Breaux v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.

Decision Date29 January 1990
Docket NumberR,AFL-CI,No. H001548,H001548
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesGiles BREAUX, David Gomez, Jose L. Espinoza, Luis Gilberto Garcia, Harold Benich, Javier Guerro Villalobos, Arturo Cortez, Fred Benich, Juan Espinoza, and Leonides Quintero, Petitioners, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,eal Party in Interest.

Scott A. Wilson, Jordan L. Bloom, Scott A. Johnson, and Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, San Diego, Robert F. Gore, Rex H. Reed, c/o National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, for petitioners.

Michael D. Stump, Daniel G. Stone, Nancy C. Smith, Cathy Christian, Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., Sacramento, for respondent.

Dianna Lyons, Daniel A. Garcia, and Lyons, Macri-Ortiz, Schneider Dunphy & Camacho, Sacramento, for real party in interest.

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, Associate Justice.

Giles Breaux and several other individuals, agricultural employees within the meaning of California's Agricultural Labor Relations Act (the Act) (Lab.Code, § 1140 et seq.), were required as a condition of their employment to be members of the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the UFW). They filed unfair labor practice charges (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 20201-20208; cf. Lab.Code, § 1160.2) against the UFW, alleging among other things that certain moneys they were required to pay to the UFW were being used, over their objections, for political activities and "other noncollective bargaining purposes." Over their objections, the UFW and the general counsel of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (the Board) entered into a written settlement of the charges and the Board, by its decision and order in United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Giles Breaux, et al.) (Dec. 19, 1985) 11 ALRB No. 32, approved the settlement with modifications. Breaux and other charging parties petitioned this court for review of the Board's decision and order.

The "union shop" agreement by which petitioners were required to be members of the UFW is authorized by the union security proviso of Labor Code section 1153, subdivision (c). In a number of cases, including a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and a recent decision of our own Supreme Court, 1 courts have considered whether and under what procedural safeguards an employee subject to a union shop agreement (or to a broadly similar "agency shop" agreement) under other federal and state labor statutes may be compelled, over his or her objection, to provide financial support to union activities with which he or she disagrees. This proceeding raises these questions in the context of the Act.

We conclude that several terms and conditions of union membership specified in the approved settlement agreement are not "reasonable" within the meaning of the union security proviso of subdivision (c) of section 1153 of the Labor Code. Accordingly we shall annul the Board's decision and order and remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with views we shall express in this opinion.

The Administrative Proceedings

The collective bargaining agreements between the UFW and petitioners' employers provided for an annual "Citizenship Participation Day" (CPD), on which workers would receive a paid holiday. The UFW had voted to require its members, as a condition of good standing in the union, to authorize their employers to remit their CPD pay directly to the UFW. (Cf. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (J. Jesus R. Conchola ) (Mar. 19, 1980) 6 ALRB No. 16, p. 3.) In short, workers were required (in petitioners' words) "to give their CPD pay to the UFW in order to keep their jobs." Petitioners' unfair labor practice charges alleged unauthorized use of their CPD pay and a portion of their union dues.

On the basis of these charges a regional director of the Board filed a complaint (Lab.Code, § 1160.2) against the UFW. As subsequently amended, the complaint alleged union unfair labor practices (Lab.Code, § 1154) with respect to the mandatory CPD contributions (Count I) and the dues (Count II), and further alleged that the union had requested or accepted bribes (Lab.Code, § 1155.5) with respect to the CPD contributions (Count III). Counts II and III were subsequently dismissed, over petitioners' objections, by the administrative law officer.

Before Count I went to evidentiary hearing the UFW and the Board's general counsel entered into a written agreement to settle all issues. In its final form the settlement agreement was made subject to the approval of the Board and was to be of no force or effect until so approved. (Cf. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20298, subd. (a).) Petitioners were not parties to the settlement agreement; it was entered into, and ultimately approved, over their objections. Such a "unilateral" settlement is an accepted practice in labor law and is alluded to in the Board's regulations. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20298; cf. 2 Morris, The Developing Labor Law (2d ed. 1983) 1620.)

