Bray By Bray v. Hobart City School Corp.

• Citation: 818 F. Supp. 1226
• Decision Date: 09 April 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H 91-370.
• Parties: Benjamin BRAY, Jr., a minor, by next friend, Sheila BRAY, and Benjamin Bray, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. The HOBART CITY SCHOOL CORPORATION; Eric Witherspoon, Ph.D., in his capacity as Superintendent of the Hobart City School Corporation and Individually; the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative; Patricia Pierce, in her capacity as Director of the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative and Individually; Joan Machuca, in her capacity as Assistant Director to the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative, and Individually; Deborah Owens; and the Indiana Department of Education, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

818 F. Supp. 1226

Benjamin BRAY, Jr., a minor, by next friend, Sheila BRAY, and Benjamin Bray, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. The HOBART CITY SCHOOL CORPORATION; Eric Witherspoon, Ph.D., in his capacity as Superintendent of the Hobart City School Corporation and Individually; the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative; Patricia Pierce, in her capacity as Director of the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative and Individually; Joan Machuca, in her capacity as Assistant Director to the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative, and Individually; Deborah Owens; and the Indiana Department of Education, Defendants.

Civ. No. H 91-370.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

April 9, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Terrance L. Smith, East Chicago, IN, for plaintiffs.

Kathleen Maicher, Merrillville, IN, Deborah Owens, Oak Park, IL, Atty. General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, Gary Matthews, Hammond, IN, for defendants.

ORDER

RODOVICH, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on four motions. The Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint was filed by the defendant, the Indiana Department of Education, on January 24, 1992. The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the defendants, the Northwest Indiana Special Education Cooperative (NISEC), Patricia Pierce, in her capacity as Director of NISEC and Individually, and Joan Machuca, in her capacity as Assistant Director to NISEC and Individually, on February 6, 1992. The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the defendants, the Hobart City School Corporation and Eric Witherspoon, Ph.D., in his capacity as Superintendent of the Hobart City School Corporation and Individually, on February 21, 1992. The Motion to Dismiss was filed by the defendant, Deborah Owens, on March 2, 1992. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by the defendant, the Indiana Department of Education, is DENIED. The Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the defendants, NISEC, Patricia Pierce, Joan Machuca, Hobart City School Corporation, and Eric Witherspoon are DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant, Deborah Owens, is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Benjamin Bray, Jr., was born in 1978 and has a post-meningitis syndrome condition. Benjamin was placed into a public school special education program from 1984 through 1988. In October, 1989, NISEC developed a program for children with severe emotional handicaps in the areas of speech and language training. NISEC designed the program in an effort to mainstream children with disabilities into the local schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. NISEC and the Hobart City School Corporation are the local educational agencies that act as the agents of the State and ensure compliance with the IDEA.

NISEC and the Hobart City School Corporation held a case conference meeting in October, 1989, to coordinate an individualized educational program (IEP) for Benjamin. The IEP attempted to mainstream Benjamin into a local school environment and to increase contact between Benjamin and other children. In December, 1989, Benjamin began to experience increased seizure activity at home. His parents, Benjamin Bray, Sr. and Sheila Bray, moved him into Charter Barkley Hospital in late December, 1989, where he stayed for nine weeks. The Brays then moved Benjamin to the Camelot Care Center in Palatine, Illinois, in March, 1990. The Brays did not obtain the consent of NISEC or the Hobart City School Corporation to place Benjamin in either facility. However, NISEC and the Hobart City School Corporation did receive updates on Benjamin's condition from both the Charter Barkley Hospital and the Camelot Care Center.

Case conference committee meetings were held in February and June, 1990, but NISEC and the parents could not agree on Benjamin's placement. In April, 1991, the Brays again sought residential placement for Benjamin, but NISEC recommended a diagnostic placement at a local school. The case conference committee eventually recommended a local school placement. Benjamin's parents sought a due process hearing which was held on June 20, 1991, and was conducted by an impartial hearing officer.

On July 11, 1991, the hearing officer determined that Benjamin should be placed in a residential home. However, since the Brays placed Benjamin in the Camelot Care Center without the consent or knowledge of the school officials, the hearing officer decided that the Brays would be responsible for the expenses associated with Benjamin's "past and current placement" at the Camelot Care Center. Finally, the hearing officer ordered NISEC and the Hobart City School Corporation to draft a new IEP and an application in accord with his findings within thirty (30) school days. Neither party appealed the hearing officer's findings.

On September 16, 1991, NISEC and the Hobart City School Corporation submitted Benjamin's IEP and the application for residential placement to the Indiana Department of Education (State). However, on September 25, 1991, the State informed NISEC that the application and the IEP were incomplete. On October 16, 1991, Benjamin and his parents filed suit contending that NISEC, the Hobart City School Corporation, and their agents prepared and sent a defective application to the State in violation of the hearing officer's order. The Brays also contend that Deborah Owens, the attorney for NISEC, deliberately advised NISEC to proceed in an unlawful manner by disregarding the findings of the hearing officer. Further, the Brays allege that the various defendants' actions constituted wilful and deliberate misconduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Brays assert that the Indiana application review process violates the IDEA since the process allows the State to deny the child the recommended placement funding or to delay implementing the child's free and appropriate public education.

On January 24, 1992, the State filed its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint contending that the Brays failed to state a claim and failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. On February 6, 1992, NISEC, Patricia Pierce, in her capacity as Director of NISEC and Individually, and Joan Machuca, in her capacity as Assistant Director to NISEC and Individually, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment contending that the Brays failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing an action under IDEA and Section 1983. On February 21, 1992, the Hobart City School Corporation and Eric Witherspoon, Ph.D., in his capacity as Superintendent of the Hobart City School Corporation and Individually, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment also contending that the Brays failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Finally, on March 2, 1992, Deborah Owens filed her Motion to Dismiss contending that she cannot be considered a state actor under Section 1983 and that she is protected by the attorney client privilege and qualified immunity.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.1990); McGraw-Edison v. Walt Disney Productions, 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.1986); Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1220 (7th Cir.1985); and Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Big O Warehouse, 741 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir.1984). The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1610, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970); Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir.1990); and Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir.1985). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 752 (7th Cir.1991); Whetstine v. The Gates Rubber Company, 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990); and Big O Tire Dealers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 163. Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals a good faith dispute as to inferences to be drawn from those facts. Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1986); Munson, 754 F.2d at 690; and Burns v. Rockford Life Insurance Company, 740 F.2d 542, 546 (7th Cir.1984). Finally, summary judgment generally is not an appropriate means of resolving questions of motive and intent. United Association of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir.1990); Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, 799 F.2d 311, 312 (7th Cir.1986); and Munson, 754 F.2d at 690.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial.

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.

This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212 (1986)

See also: Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1986); County of Vernon v. United States, 933 F.2d 532, 534 (7th...