Breish v. Ring Screw Works

• Decision Date: 23 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 14,14
• Citation: 397 Mich. 586,248 N.W.2d 526
• Parties: Fred W. BREISH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RING SCREW WORKS, Defendant-Appellee. 397 Mich. 586, 248 N.W.2d 526, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2061, 79 Lab.Cas. P 11,753
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 526

248 N.W.2d 526

Fred W. BREISH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RING SCREW WORKS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14.

397 Mich. 586, 248 N.W.2d 526, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2061,

79 Lab.Cas. P 11,753

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 23, 1976.

Edward M. Miller, Birmingham, for plaintiff-appellant.

Hyman & Rice, Stanley H. Slazinski, Southfield, for defendant-appellee.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This case involves a suit by a discharged employee against his former employer for breach of a collective bargaining contract. The employee exhausted the contractual grievance procedure. At each applicable step of the procedure, the employer denied the employee's grievance. Under the terms of the collective bargaining contract, the 'final' decision on the merits of the employee's grievance was, effectively, recourse to a strike by his union. The union voted not to strike over his complaint. We are asked to decide whether the strike vote was the employee's sole and exclusive mode of legal redress, thereby precluding him from maintaining a breach-of-contract suit against the employer.

The federal labor law on this question mandates that judicial review of a 'final' decision on the merits of an aggrieved employee's complaint is barred unless the final step of the grievance procedure is inadequate to provide a procedurally fair decision. In this case, the 'final' determination of the merits of the discharged employee's complaint was the strike vote by his fellow union members. The effect of this procedure is that the decision of whether an employee should be discharged from his employment is dependent on whether those adjudging the merits of his claim choose to imperil their own economic status; those desiring to rule in favor of the discharged employee would pay the price of giving up their own jobs. We believe such a 'final' merits determination is contrary to the federal labor law. We hold, therefore, that such a 'final' decision on the merits of the employee's grievance does not bar the employee from maintaining a breach-of-contract suit against his former employer. We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand to the trial court for consideration of the suit on its merits.

I--FACTS

Plaintiff-Appellant Breish was discharged from his employment by Defendant-Appellee Ring Screw Works on June 1, 1971 for alleged theft of company property, a small can of cleaner valued at less than one dollar ($1.00). Ring Screw Works discharged Breish for what it considered 'just cause,' pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time between Ring Screw Works and UAW Local 771. ¹

That collective bargaining agreement included the following grievance procedure:

'ARTICLE IV

'GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

'Section 1. Should a difference arise between the Company and the Union, or its members employed by the Company as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the agreement, an earnest effort will be made to settle it as follows:

'Step 1. Between the employee, his steward, and the foreman of his department. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then

'Step 2. Between the Shop Committee, with or without the employee, and the Company management. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then

'Step 3. The Shop Committee and the Company may call in an outside representative to assist in settling the difficulty.

'Section 2. (a) Grievances alleging an unjust or discriminatory discharge must be submitted in writing to the foreman involved within two (2) working days of the discharge. The Company must render a final decision through the grievance procedure within four (4) working days of the receipt of such grievance.

'(b) Any employee who, as the result of such grievance is reinstated, shall be paid by the Company for the time which he would otherwise have worked for the Company and shall be returned to his regular job at his previous rate.

'Section 3. The Company shall not consider the grievance of any individual employee unless it is presented in writing under the grievance procedure within five (5) working days of their (sic) occurrence, excepting discharges which are governed by the preceding section.

'Section 4. Members of the Shop Committee and Chief Stewards shall be allowed the necessary time to adjust grievances.

'Section 5. An agreement reached between the Company and the Shop Committee under the grievance procedure shall be binding on all employees affected and cannot be changed by any individual.'

