Breedon v. Maryland State Dept. of Ed.
Decision Date | 05 March 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 493,493 |
Citation | 411 A.2d 1073,45 Md.App. 73 |
Parties | David B. BREEDON, et ux. v. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Ralph J. Moore, Jr. and N. Frank Wiggins, Washington, D. C., with whom were Cohn & Marks, Washington, D. C., on brief, for appellants.
Ellen M. Heller, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., and Dennis M. Sweeney, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief, for appellee, Maryland State Dept. of Ed.
Richard C. Daniels, Mount Rainer, with whom was Paul M. Nussbaum, Mount Rainer, on brief, for other appellee.
Argued before THOMPSON, MOORE and MELVIN, JJ.
William B. Breedon, the subject of this appeal, is a young man with aphasia, a disorder which renders it exceedingly difficult for him to communicate with the world because language is something which he cannot readily comprehend. 1 This dispute began in 1975 when the school officials of Prince George's County decided that William should be placed in a public school facility. William's parents insisted that continued private schooling would better fulfill his educational needs, and they asked the school officials to pay for his tuition.
While at first glance the case appears to center on the procedural and substantive rights of a handicapped child to a publicly-financed, appropriate education, we perceive from the record a procedural error which diverts us from the merits of William's appeal. The issue which we believe is determinative concerns the power of the circuit court, sitting as a reviewing court under the Administrative Procedure Act 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "APA"), to receive, in open court, additional evidence not offered before the administrative agency. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Levin, J.) held a hearing and received additional evidence on the parents' appeal from an adverse decision of the Hearing Review Board of the Maryland State Department of Education. For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court upholding the departments' action and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
William, who will be twenty years old this spring, has been the object of attentive parental concern since the discovery of his disorder at age four. Until 1967 the Breedon family resided in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. Mrs. Breedon diligently sought out an educational program for William but found that aphasic children were in a virtual no man's land, as she explained to the Hearing Review Board:
After much searching, the Breedons, in 1968, discovered the Children's Hearing and Speech Center at Children's Hospital in the District of Columbia. William was accepted by the center, and the family moved to Maryland. As Mrs. Breedon told the board:
During the next seven years, until the Spring of 1975, William made steady progress to the point where his linguistic ability ranged between a second grade and a sixth grade level, depending upon the nature of the tests and the particular skill being tested. In April 1975, William turned fifteen; he was then considerably older than the other students at Children's. Mrs. Breedon explained to the board why William's educational program necessitated a change:
Thus began the search for a new school for William. 3 On May 22, 1975, a Pupil Personnel Team for the Prince George's County Schools reported that there was no appropriate public school in the county for a young man with William's needs. Mrs. Breedon immediately filed for tuition funding in order to place William at the Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy Institute in the District of Columbia because
In July 1975, a reconstituted Pupil Personnel Team reversed the prior team's conclusion and instead proposed that William be placed at the H. Winship Wheatley Center, a facility for multiply-handicapped children operated by the Prince George's County schools. Formal notice of the Wheatley placement was made on August 27, 1975. Not satisfied with the proposed placement, the Breedons requested a local level hearing. In early September 1975, the Breedons received formal notification that their request for tuition funding for the Kennedy Institute had been denied. Feeling very strongly that Wheatley was inappropriate for an aphasic person whose primary need was growth in linguistic ability, the Breedons enrolled him at Kennedy at their own expense.
Again, in February 1976, the Breedons attempted to convince the Prince George's County School officials that the Wheatley school did not meet William's needs. Their effort to have the Wheatley placement reconsidered was denied on March 12, 1976. Shortly thereafter, on March 19, 1976, a Hearing Panel of the Prince George's County school system (local level hearing) was convened, and it received the testimony of Mrs. Breedon and various experts in the field of special education. Ruling that "William functions as a multiply handicapped youngster," the Hearing Panel stated that the Wheatley "placement was not shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be inappropriate." In addition, the panel concluded that "the Wheatley staff can provide reading, mathematics, and language programs which will reasonably meet William(')s academic needs."
It has been, and continues to be, the Breedons' position that William is chiefly language-impaired. They relegate any motor or behavioral problems to secondary importance and insist that William requires a structural and linguistically-oriented academic program in order to advance his limited capability to comprehend and use the English language. They also contend that William does not function as a multiply-handicapped person, and they allege that the Hearing Panel was wrong in concluding to the contrary.
As provided by the Bylaws of the Maryland State Department of Education, the Breedons appealed to the department's Hearing Review Board (State level hearing). 4 At that de novo hearing, Mrs. Breedon and various experts again testified about William, his language impairment, and his educational needs. Two months later, on August 30, 1976, the board affirmed the decision of the local panel, finding that "William functions educationally as a multiply handicapped child with language impairment being the primary area of disability." The board also ruled that "the Prince George's County Public Schools has an appropriate program that can be modified to meet the needs of your son at the Wheatley Special Education Center."
From that adverse ruling, the Breedons again appealed, this time to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 5 They alleged that the board's decision was "against the weight of competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. . . ." See Md.Ann.Code, art. 41, § 255(f)(5) (1979 Cum.Supp.). In addition, the Breedons argued that no public school facilities, appropriate to William's needs, existed in Prince George's County, and they complained about several alleged procedural deficiencies in the administrative process.
Although the order for appeal was filed on September 29, 1976, a hearing on the merits of the Breedons' allegations was not held until September 18, 1978. 6 At that hearing, Judge Levin received further testimony from Mrs. Breedon as well as the testimony of five experts in the field of special education. 7 The Breedons argued that the board had received erroneous data regarding the mean I.Q. of the Wheatley class to which William would have been assigned, and that the board had compared the Kennedy and Wheatley schools in reaching its decision without giving the Breedons an opportunity to submit comparative evidence.
In a written opinion, Judge Levin affirmed the decision of the Hearing Review Board and denied the Breedons' motion for further relief. 8 He acknowledged that he "considered the additional evidence adduced before (me) in open court pursuant to § 255(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act as propounded (sic) prior to the July 1, 1978 amendment to that section which disallowed production of additional evidence before the Court." Although recognizing the disparity in the I.Q. data presented before the board and the court, he did not find it "so significant to warrant the disturbance of the decision of the State Board." 9 He therefore concluded that the board's decision was "clearly supported by competent, material and substantial evidence that William, as a multiply-handicapped child, would get an appropriate education suitable to his needs at Wheatley." The court's opinion was silent on the comparability issue raised by the Breedons.
On this appeal, the Breedons argue that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review, under either the old or new statutes, 10 and that the Maryland...
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