Braz. v. Scranton Sch. Bd.

Docket NumberCivil Action 3:22-CV-01514
Decision Date11 September 2023
PartiesJEFFREY BRAZIL, Plaintiff, v. SCRANTON SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Scranton School Board, Superintendent Melissa McTiernan, Paul Dougherty, and John Doe School Board Members 1-8 (collectively, School Defendants), and Defendants Special Agent Robert McHugh and Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Mulvey (collectively, “Commonwealth Defendants) filed on February 17, 2023, and April 10 2023, respectively. (Doc. 17; Doc. 26). On September 28 2022, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brazil (Brazil) commenced this action by filing a complaint against School Defendants for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C § 1983. (Doc. 1). On February 3, 2023, Brazil filed the amended complaint. (Doc. 11). The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 24). For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss shall be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc 17; Doc. 26).

I. Background and Procedural History

On September 28, 2022, Brazil initiated this action by filing a complaint against School Defendants and Commonwealth Defendants. (Doc. 1). School Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint on December 22, 2022. (Doc. 5). In response, Brazil filed the amended complaint on February 3, 2023, rendering School Defendants' motion to dismiss moot. (Doc. 11; Doc. 16). According to the amended complaint, Brazil was previously employed by the Scranton School District (the District) as the Director of Facilities from January 2012 until March 2019, when he resigned. (Doc. 11). Brazil alleges that School Defendants willfully and maliciously made false statements to various law enforcement and investigatory agencies leading to his arrest on September 30, 2022, and the institution of charges of reckless endangerment of children for failing to address the presence of lead and asbestos in several Scranton School District buildings. (Doc. 11, at 20-31). Brazil contends that he proactively conducted testing, made the results known, and provided remedial instruction to maintenance staff. (Doc. 11, ¶ 73). Brazil sets forth the following causes of action: malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants (Count I); malicious prosecution and abuse of process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants (Count II); false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Common Law against all Defendants (Count III); false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Common Law against all Defendants (Count IV); conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants (Count V); common law malicious prosecution against School Defendants (Count VI); common law malicious use and abuse of process against School Defendants (Count VII); and selective prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment against Commonwealth Defendants (Count VIII). (Doc. 11).

On February 17, 2023, School Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss. (Doc. 17). On April 10, 2023, Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 26). The motions to dismiss have been fully briefed and are now ripe for disposition.[1] (Doc. 17; Doc. 18; Doc. 21; Doc. 26; Doc. 27; Doc. 34; Doc. 36).

II. Standard of Law
A. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). [T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions...' Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347. The Third Circuit has further instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

B. Section 1983

The Scranton School Board and the board members are state actors for purpose of § 1983. See Kline ex rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 454 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2006). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. He must allege:

1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds,Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). If a defendant fails to act under color of state law when engaged in the alleged misconduct, a civil rights claim under section 1983 fails as a matter of jurisdiction, Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981), and there is no need to determine whether a federal right has been violated. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; accord Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995). As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs .... [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

With respect to punitive damages for a § 1983 violation, this remedy is only available “when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). Regarding federal civil rights claims, “reckless indifference” refers to the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of his actions, not the egregiousness of his actions. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 431 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999)).

III. Discussion
A. Brazil's Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Initially Commonwealth Defendants argue that Brazil has abandoned his Fourteenth Amendment claims...

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