Brechbill v. Randall

• Decision Date: 26 May 1885
• Parties: Brechbill v. Randall and others.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

102 Ind. 528

1 N.E. 362

Brechbill

v.Randall and others.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed May 26, 1885.

Appeal from Noble circuit court.

P. V. Huffman, for appellant.

W. L. Penfield, for appellee.

Elliott, J.

If the statute requiring persons who sell or offer for salpatent-rights to file with the clerk of the proper county a duly-authene ticated copy of the letters patent, and an affidavit that the letters are genuine, and have not been revoked or annulled, and that he has authority to sell the right patented, is valid, this judgment must be affirmed, otherwise it must be reversed.

In our opinion the statute is valid, for the reason that in enacting it the legislature exercised a police power resident in the state. The power to make police regulations for the protection of its citizens against fraud and imposition is not taken from the states by the federal constitution, or by any national statute. It has, indeed been authoritatively settled that the national legislature cannot exercise police powers for the protection of the inhabitants of a state. This is a domestic matter, to be governed and regulated by state laws. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12;U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41;U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214;Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113;Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465;Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3;S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.

The state is not inhibited from enacting police regulations which operate upon instrumentalities or articles of commerce, provided no discriminations are made against classes of citizens, and no restrictions are placed upon commercial intercourse. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, supra;Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99;County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691;Munn v. Illinois, supra;Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123;Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36;Cooley v. Board, 12 How. 299;City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102;State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110.

In the case of Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, the doctrine stated was applied to the case of a patented article, and the principle declared in that case rules here. The doctrine of the case just cited was fully approved in Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 562, (see opinion, 565,) and must be deemed the law of this state. We need not inquire whether a statute discriminating against patented articles would or would not be valid, for that is not here the question. We are not, therefore, required to review the cases of Crittenden v. White, 23 Minn. 24; S. C. 23 Amer. Rep. 676; Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; S. C. 22 Amer. Rep. 63; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309; S. C. 26 Amer. Rep. 514. Here there is no discrimination, for the statute simply prescribes a method by which our citizens can secure protection against fraud. The requirement that a record shall be made is not an unreasonable one, nor does it impede the free course of commerce; it simply compels an exhibition of the source of title, and a description of the thing offered for sale. The intangible character of the thing put into market, and its peculiar nature, distinguishes it from other articles of commerce, and it is this that makes necessary laws of a peculiar character. It is the character of the commodity that makes necessary a law applying particularly to it, and not to articles of commerce in general; and in enacting a statute particularly applicable to a thing of a peculiar nature, there is no discrimination, and no obstruction to the free course of commerce. Honest dealers cannot be harmed by such a law, and if dishonest ones are, all the greater the merit of the law.

The answer avers that no copy of the letters-patent was filed, and that no affidavit was made and filed; and it further alleges that the words “given for a patent” were not written in the note. We are not required to decide what the result would be if the answer averred no more than that the words “given for a patent” were not written in the note, for the other allegations in themselves make the answer good. We need not, therefore, determine whether the decision in Helm v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Ind. 167...