kill a deputy United States marshal (18 U.S.C. § 1114), (2) assault on a deputy marshal (18 U.S.C. § 111), and (3) the use of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).

These were the facts as presented by the Government during the course of a plea hearing, pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at which Braxton pleaded guilty to the assault and firearm counts of the indictment, and not guilty to the attempt to kill count. The pleas were not made pursuant to any plea agreement, and the Government did not dismiss the attempt to kill count at the plea hearing. The purpose of the hearing was simply to provide a factual basis for accepting Braxton's guilty pleas.

Braxton agreed with the facts as the Government characterized them, with two small caveats, neither of which is significant for purposes of this case. Subject to those "modifications," Braxton agreed that "what the Government say[s] that it could prove [happened] happened." App. 19. With this factual basis before it, the District Court accepted Braxton's guilty pleas, specifically noting that "there is no plea agreement." Ibid.

Two months later, Braxton was sentenced. Relying upon a proviso in § 1B1.2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual (1990), and over Braxton's objections, the District Court in essence sentenced Braxton as though he had been convicted of attempted killing, the only charge to which Braxton had not confessed guilt. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, 903 F.2d 292 (CA4 1990), and we granted certiorari. 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 426, 112 L.Ed.2d 410 (1990).

I

Ordinarily, a court pronouncing sentence under the Guidelines applies the "offense guideline section . . . most applicable to the offense of conviction." § 1B1.2(a). There is, however, one "limited" exception to this general rule, § 1B1.2, Commentary, n. 1, consisting of the following proviso to § 1B1.2(a):

"Provided, however, in the case of conviction by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more serious offense than the offense of conviction, [the court shall apply the guideline in such chapter] most applicable to the stipulated offense."

Braxton's conviction was no doubt by a "plea of guilty." This case presents the questions whether it was also a convic- tion by a plea (1) "containing a stipulation" that (2) "specifically establishes" that Braxton attempted to kill the marshals who had been sent to arrest him. The Courts of Appeals have divided on the meaning of the first phrase, "containing a stipulation," and Braxton argues that however that phrase is read, the court below misapplied the second, "specifically establishes a more serious offense." We consider each contention in turn.

A.

As the District Court noted, there was no plea agreement in this case. Braxton argues that his plea did not "contai[n]" a stipulation because by "containing a stipulation," the Guidelines mean a stipulation that is part of a formal plea agreement. Some Circuits to consider the question have agreed with that interpretation, believing that the "stipulation" must be part of the "quid pro quo" for the Government's agreement not to charge a higher offense. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 816, n. 4 (CA2 1990); United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1273, n. 5 (CA5 1989). But as the Government points out, § 1B1.2 does not by its terms limit its application to stipulations contained in plea agreements; the language speaks only of "plea[s] . . . containing a stipulation." Since, the Government argues, any formal assent to a set of facts constitutes a stipulation, Braxton's guilty plea "contain[ed] a stipulation" upon which the court could rely in setting his base-offense level. That was the approach of the court below.

A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction, and the reason we granted certiorari in the present case, is to resolve conflicts among the Circuit Courts of Appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law. See this Court's Rule 10.1. With respect to federal law apart from the Constitution, we are not the sole body that could eliminate such conflicts, at least as far as their continuation into the future is concerned. Obviously, Congress itself can eliminate a conflict concerning a statutory provision by making a clarifying amendment to the statute, and agencies can do the same with respect to regulations. Ordinarily, however, we regard the task as initially and primarily ours. Events that have transpired since our grant of certiorari in the present case have focused our attention on the fact that this may not be Congress' intent with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines.

After we had granted Braxton's petition for certiorari, the Commission requested public comment on whether § 1B1.2(a) should be "amended to provide expressly that such a stipulation must be as part of a formal plea agreement," 56 Fed.Reg. 1891 (1991), which is the precise question raised by the first part of Braxton's petition here. The Commission took this action pursuant to its statutory duty "periodically [to] review and revise" the Guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o ). The Guidelines are of course implemented by the courts, so in charging the Commission "periodically [to] review and revise" the Guidelines, Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest. This congressional expectation alone might induce us to be more restrained and circumspect in using our certiorari power as the primary means of resolving such conflicts; but there is even further indication that we ought to adopt that course. In addition to the duty to review and revise the guidelines, Congress has granted the Commission the unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given...