The process of Board approval of the settlement was protracted. The matter was twice taken to another Court of Appeal which once dismissed it when the Board set aside the order then under review and once remanded it for further Board consideration in light of a new U.S. Supreme Court decision, but never reached the merits. The Board's final approval of the settlement, with Board-ordered modifications, is embodied in the decision and order now before us for review.

The Approved Settlement Agreement

Petitioners have acknowledged they could have been required, even over their objections, to contribute financial support to the UFW's "collective bargaining activities." On the other hand, neither the Board nor the UFW has asserted that an employee who objected could be compelled to support a union's "political activities," and both have acknowledged that an objecting employee would be entitled to a rebate of such portion of his or her union dues and assessments as would otherwise be applied to political activities. Dispute has centered on the propriety of union expenditures, over a member's objections, for activities which are neither clearly political nor clearly for collective bargaining, and on procedures by which objections may be made, disputes resolved, and appropriate rebates paid in particular cases.

The settlement agreement addressed these issues. Here is the text of the pertinent part of the settlement agreement as modified by the Board. Text stricken through (---) was deleted from the settlement agreement, and bracketed and underlined text was added, by Board order:

"(1) Respondent will institute the procedure described in this paragraph and in the attached Notice to Employees by which a union member may object to the use of any dues for activities or causes primarily political in nature. The member may perfect his objection by individually notifying the National Secretary-Treasurer of his objection by registered or certified mail. An objection may be continued from year to year by individual notification given during each annual fourteen (14) day period. The approximate proportion of the member's dues spent for such activities or causes primarily political in nature to which the member objects shall be determined by a committee of the National Executive Board, which shall be appointed by the President, subject to the approval of the National Executive Board. The member will be refunded this proportion of his/her dues. [The noncompellable portion of objecting members' Citizens Participation Day (CPD) dues shall be rebated, with interest, within one year of payment with an accounting of all expenditures deemed compellable for which any CPD dues were retained.] If an objecting member is dissatisfied with the approximate proportional allocation made by the committee of the Board or the disposition of his objection by the National Secretary-Treasurer, the member may appeal directly to the full National Executive Board and the decision of the Board shall be appealable to the Public Review Board or the United Farm Workers constitutional convention at the option of the member. The determination made by the committee of the Board shall be sufficiently detailed and substantiated by documentation so as to allow a member to process a meaningful appeal, should he desire.

"(2) CPD funds collected subsequent to the date of this agreement from objecting members will be placed in an escrow account pending determination of the proportionate refund by the Committee of the National Executive Board.

"(3) ..........................

"(4) ... the parties agree the CPD constitutes dues which may be collected in full, subject to a proportional rebate as outlined in this paragraph."

The UFW represents it has modified its procedure "so that objections may be lodged at any time, and continue from year to year without renewal, until the member withdraws the objection." The UFW's modification is constructive and should be incorporated into the Board's decision and order on remand.

Counsel for petitioners argue primarily that the Board's decision and order does not sufficiently limit union use of objecting members' dues and CPD pay, and does not provide adequate procedural safeguards for members who object to union expenditures. They rely on U.S. Supreme Court decisions culminating in Teachers v. Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066 (Chicago Teachers ). They ask that this court remand the matter to the Board, under clear guidelines, for a more satisfactory order.

Justiciability

No party questions the general rule that the Board's decision and order approving a unilateral settlement agreement made subject to its approval is reviewable in this court. (Lab.Code, § 1160.8; cf. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20298; NLRB v. Food and Commercial Workers (1987) 484 U.S. 112, 120-21, 108 S.Ct. 413, 419, 98 L.Ed.2d 429, 440 (dictum); cf. also Belridge Farms v....

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