In addition to the grievance procedure, the collective bargaining agreement included a provision which permitted the union to strike if and when 'all negotiations have failed through the grievance procedure set forth herein.' ²

Breish filed a grievance three days after he was discharged. Ring Screw Works accepted the grievance, which was subsequently processed through the grievance procedure Supra. Ring Screw Works denied Breish's grievance at each applicable step of the grievance procedure. On September 19, 1971, Breish submitted his grievance to the Local Union membership for a strike vote. The Union membership voted to not strike over Breish's grievance; the vote was ten (10) 'yes,' twenty-seven (27) 'no.' Breish appealed the result of the strike vote to the UAW Convention Appeals Committee, as was his right under UAW International procedures. The UAW Convention Appeals Committee unanimously upheld the Local Union's strike vote. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 31--35.

After Breish exhausted the applicable steps of the grievance procedure without resolution of his grievance (and before Breish took his grievance to the union membership for a strike vote) Breish sued Ring Screw Works and UAW Local 771 in Oakland County Circuit Court on July 21, 1971. The defendant union had the action removed to the United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division) on August 20, 1971. On Breish's motion, the 'separate and independent * * * claims * * * against Ring Screw Works * * *' were remanded to the Oakland County Circuit Court August 22, 1972. Appellant's Appendix, p. 21.

On October 10, 1973 the Federal District Court, per Judge Kennedy, granted the union its motion for summary judgment. The court found, as a matter of law, that even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Breish, the union did not breach its duty of fair representation toward Breish as Breish had alleged. Appellant's Appendix, p. 45.

After the Federal Court decision, Ring Screw Works moved for summary judgment on the breach-of-contract suit before the Oakland County circuit court. On January 31, 1974 the court granted the motion for the reason that (Appellant's Appendix, p. 54):

'The case of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842) (1967) clearly indicates that, in cases such as the one presently before this court, the employee bears the burden of establishing that he was unjustly discharged And that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.'

Breish appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding but did so 'for different reasons.' 59 Mich.App. 464, 466, 229 N.W.2d 806 (1975). The Court rejected the circuit court's conclusion that Breish was precluded from bringing his action because the union had not breached its duty of fair representation toward Breish. ³ Instead, the court perceived 'the primary question' to be 'whether a union employee may resort to the courts where, having been discharged, the collective bargaining agreement provides no right to arbitration of the dispute.' 59 Mich.App. 464, 468, 229 N.W.2d 806, 808. The court answered this 'primary question' negatively, holding:

'The many Federal cases here cited * * * lead us to the conclusion that where the contract provides a method of resolving grievances in a final and binding manner, the fact that arbitration is not used as a method of resolving disputes does not allow the parties automatic access to the courts.'

59 Mich.App. 464, 470, 229 N.W.2d 806, 809.

Breish applied for leave to appeal. This Court granted leave August 19, 1975.

II--CONTEXT OF FEDERAL LABOR LAW

The issue in this case is narrow: we are asked to decide whether the strike vote of plaintiff's union, effectively the culminating step under the contractual grievance procedure, is plaintiff's sole and exclusive mode of legal redress, thus barring him from maintaining a breach-of-contract suit against defendant.

Although this might appear to be a simple, routine case on the surface, its resolution brings into play a broad spectrum of complex federal labor relations law. ⁴ An essential reason for this legal complexity is that the contract grievance procedure at issue is quite uncommon in the context of labor relations law. ⁵ According to one reputable estimate, ninety-six percent of the collective bargaining contracts in the United States include comprehensive contract grievance procedures culminating in final and binding arbitration; ⁶ most legal questions pertaining to the 'finality' of a culminating step of a grievance procedure therefore revolve around the 'finality' of arbitration decisions. Thus in the instant case we must interpret federal law with respect to a relatively unique issue, an issue which we note, has never been directly decided by the United States Supreme Court.

Because of the legal complexities involved, we believe it necessary, as an initial measure, to briefly discuss and define the applicable context of federal labor law in which the issue arises. In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), the United States Supreme Court declared that under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act individual employees have the right and standing to sue on collective bargaining contracts negotiated between their union and their employer. ⁷ Subsequent to Smith, the Court circumscribed this broadly stated right of employees to sue under § 301. Accordingly, in Republic Steel...