Bray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., LOUIS-SAN
| Citation | 310 S.W.2d 822 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,LOUIS-SAN,No. 46092,46092,2 |
| Parties | Adrian O. BRAY et al., Appellants, v. ST.FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Respondents |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Bradley & Noble, Lawrence L. Bradley, Kennett, for appellants.
Sneed & Trantham, Hugh W. Trantham, Piggott, Ark., for respondent Piggott Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n.
Ford & Ford, Elbert L. Ford, James F. Ford, Kennett, for defendants-respondents.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
This is a suit to quiet the title to an abandoned railroad right of way, a strip of ground 100 feet wide and approximately 1,760 feet in length through the town of Campbell. A public road parallels the right of way on the west and the defendants now own the abutting lots on the east side of the right of way. The plaintiffs are the heirs at law of Elijah Bray, who when he died in 1884 was then the owner of the quarter section of land through which the railroad was constructed. The trial court made seventeen specific findings of fact and seven conclusions of law, two of which were that the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest whatever in the abandoned strip and that the seven sets of defendants as abutting landowners 'have title superior to that of appellants' and accordingly, upon the plaintiffs' petition to quiet the title, the court found the issues in favor of the defendants and the plaintiffs have appealed and challenge, as a matter of law, these two findings and conclusions.
In 1877 Elijah Bray owned the quarter section of land in which the right of way and adjoining lots involved in this litigation are now located. Mr. Bray died intestate in 1884 and in 1896 his widow, then Mrs. N. M. Dalton, purported to grant to a lumber company 'the use of a strip of land One hundred feet wide across my Lands * * * to be used for Railroad purposes only.' A railroad was constructed across the strip and was used and operated as a railroad until its abandonment in 1950. As stated, the defendants own the lots and tracts of land abutting the right of way on the east and a public road parallels the right of way on the west. Upon the abandonment of the railroad in 1950 the abutting owners went into possession of the right of way and obtained quitclaim deeds from the railroad.
While the plaintiffs inferentially question the legality of the railroad's acquisition of the right of way they concede a use or interest for railroad purposes 'on prescription' and an easement. They say, however, that the 'fee (simple title) was in the Bray children; they never parted with it.' They also argue that a railroad right of way 'is not a public highway' and therefore urge that the rules governing abandoned public highways have no application to an abandoned railroad right of way. But, in its essence the plaintiffs' claim is that 'When a railroad right of way is abandoned, title freed of the easement is in the original grantor, his heirs or assigns,' here the plaintiffs as the heirs at law of Elijah Bray. The appellants concede that 'the Bray family sold off on both sides of the old right of way prior to its abandonment,' nevertheless, they point to the conveyances and argue, in contrast to the argument usually made, that the language and descriptions in these instruments are not subject to the 'strained' construction of 'intending to convey the land in the right of way and as merely reserving the use of the right of way to the railroad.' This fact, they say, rebuts any presumption that the appellants or their predecessors, by their conveyances, intended to part with or transfer their title to the fee in the abandoned right of way. It is contended that there is no evidence showing whether the right of way came out of land on its east side or on its west side, in fact, it is said, 'It came right out of the middle of an 80 acres, all of which was owned by the Bray heirs.' Therefore it is argued, since the right of way is abutted on the west by a highway, there can be no presumption that the west 50 feet would 'be attached to the owners on the East.'
We have attempted to set out the appellants' argument in detail because they tacitly concede that Brown v. Weare, 348 Mo. 135, 152 S.W.2d 649, 136 A.L.R. 286; Hennick v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 364 Mo. 883, 269 S.W.2d 646, and many other cases, are directly in point and contrary to their essential claims here. They urge, however, that the Brown case is based on a false premise, erroneously construed the conveyances involved, and, in short, is not 'sound.' In effect they contend that it erroneously overrules what is said to be the prior sound rule: 'A railroad right of way when abandoned is the property of the original grantor, freed of such easement, or his grantees, heirs or devisees; but the court will, if the language of conveyances of adjacent land permits, construe such conveyance as passing the fee to the right of way.'
The case upon which the appellants rely did not establish, as we understand the case, a rule contrary to that set forth in the Brown case or elsewhere for that matter. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Griffith, 342...
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